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Introduction
Leo Hendrik Baekeland, born in 1863, was always at the head of
his class. He graduated at sixteen and received his doctor's degree
maxima cum laude when he was still only twenty-one. By 1891, he
had opened an oce in the US as an independent consultant and
invented a type of photographic paper that could be developed
under articial light. In 1899, Leo Baekeland was still struggling
with his Velox photosensitive manufacturing business.
One day he received an invitation letter from George Eastman-
Kodak, who had established the Eastman Kodak Company in
Rochester, New York. George suggested that if Baekeland was
willing to sell his Velox manufacturing company, he was welcome to
visit him for a talk. During the long carriage ride up to Rochester,
Baekeland planned to ask for $50,000, but kept wondering if he
would be able to get even $25,000 for his manufacturing process.
George Eastman invited Leo Baekeland into his oce, and fortu-
nately for Baekeland, Eastman spoke rst and right away oered
him one million dollars. Baekeland immediately took the oer. He
could now aord to do his research in a well-equipped laboratory
and went on to invent the rst plastic, Bakelite.
I. Asimov. Asimov's Biographical Encyclopedia of Science and
Technology: The Lives and Achievements of 1195 Great Scientists
from Ancient Times to the Present, Chronologically Arranged,
Second Revised Edition. Equinox book. Doubleday, 1982;
and R.R. Gehani. Management of Technology and Operations.
Wiley, 1998.
11.1 Negotiation
Negotiation is a core activity in human society to form alliances, to reach trade agree-
ments, and to resolve conicts. One cannot overstate the importance of negotiation
and the centrality it has taken in our everyday lives. People negotiate everywhere,
in business as well as their personal lives [203], mostly without realizing they do
so [214]. Negotiation not only occurs in obvious instances, such as job negotiation,
politics, acquiring a house, or haggling at the marketplace. We also use it in various
everyday situations, such as setting a calendar date with a friend, asking for a refund,
or agreeing on a deadline.
The eld of negotiation is an important topic of research in economics [189, 202],
articial intelligence [95, 123, 148, 149, 157, 230], game theory [36, 95, 123, 157, 189,
199, 217], and social psychology [216]. The last two decades have seen a growing
interest in the automation of negotiation and e-negotiation systems [34, 98, 123,
136, 149], for example in the setting of e-commerce [38, 104, 144, 169]. This interest
is fueled by the promise of automated agents being able to negotiate on behalf of
human negotiators, and to nd better outcomes than human negotiators [38, 69, 119,
161, 169, 191].
Negotiation agents can alleviate some of the eorts required of people during nego-
tiations and make negotiation problems more manageable and comprehensible for
negotiators [62]. The potential benets of automation include the reduced time and
negotiation costs resulting from automation [47, 48, 49, 169], the potential increase in
negotiation usage since the user can avoid social confrontation [41, 169], the ability to
improve the negotiation skills of the user [111, 161, 166], and the possibility of nding
more interesting deals by exploration of the outcome space [111, 169]. There are also
many unexpected uses of automated negotiation; for example controlling the load in
an electrical grid [122], locating available parking spaces [183], playing Civilization
IV [1], routing telephone calls [214], or Mars rovers coordinating autonomously who
is better equipped for a given task [58]. Thus, success in developing an automated
agent with negotiation capabilities has great advantages and implications.
1.2 An Automated Negotiator
Automated negotiation research deals with two main topics [123, 145], which both
have received their fair share of attention in the eld.
From a system design or mechanism design point of view, devising an eective nego-
tiation protocol is the most important concern (e.g. [81, 117, 214, 253]). Negotiation
protocols are the set of rules that govern the way the negotiation takes place. This
covers the number of participants and the valid actions of the participants in every
particular negotiation state (e.g., which messages can be sent by whom, to whom,
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e.g., protocol, domain, preferences, time.
Negotiating Agent Opponent(s)
send and 
receive actions
Figure 1.1: The setting for an automated negotiator.
and at what stage). It also species the structure of the possible agreements, and
what operations are allowed to change the contents of proposed oers.
In other cases, such as in this thesis, the agent's decision making model is the
dominant concern (e.g. [149, 224, 229]). The main focus here is on the reasoning
modules and strategies that the negotiating agents employ to make their decision
in order to achieve their objectives. When the protocol is such that it leaves room
for strategic reasoning, the success of a self-interested agent is determined by the
eectiveness of its decision making model.
In order to be successful, a negotiating agent needs to be able to perform a variety
of tasks. First of all, the agent needs to be able to interact with the others in a
given negotiation setting that denes the dierent parameters of the negotiation
(see Figure 1.1). During negotiation, the agent exchanges proposals with the other
participants in order to reach an acceptable agreement, which is a contract that all
negotiating parties agree upon. The range of contracts being negotiated over (i.e.,
the set of all possible negotiation outcomes) is called the negotiation domain. Of
course, the proposals must be submitted according to certain rules and be valid
according to constraints set by the negotiation protocol. Every agent has preferences
over the negotiation domain, which dene the particular negotiation scenario.
The agent designer can select a number of performance measures to assess the success
of a negotiating agent. The most popular way is to assign a certain utility to the
outcomes that are reached by the agent. Other measures that the agent designer
might choose are the duration of the negotiation (i.e., how fast the agent is able to
reach agreements), or fairness of the outcome (i.e., whether the agreement satises
all negotiation parties).
31.2.1 Generic Negotiation Strategies
With the constant introduction of new negotiation domains, negotiating agents may
encounter dierent types of opponents with dierent characteristics. Therefore, an
important research topic in automated negotiation is the design of agents that can
perform well in a variety of circumstances. Such generic automated negotiation
agents should be capable of negotiating prociently within arbitrary negotiation
scenarios, with opponents that are diverse in their behavior.
A number of automated negotiation strategies have been proposed that are designed to
operate in specic and relatively simple scenarios and are often based on simplifying
assumptions (e.g., [76, 79, 117, 125, 150, 166]). A typical example of such an
assumption is that the opponent strategies and preferences are known or partially
known. This is generally unrealistic, as negotiators tend to avoid revealing their
private information [37], because the shared information may be used to the revealer's
disadvantage [182].
Examples of more general agent negotiators are increasingly available in the literature.
Every year, automated negotiation agents are improving in various ways and have
proven to be successful in many regards (for an exposition, see Chapter 2 and
Appendix B). They all have their unique strengths and weaknesses and are based on
a variety of techniques, such as game-trees [128], generic trade-o algorithms [76, 125],
concession curves [75, 83], statistical analysis [131, 132], wavelet decomposition [54,
56, 53], and Gaussian process regression [258, 261, 263].
Each technique is used for various aspects of the negotiation process, such as prefer-
ence learning, strategy prediction, making concessions, or choosing when to accept.
However, when testing the performance of the resulting agents, varying performance
measures for the negotiation outcome are used, but their inner components are not
inspected. This makes it very dicult to meaningfully compare the agents, let alone
their underlying techniques. As a result, we lack a reliable way to pinpoint the most
eective constituents of a negotiating agent. This makes it virtually impossible to
determine the reasons for an agent's success or to provide incremental improvement
over existing agent designs.
To put it succinctly:
Problem
We lack a fundamental approach to build comparably eective, general auto-
mated negotiators in an incremental fashion that enables us to understand how
their underlying techniques inuence their performance.
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Negotiation Strategy Space
Bidding 
Strategies
What concessions to 
make?
Opponent Modeling 
Techniques
What does the opponent 
want?
Acceptance 
Strategies
Should we accept or 
reject?
b1
b2 o1
o2
o3 a1
a2
a3
s1
s2 s3 s4 s5
s6
Figure 1.2: The strategy space of automated negotiators can be explored by combining
a bidding strategy with an opponent model and an acceptance strategy.
1.3 Bidding, Learning, and Accepting
There is a wide variety of currently existing sophisticated agent strategies and
architectures, but we show in this thesis that there is some common structure to
their overall design. For example, every agent decides whether the opponent's oer
is acceptable, and if not, what oer should be proposed instead. In addition, when
the agent decides on the counter-oer, it considers its own utility, but it usually also
takes the opponent's utility into account. We elaborate on this topic in Chapter 3,
but for now it suces to say that we distinguish three distinct components of a
negotiating agent strategy, each of which we analyze separately in this thesis:
 Bidding strategy. Given the current negotiation state, what are the appro-
priate bids to be made?
 Opponent model. How can we learn what the opponent wants, and how do
we take this into account?
 Acceptance strategy. Should we accept the opponent's bid, reject it, or walk
away from the negotiation altogether?
5There are two major advantages of distinguishing between the dierent components
of a negotiating agent's strategy: rst, given performance measures for the individual
components, it allows the study of the behavior and performance of the components
in isolation. For example, it becomes possible to compare the accuracy of the
opponent modeling components of a set of agents, and to pinpoint the best opponent
model among them. Second, we can assemble, from already existing components,
new negotiating agents in a plug and play fashion (see Fig. 1.2), e.g.: replacing the
opponent model of an agent and then examining whether this makes a dierence in
performance. Such a procedure enables us to combine the individual components to
systematically explore the space of possible negotiation strategies. Finding a good
negotiating strategy then boils down to deciding what to bid, how to learn, and when
to accept.
Due to possible dependencies between the components, the agent should be able
to combine them in a meaningful way; e.g., purposely selecting `exploratory oers'
to learn more about the opponent's preferences, or considering the opponent's
future behavior when deciding whether to accept the opponent's bid. This means
that in order to be successful, a negotiating agent should not only have the three
components work eectively in an individual manner, but the agent also needs a
powerful architecture with which to assemble the components into a negotiation
strategy.
1.4 Research Questions
The advantages of a component-based approach for an automated negotiator as
outlined above have motivated our concrete research aim as follows:
Thesis aim
The central aim of this thesis is to research eective ways for a general automated
negotiating strategy to learn, to bid, and to accept and to develop a compositional
approach for evaluating and combining these components.
Note that our thesis aim consists of two separate aspects: creating a component-based
approach, and using it to analyze and devise the components. That is, our aim
involves both a design and an analysis point of view that together contribute to a
more methodological approach for automated negotiation research. We will treat
both aspects separately and formulate a set of research questions for each of them.
61.4.1 Designing a component-based automated negotiation
framework
To develop a compositional approach to evaluate and combine the components, we
need to design a negotiation environment that supports negotiation analysis and
that implements benchmarks for general automated negotiating strategies and their
components. In particular, we need to establish an agent decision making architecture
capable component-based negotiation behavior. For this, we need to understand how
the bidding, learning and accepting components of a negotiating agent relate to each
other and how to combine them in an eective way. Also, given the availability of
state of the art negotiation strategies, an important consideration is that existing
agent designs can be incorporated into our approach.
Thus, in order to achieve the design aspect of our aim, we address the following
questions:
Research Questions I
Designing a component-based automated negotiation framework.
How do we create a negotiation framework that:
1. supports new agent designs and provides insight into the eectiveness of
negotiation strategies;
2. facilitates evaluating and combining various negotiation strategy compo-
nents;
3. enables us to decompose existing, state of the art agent designs into distinct
components.
1.4.2 Analyzing the negotiating strategy components
To analyze the components individually, it is necessary to formulate benchmarks
and predictors for the performance of the individual components. The performance
measures for the bidding strategy, opponent model, and acceptance strategy are
likely to be dierent for each case. With performance measures for every component,
we can specify solutions separately in a plug and play fashion. We will consider
specic situations (and specic classes of opponents in particular) for which we can
nd eective solutions, and in some cases, even optimal ones.
Of course, after analyzing the components individually, we need to consider what
happens if we assemble them again, and whether combining eective components also
improves the overall performance. There could be strong interdependency between
7the components, and some components can prove to be more important to consider
than others.
We formulate three additional questions regarding the analysis aspect of our research
aim:
Research Questions II
Analyzing the negotiating strategy components: what to bid, how to
learn, and when to accept.
1. What measures can we use to compare and predict the performance of the
individual components?
2. Can we pinpoint classes of opponents against which we can nd eec-
tive components? Can we formulate optimal solutions for any of the
components?
3. How does the performance of the components inuence the negotiator's
performance as a whole, and which components are most important?
1.5 Thesis scope
Before we describe our research method to answer our research questions, we briey
frame the scope of our work. We will elaborate extensively on our model of negotiation
(and on related possibilities) in Chapter 2.
This thesis focuses on bilateral negotiations (i.e., negotiations between two agents),
in which the agents exchange oers in turns. While the negotiation domain is known
by both agents, the preferences of each player is private information. The agents
seek to reach an agreement while aiming to satisfy their own preferences.
The heart of this thesis consists of the analysis of decision making procedures for a
negotiating agent in such a setting. More specically, if we adhere to the classication
used by Lomuscio et al. [169], the focus of this thesis is as follows:
Thesis scope
This thesis focuses on one-to-one negotiations with alternating oers on multiple-
issue domains, using self-interested agents with bounded rationality and incom-
plete information.
81.6 Dissertation Outline
We give a detailed overview of this thesis in the paragraphs below (see also Figure 1.3).
A summary is available at the end of this section.
Quick read guide
For the reader in a hurry, we suggest the following quick read guide for this
thesis:
1. Skip the Background chapter entirely, but read the summaries of Ap-
pendix A about Genius (p.241) and Appendix B about ANAC (p.251).
2. Read the full chapter about the BOA framework (Chapter 3, p.51).
3. Choose one chapter for each component of the BOA framework. We
recommend Chapter 5 on optimal acceptance policies (p.89), Chapter 7
on performance and accuracy of learning methods (p.127), and Chapter 8
on the classication of bidding strategies (p.147).
4. Read Section 10.4 (p.191) on how the BOA components t together.
5. End with our concluding chapter (p.201).
1.6.1 The Fundamentals
We start Chapter 2 by briey discussing the background and related work in auto-
mated negotiation. We give denitions of the basic terminology used in negotiation
literature and we discuss prime examples of existing automated negotiation architec-
tures and strategies. We focus specically on existing bidding strategies, opponent
models and acceptance strategies, and on combining a set of components to explore
the negotiation strategy space.
We conclude the background chapter by describing several methodologies for evalu-
ating and comparing negotiation strategies and components. Among our discussed
evaluation methods are performance and accuracy measures, agent competitions,
and analytical software to assess the outcome of the negotiation. We conclude with
a discussion of several evaluation methodologies of negotiation strategies, with an
emphasis on performance and accuracy measures.
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Validation
BOA framework 3
A O B
Genius
ANAC
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B
8, 9
10
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Figure 1.3: A graphical representation of the outline of this thesis. Genius (Ap-
pendix A) lays the groundwork for ANAC (Appendix B), and the BOA framework
(Chapter 3) builds on top of both of them. In turn, all three support the pillars to
component analysis of Bidding (Chapter 8 and 9), Opponent modeling (Chapter 6
and 7), and Accepting (Chapter 4 and 5). We put the pieces together in Chapter 10,
culminating in the validation of the BOA framework (Chapter 11).
101.6.2 The BOA Architecture
Chapter 3 describes the BOA architecture, in which we can develop and integrate
the dierent components of a negotiating agent into one negotiating strategy. We
use the BOA architecture to explore the space of possible strategies by studying and
recombining dierent state of the art strategy components.
The BOA architecture is integrated seamlessly into a generic negotiation environment
called Genius (Appendix A), which is a exible software environment that facilitates
the design, evaluation and analysis of negotiation strategies. Genius provides full
support for a diversity of dierent negotiation protocols, scenarios, and agents, which
we amend with analytical tools and various existing agents, negotiation scenarios,
and protocols from literature. The implementation of the BOA architecture oers the
user the ability to create and combine newly developed components using a graphical
user interface.
To explore the negotiation strategy space of the negotiation research community,
we require a variety of dierent state of the art negotiating agents, and we need to
formulate objective evaluation criteria for them. Appendix B describes the organi-
zation and insights gained from four instances of a yearly international negotiation
competition (ANAC) held between 2010 and 2013 in conjunction with the Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).
ANAC acts as an evaluation tool for negotiation strategies, and encourages the design
of negotiation strategies and scenarios. Moreover, through ANAC we learn new,
improved approaches to eective agent designs, which are accessible as benchmarks
for the negotiation research community. We organize the competition, but we also
participate in it, through which we foster our ties with the automated negotiation
community. The agents, domains, and scores of ANAC are used in most chapters of
this thesis and are discussed in detail in Appendix C{F.
With Genius, ANAC and the BOA architecture in place, we embark on the task to
re-implement more than 20 agents from literature and ANAC and to decouple them
to t into the BOA architecture without introducing any changes in their behavior.
This enables us to do two things: rst of all, it allows us to independently analyze
the components of every decoupled negotiation strategy; second, we can proceed to
mix and match dierent BOA components to create new negotiation strategies. Such
a procedure makes it possible to systematically search for an eective automated
negotiator.
1.6.3 Analyzing the Components of an Automated Negotia-
tor
In Chapter 4{9, we focus on the rst benet of the BOA architecture: seeking out
the best of each BOA component. For each of the three components, we nd and
11analyze the best ones for specic cases, and in the case of bidding and acceptance
strategies, we devise optimal ways of doing so.
In Chapter 4, we study and classify all current approaches regarding acceptance
strategies, and we pinpoint the ones that perform best, together with reasons why
they work well. In Chapter 5, we adopt a more principled approach by applying
optimal stopping theory to calculate the optimal decision on the acceptance of an
oer.
We study the performance of a variety of dierent opponent models in Chapter 6,
identifying the best preference learning techniques. We consider opponent models
from both a performance and an accuracy perspective in Chapter 7, and we pinpoint
the accuracy measures that are the best predictors for good performance of opponent
modeling techniques.
Finally, we take two dierent approaches to gain more insight into eective bidding
strategies. In Chapter 8, we present a new classication method for negotiation
strategies, based on their pattern of concession making, and we formulate guidelines
on how agents should bid in order to be successful. We focus on optimal bidding
strategies in Chapter 9. We apply optimal stopping theory again, this time to nd
concession sequences that maximize the utility for the bidder against particular
opponents. We show there is an interesting connection between optimal bidding and
optimal acceptance strategies, in the sense that they are mirrored versions of each
other.
1.6.4 Putting the Pieces Together
Lastly, after analyzing all components separately, we put the pieces back together
again in Chapter 10, showing that the BOA framework leads to signicant improve-
ments in agent design. We win ANAC 2013, which had 19 participating teams
from 8 international institutions, with an agent that is designed using the BOA
framework and is informed by our analysis of the dierent components. We take all
BOA components accumulated so far, including the best ones, and combine them all
together to explore the space of negotiation strategies. We test the performance of
every component and perform statistical analysis to see whether the best components
together lead to the best agent, and which components contribute most signicantly
to the end result.
12Dissertation outline summary
1. Design a component-based negotiation architecture (BOA);
2. Establish a negotiation environment (Genius) and integrate the BOA
architecture in it;
3. Organize a negotiation competition (ANAC);
4. Fit existing, state of the art negotiating agents (including ANAC agents)
into the BOA framework;
5. Analyze and optimize all BOA components independently;
6. Recombine the BOA components, evaluate the component contributions,
and benchmark the resulting agents.
7. Validate the BOA framework and demonstrate its value by winning ANAC
2013 with a BOA agent.
131.7 Contributions
The most important contributions of this thesis are listed below. We elaborate on
each contribution in our conclusions in Chapter 11.
Contributions
1. Introducing a component-based negotiation architecture to systematically
explore the space of automated negotiation strategies. (Chapter 3)
2. Developing design, evaluation and benchmarking methods for negotiation
agents. (Appendix A and B)
3. Classifying and comparing acceptance strategies and formulating optimal
acceptance strategies. (Chapter 4 and 5)
4. Identifying the most eective and accurate learning methods, and de-
termining the best methods to predict their performance. (Chapter 6
and 7)
5. Formulating optimal bidding strategies and categorizing concession behav-
ior. (Chapter 8 and 9)
6. Quantifying the importance and interactions of the components of a
negotiating agent. (Chapter 10)
7. Validating the BOA architecture and demonstrating its success in exploring
the negotiation space. (Chapter 10 and 11)
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Background
In this chapter, we discuss briey the background and related work in automated nego-
tiation. We begin with denitions of the key aspects of automated negotiation, such as
the negotiation domain, the protocol, and the preferences. We discuss what it means for a
negotiating agent to employ a negotiation strategy and we highlight several prime examples
of existing negotiation strategies. We also discuss a number of high-level negotiation
architectures and how they can assist in exploring the negotiation strategy space. We focus
specically on the three components we distinguish in the Chapter 1, namely the various
ways in which current negotiation strategies bid, learn, and accept.
We conclude the background chapter by describing several methodologies for evaluating
and comparing negotiation strategies and components. Among our discussed evaluation
methods are performance and accuracy measures, agent competitions, and analytical
software to assess the outcome of the negotiation.
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202.1 Introduction
Negotiation is a common and important process for making decisions and resolving
conicts. People encounter negotiation situations everywhere, from specic situations
such as job negotiations and hostage crises situations [147] to more general situations
such as resource and task allocation mechanisms [222, 227, 234], conict resolution
mechanisms [63, 273], and decentralized information services [149, 240].
In recent years, the fact that negotiation covers many aspects of our lives has led to
an increasing focus on the design of automated negotiators; i.e., autonomous agents
capable of negotiating with other agents in a specic environment [123, 149]. This
interest has been growing since the beginning of the 1980s with the work of early
adopters such as Smith's Contract Net Protocol [234], Sycara's persuader [241, 239],
Robinson's oz [209], and the work by Rosenschein [215] and Klein [140].
In this chapter, we discuss briey the background and related work in automated
negotiation. We will begin with denitions of the basic terminology used in this eld
in Section 2.2. In the subsequent section (2.3), we discuss several prime examples
of existing negotiation strategies and their architecture. In Section 2.4 we discuss
several ways of evaluating negotiation strategies.
2.2 Terminology
The dening elements of a bilateral negotiation are depicted in Figure 2.1. A bilateral
automated negotiation concerns a negotiation between two agents, usually called A
and B. The party that is negotiated with is also called the partner or opponent.
The negotiation setting consists of the negotiation protocol { the rules of encounter
{, the negotiating agents, and the negotiation scenario. The negotiation takes place
in a negotiation domain, which species all possible outcomes (the so-called outcome
space). Furthermore, every agent in the scenario has a preference prole, which
expresses the preference relations between the possible outcomes. Together, this
denes the negotiation scenario that takes place between the agents. The negotiation
scenario and protocol specify the possible actions an agent can perform in a given
negotiation state.
2.2.1 Negotiation Domain
The negotiation domain { or outcome space { is denoted by 
 and denes the
set of possible negotiation outcomes. The domain size is the number of possible
outcomes j
j. A negotiation domain consists of one or more issues, which are the
main resources or considerations that need to be resolved through negotiation; for
21Figure 2.1: Overview of the dening elements of an automated bilateral negotiation.
example, the price or the color of a car that is for sale. Issues are also sometimes
referred to as attributes, but we reserve the latter term for opponent attributes, which
are properties that may be useful to model to gain an advantage in a negotiation.
To reach an agreement, the agents must settle on a specic alternative or value
for each negotiated issue. That is, an agreement on n issues is an outcome that is
accepted by both parties of the form ! = h!1;:::;!ni, where !i denotes a value
associated with the ith issue. We will focus mainly on settings with a nite set of
discrete values per issue. A partial agreement is an agreement on a subset of the
issues. We say that an outcome space dened by a single issue is a single-issue
negotiation, and a multi-issue negotiation otherwise.
2.2.2 Negotiation Protocol
A negotiation protocol xes the rules of encounter [214], specifying which actions
each agent can perform at any given moment. Put another way, it species the
admissible negotiation moves. There are a number of bilateral negotiation protocols.
We do not aim to provide a complete overview of all protocols, instead we refer
to Lomuscio et al. [169] for an overview of high-level parameters used to classify
them, and to Marsa-Maestre et al. [173] for guidelines on how to choose the most
appropriate protocol to a particular negotiation problem.
An often used negotiation protocol in bilateral automated negotiation is the alter-
nating oers protocol [190, 217]. This protocol dictates that the two negotiating
agents propose outcomes, also called bids or oers, in turns. That is, the agents
create a bidding history: one agent proposes an oer, after which the other agent
proposes a counter-oer, and this process is repeated until the negotiation is nished,
for example by time running out, or by one of the parties accepting.
22We use the alternating oers protocol throughout this thesis because of its simplicity,
and moreover, it is a protocol which is widely studied and used in the literature,
both in game-theoretic and heuristic settings (a non-exhaustive list includes [83, 149,
151, 189, 190]).
An important feature that dierentiates protocols is their usage and denition of
the deadline of a negotiation. The deadline of a negotiation refers to the time before
which an agreement must be reached to achieve an outcome better than the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement [202]. Each agent can have its own private
deadline, or the deadline can be shared among the agents. The deadline may be
specied as a maximum number of rounds [235], or alternatively as a real-time target.
Note that when the negotiation happens in real time, the time required to reach
an agreement depends on the deliberation time of the agents (i.e., the amount of
computation required to evaluate an oer and produce a counter oer).
As in [82, 229], we supplement the alternating-oers protocol with a common global
real time line, represented here by T = [0;D]. We stipulate that the deadline has
been reached when t = D, at which moment both agents receive utility 0.
We represent by xt
A!B the negotiation outcome proposed by agent A to agent B at
time t. A negotiation thread or negotiation trace (cf. [75, 229]) between two agents
A and B at time t 2 T is dened as a nite sequence
H
t
A$B :=
 
x
t1
p1!p2;x
t2
p2!p3;x
t3
p3!p4;:::;x
tn
pn!pn+1

;
where
1. The oers are ordered over time T : tk  tl for k  l.
2. The oers are alternating between the agents: pk = pk+2 2 fA;Bg for all k.
3. All ti represent instances of time T , with tn  t,
4. The agents exchange complete oers: xtk
pk!pk+1 2 
 for k 2 f1;:::;ng.
Additionally, the last element of Ht
A$B may be equal to one of the particles
fAccept;Endg. We will say a negotiation thread is active if this is not the case.
When agent A receives an oer xt
B!A from agent B sent at time t, it has to decide
at a later time t0 > t whether to accept the oer, or to send a counter-oer xt0
A!B.
Given a negotiation thread Ht
A$B between agents A and B, we can express the action
performed by A with a decision function [82, 229]. The resulting action is used to
extend the current negotiation thread between the two agents. If the agent does not
accept the current oer, and the deadline has not been reached, it will prepare a
counter-oer by using a negotiation strategy or tactic to generate new values for the
negotiable issues (see Section 2.3).
Various alternative versions of the alternating oers protocol have been used in
automated negotiation, extending the default protocol, and imposing additional
constraints; for example, in a variant called the monotonic concession protocol [186,
23214], agents are required to initially disclose information about their preference order
associated with each issue and the oers proposed by each agent must be a sequence
of concessions, i.e.: each consecutive oer has less utility for the agent than the
previous one. Other examples are the three protocols discussed by Fatima et al. [80]
that dier in the way the issues are negotiated: simultaneously in bundles, in parallel
but independently, and sequentially. The rst alternative is shown to lead to the
highest quality outcomes. A nal example is relevant for our work in Chapter 9 on
optimal concession curves, namely a protocol in which only one oer can be made.
In such a situation, the negotiation can be seen as an instance of the ultimatum
game, in which a player proposes a deal that the other player may only accept or
refuse [233]. In [221], a similar bargaining model is explored as well; that is, models
with one-sided incomplete information and one sided oers. It investigates the role of
confrontation in negotiations and uses optimal stopping is to decide whether or not
to invoke conict. The setting of Chapter 9 can also be found in [3], which presents
an alternating oer protocol for bilateral bargaining with imperfect information and
deadline constraints.
2.2.3 Preference Proles
Negotiating agents are assumed to have a preference prole, which is a preference
order  that ranks the outcomes in the outcome space. Together with the domain
they make up the negotiation scenario.
An outcome !1 is said to be weakly preferred over an outcome !2 if !1  !2. If in
addition !2 6 !1, then !1 is strictly preferred over !2, denoted !1 > !2. An agent is
said to be indierent between two outcomes if !1  !2 and !2  !1. In that case, we
also say that these outcomes are equally valued. An indierence curve or iso-curve is
a set of outcomes that are equally valued by an agent. In a total preference order,
one outcome is always (weakly) preferred over the other outcome for any outcome
pair, which means there are no undened preference relations. Finally, an outcome !
is Pareto optimal if there exists no outcome !0 that is preferred by an agent without
making another agent worse o [202]. For two players A and B with respective
preference orders A and B, this means that there is no outcome !0 such that:
(!
0 >A ! ^ !
0 B !) _ (!
0 >B ! ^ !
0 A !):
An outcome that is Pareto optimal is also said to be Pareto ecient. When an
outcome is not Pareto ecient, there is potential, through re-negotiation, to reach a
more preferred outcome for at least one of the agents without reducing the value for
the other.
A preference prole may be specied as a list of ordering relations, but it is more
common in literature to express the agent's preferences by a utility function. A
utility function assigns a utility value to every possible outcome, where a higher value
means the outcome is more preferred. Some learning techniques make additional
24assumptions about the structure of the utility function [133], the most common being
that the utility of a multi-issue outcome is calculated by means of a linear additive
function that evaluates each issue separately [133, 202, 203]. Hence, the contribution
of every issue to the utility is linear and does not depend on the values of other
issues. The utility u(!) of an outcome ! = h!1;:::;!ni 2 
 can be computed as a
weighted sum from evaluation functions ei(!i) as follows:
u(!) =
n X
i=1
wi  ei(!i); (2.1)
where the wi are normalized weights (i.e.
P
wi = 1). Linear additive utility functions
make explicit that dierent issues can be of dierent importance to a negotiating
agent and can be used to eciently calculate the utility of a bid at the cost of
expressive power, as they cannot represent interaction eects (or dependencies)
between issues.
A common alternative is to make use of non-linear utility functions to capture more
complex relations between oers at the cost of additional computational complexity.
Examples of this type of work can be found in [118, 139, 170, 210], where multiple
inter-dependent issues are considered, with very large utility spaces as a result.
In our setting, both the domain and preferences stay xed during a single negotiation
encounter, but while the domain is common knowledge to the negotiating parties,
the preferences of each player is private information. This means that the players
do not have access to the utility function of the opponent. In more detail, even the
opponent's orderings of the issues are unknown, and the agents are not provided with
any prior distribution over the utility functions. However, the players can attempt
to learn during the negotiation encounter.
The preference prole of an agent may also specify a reservation value. The reservation
value is the minimal utility that the agent still deems an acceptable outcome. That
is, the reservation value is equal to the utility of the best alternative to no agreement.
A bid with a utility lower than the reservation value should not be oered or accepted
by any rational agent. In a single-issue domain, the negotiation is often about the
price P of a good [75, 82, 269, 270]. In that case, agent A and B usually take the
roles of buyer B and seller S, and their reservation values are specied by their
reservation prices RPB and RPS. RPB denotes the highest price a buyer is willing
to pay, while RPS is the lowest price at which a seller is willing to sell.
The negotiator's nearness to a deadline is only one example of time pressure [51],
which is dened as a negotiator's desire to end the negotiation quickly [198]. Another
way to model time pressure is to supplement the negotiation scenario with a discount
factor. Let d in [0;1] be the discount factor and let t in [0;1] be the current normalized
time. We compute the discounted utility ud(!) from the undiscounted utility u(!)
as follows:
u
d(!) = u(!)  d
t: (2.2)
25If d = 1, the utility is not aected by time, and such a scenario is considered to be
undiscounted, while if d is very small, there is high pressure on the agents to reach
an agreement. Note that discount factors are part of the scenario, are known to both
agents and are always symmetric (i.e. d always has the same value for both agents).
The reasons for having deadlines and discount factors are both pragmatic and to
make the negotiation more interesting from a theoretical perspective. Without a
deadline or discount factor, the negotiators have no incentive to accept an oer,
and so the negotiation might go on forever. Also, with unlimited time an agent
may simply try a large number of proposals to learn the opponent's preferences. In
addition, as opposed to having a xed number of rounds, both the discount factor
and deadline are measured in real time. This, in turn, introduces another factor
of uncertainty since it is now unclear how many negotiation rounds there will be,
and how much time an opponent requires to compute a counter oer. Also, this
computational time will typically change depending on the size of the outcome space.
2.2.4 Outcome Spaces
A useful way to visualize the preferences of both players simultaneously is by means
of an outcome space plot (Figure 2.2). The axes of the outcome space plot represent
the utilities of player A and B, and every possible outcome ! 2 
 maps to a point
(uA(!);uB(!)). The line that connects all of the Pareto optimal agreements is the
Pareto frontier.
Note that the visualization of the outcome space together with the Pareto frontier is
only possible from an external point of view. In particular, the agents themselves
are not aware of the opponent utility of bids in the outcome space and do not know
the location of the Pareto frontier.
From Figure 2.2 we can immediately observe certain characteristics of the negotiation
scenario. For example, the domain size, whether the bids are spread out over the
domain, and the relative occurrence of Pareto optimal outcomes.
One important measure is the bid distribution, which is dened as the mean distance
to the Pareto frontier. A scenario with a high bid distribution has a high percentage
of outcomes far from the Pareto frontier. This is dened formally as:
distribution(
) =
X
!2

minp2
P d(!;p)
j
j
; (2.3)
where 
P  
 is the set of Pareto ecient possible outcomes.
There are a number of special outcomes in the outcome space. Of course, the best
result would be the outcome ! at which both parties would receive their maximum
utility. This would lead to complete satisfaction of both parties, but unfortunately,
this is usually not a possible outcome.
26Figure 2.2: A typical example of an outcome space between agents A and B.
There are also a number of denitions for what constitutes a fair outcome for both
players [202]. The Nash solution is dened as the outcome that maximizes the
product of the utilities of agents A and B:
!Nash = max
!2

uA(!)  uB(!): (2.4)
An alternative is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, which is dened as:
!Kalai = min
!2


uA(!)
uB(!)
 
uA(!)
uB(!)

: (2.5)
The opposition of the negotiation scenario is determined by the minimum distance
from the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to the point !.1 Formally:
opposition(
) = d(!Kalai;!) (2.6)
where 
 is the set of all possible outcomes, and d(!1;!2) gives the Euclidean distance
between two points !1;!2 in the outcome space, as dened in Eq. (2.7).
d(!1;!2) =
p
(uA(!1)   uA(!2))2 + (uB(!1)   uB(!2))2; (2.7)
1There are various ways to dene the opposition of a scenario (see [134]), but as in [113], we will
employ a denition based on distance measures throughout the thesis. Another popular denition
is: opposition(
) = min!2
 d(!;!)
27When a gain for one party can be achieved only at a loss for the other party (i.e., when
the preferences are conicting), the negotiation scenario is said to be competitive, or
to have strong opposition. Conversely, in a cooperative scenario (or: a scenario with
weak opposition), both parties achieve either losses or gains simultaneously.
2.3 Negotiating Strategies
A negotiating agent employs a negotiation strategy to determine its action in a given
negotiation state. Research on general agent negotiators has given rise to a broad
variety of negotiation strategies that have already been established both in literature
and in implementations, (e.g. [57, 75, 76, 117, 125, 166]). The strategies of the agents
usually vary from equilibrium strategies in a game theoretical setting to more heuristic
approaches. Here we focus in particular on self-interested, boundedly rational agents
that are able to conduct bilateral negotiations with incomplete information (following
the classication of [169]).
Examples of such general agent negotiators in the literature include, among others:
Zeng and Sycara [270], who introduce a generic agent called Bazaar; Faratin et
al. [76], who propose an agent that is able to make trade-os in negotiations and
is motivated by maximizing the joint utility of the outcome (that is, the agents
are utility maximizers that seek Pareto-optimal agreements); Karp et al. [128], who
take a game-theoretic view and propose a negotiation strategy based on game-trees;
Jonker et al. [125], who propose a a concession oriented strategy called ABMP; and
Lin et al. [165], who propose an agent negotiator called QOAgent.
The ANAC competition that we hosted brought forth an additional 60 advanced
negotiation strategies (see Appendix B on ANAC and Appendix C{F for agent
descriptions). Notable ANAC agent strategies include: Agent K [131, 132], which
calculates its target utility based on the average and variance of previous bids and
employs a sophisticated acceptance strategy; IAMHaggler [261, 263, 258], which uses
Gaussian process regression technique to predict the opponent's behavior; CUHK
Agent [103, 102], which adaptively adjusts its acceptance threshold based on domain
and opponent analysis; OMAC Agent [55, 54, 56, 53], which models the opponent
using wavelet decomposition and cubic smoothing spline; The Fawkes, which combines
the best bidding, learning, and accepting strategy components; and nally, Meta-
Agent [115, 116], which, for any given negotiation domain, dynamically selects the
most successful ANAC agent to produce an oer.
In Chapter 3, we introduce a component-based architecture for negotiating agents,
so we start by describing literature that investigates and evaluates such components.
There are two categories of relevant work we highlight here: literature detailing the
architecture of a negotiating agent's strategy (Section 2.3.1); and work that explores
and combines a set of negotiation strategy components to nd better strategies
(Section 2.3.2).
28Our component-based architecture consists of three basic components: a bidding
strategy, which determines which concession should be made in a negotiation state;
an acceptance strategy, which is used by an agent to determine whether an opponent's
oer should be accepted; and optionally an opponent model, which can be used
both by the bidding strategy and acceptance strategy to reach a better outcome by
exploiting knowledge about the opponent. We provide some background on each of
the components in Section 2.3.3{2.3.5.
2.3.1 Architecture of Negotiation Strategies
To our knowledge, there is little work in literature describing the generic components of
a negotiation strategy architecture, at a similar level of detail as our BOA architecture,
which is outlined in Chapter 3. For example, Bartolini et al. [33] and Dumas et
al. [68] treat the negotiation strategy as a singular component.
Jonker et al. [125] present an agent architecture for multi attribute negotiation,
where each component represents a specic process within the behavior of the agent,
e.g.: attribute evaluation, bid utility determination, utility planning, and attribute
planning. There are some similarities between the two architectures; for example,
the utility planning and attribute planning component correspond to the bidding
strategy component in our architecture. In contrast to our work however, Jonker et
al. focus on tactics for nding a counter oer and do not discuss acceptance strategies.
The fact that our architecture allows this, makes it possible to nd better strategies
to accept (see Chapter 4 and 5).
Ashri et al. [6] introduce a general architecture for negotiation agents, discussing
components that resemble our architecture; components such as a proposal evaluator
and response generator resemble an acceptance condition and bidding strategy
respectively. However, the negotiation strategy is described from a BDI-agent
perspective (in terms of motivation and mental attitudes).
Hindriks et al. [110] introduce an architecture for negotiation agents in combination
with a negotiation system architecture. Parts of the agent architecture correspond
to our architecture, but they treat the acceptance strategy and bidding strategy as a
singular component, and their focus is primarily on how the agent framework can be
integrated into a larger system.
2.3.2 Negotiation Strategy Space Exploration
There are various ways to explore the automated negotiation strategy space by
combining a set of negotiation strategies.
Faratin et al. [75] analyze the performance of pure negotiation tactics on single issue
domains in a bilateral negotiation setting. The decision function of the pure tactic
29is then treated as a component around which the full strategy is built. While they
discuss how tactics can be linearly combined, the performance of the combined tactics
is not analyzed.
Some authors use genetic algorithms to automatically combine certain tactics or
strategies. This approach is dierent to how we combine components using the BOA
framework, however they do share certain traits, as they view a strategy consisting
of dierent components and combine them in order to produce a better performing
strategy. For example, Matos et al. [177] employ a set of baseline negotiation
strategies that are time dependent, resource dependent, and behavior dependent [75],
all with varying parameters. The negotiation strategies are encoded as chromosomes
and combined linearly, after which they are used by a genetic algorithm to analyze
the eectiveness of the strategies. The tness of an agent is its score in a negotiation
competition. This approach analyzes acceptance criteria that only specify a utility
interval of acceptable values, and hence do not take time into account. The agents
also do not employ explicit opponent modeling.
Eymann [70] also uses genetic algorithms with more complex negotiating strategies,
evolving six parameters that inuence the bidding strategy. The genetic algorithm
uses the current negotiation strategy of the agent and the opponent strategy with the
highest average income to create a new strategy, similar to other genetic algorithm
approaches (see Beam and Segev [34] for a discussion of genetic algorithms in auto-
mated negotiation). The genetic algorithm approach mainly treats the negotiation
strategy optimization as a search problem in which the parameters of a small set of
strategies are tuned by a genetic algorithm. In Chapter 3, we analyze a more complex
space of newly developed negotiation strategies, as our pool of surveyed negotiation
strategies consists of strategies introduced in the ANAC competition, as well as the
strategies discussed by Faratin et al. (see Section 2.3.3). Furthermore, our work
combines dierent components instead of complete strategies or strategy parameters
and also investigates the importance of particular components (see Chapter 10).
Ros and Sierra obtain promising results in [213] with a negotiation strategy that
combines two components: a concession based strategy (either time-based or behavior-
based [75]) that decreases a utility threshold to achieve an agreement, and a trade-o
strategy [76] that searches for a satisfactory proposal. Our work in this thesis diers
with Sierra et al. as we consider a much wider array of agents of which we are able
to change the opponent model as well.
Finally, Ilany and Gal [115, 116] take the approach of selecting the best strategy from
a predened set of agents, based on the characteristics of a domain. Through machine
learning this agent is optimized to choose the best strategy for that particular domain.
The dierence with our work is that they combine whole strategies, whereas the BOA
architecture combines the components of strategies. Our contribution is to dene
and implement an architecture that allows to easily vary all main components of a
negotiating agent. Especially in Chapter 10, we study the eects of a much larger
group of state of the art negotiation components than has been done before.
30Another way to explore the space of negotiation strategies is to classify them according
to their behavior. We do so in Chapter 8, in which we present a new classication
method for negotiation strategies, based on their pattern of concession making. This
chapter is inspired by ideas presented in [152] (of which parts originally appeared in
unpublished work by Kersten in 2005). In [152], four dual negotiation orientations
are distinguished, depending on the negotiator's own orientation and that of the
negotiating partner. Both orientations can be either competitive or cooperative,
leading to four dierent labels: Competitor, Yielder, Exploiter, and Cooperator. In
Chapter 8, we re-use these labels to name the stance of a negotiator against dierent
kinds of opponents. However in our work, the negotiators are assumed to have dierent
responses to dierent observed behavior by the other party. Therefore, instead of
the negotiator having one particular stance during the negotiation, the position of
the negotiators can change in response to the competitiveness of the opponent. For
example, a negotiator may be both an Exploiter (against a Cooperator), and a Yielder
(against a Competitor). The negotiator would then be called an Inverter, as he takes
on the reverse role of his opponent.
In [168], a classication scheme is given for electronic commerce negotiation, including
characteristics of the negotiating agents. It is argued that agents can act in a self-
interested way, or altruistically, or strike a balance in between. This choice is then
seen as a component of the bidding strategy of the agent, which ultimately decides
how and when to place oers, or when to withdraw, etc. Although the paper makes
this distinction in bidding characteristics, it does not provide a denition or a way
to quantify them.
Thomas [244] denes ve conict{handling modes that can be applied to negotiation:
competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, and accommodating. Similar to
our work in Chapter 8, the classication method uses two underlying dimensions.
However, the underlying dimensions are dierent, namely: assertiveness (attempting
to satisfy one's own concerns), and cooperativeness (attempting to satisfy other's
concerns). This classication method is phrased in qualitative, intentional terms of
the conict-handler. Similarly, Zachariassen [268] distinguishes negotiation strategies
into two strategy types: distributive and integrative. This description also focuses
on the approach used by the negotiators. Our work has a dierent focus from
both papers, centering around quantitative negotiation characteristics in response to
agents having either high and low concession rates. Furthermore, we do not classify
negotiation strategies in a binary way (either cooperative or non-cooperative), but we
employ a continuous spectrum in our approach to classify the full space of negotiation
strategies.
2.3.3 Bidding Strategies
The bidding strategy, also called negotiation tactic or concession strategy, is usually
a complex strategy component. Two types of negotiation tactics are very common:
31time-dependent tactics and behavior-dependent tactics. Each tactic uses a decision
function, which maps the negotiation state to a target utility. Next, the agent can
search for a bid with a utility close to the target utility and oer this bid to the
opponent.
Time-dependent tactics
Functions which return an oer solely based on time are called time-dependent tactics.
The standard time-dependent strategy calculates a target utility u(t) at every turn,
based on the current time t. Perhaps the most popular time-based decision function
can be found in [75, 83], which, depending on the current normalized time t 2 [0;1],
makes a bid with utility closest to
u(t) = Pmin + (Pmax   Pmin)  (1   F(t)); (2.8)
where
F(t) = k + (1   k)  t
1=e:
The constants Pmin;Pmax 2 [0;1] control the range of the proposed oers, and
k 2 [0;1] determines the value of the rst proposal. For 0 < e < 1, the agent
concedes only at the end of the negotiation and is called Boulware. If e  1, the
function concedes quickly to the reservation value, and the agent is then called a
Conceder.
For k = 0 and e = 1, we obtain a very simple conceding tactic called Conceder Linear.
It reduces equation (2.8) to
u(t) = Pmin + (Pmax   Pmin)  (1   t);
so that the agent linearly reduces its demanded utility from Pmax to Pmin as time
passes.
In many of our experiments in later chapters, we set k = 0, and Pmax;Pmin are
respectively set to the maximum and minimum utility that can be obtained in the
negotiation scenario. The specication of these strategies given in [75, 83] does not
involve any opponent modeling; that is, given the target utility, a random bid is
oered with a utility closest to it. Time-dependent tactics accept if and only if the
opponent's bid is better than the target utility.
Baseline tactics
The Hardliner strategy (also known as take-it-or-leave-it, sit-and-wait [5] or Hard-
ball [156]) can be viewed as an extreme type of time-dependent tactic. This strategy
simply makes a bid of maximum utility for itself and never concedes, and is therefore
the most competitive strategy that can be implemented.
32In total three tactics are dened: Relative Tit for Tat, Random Absolute Tit for Tat,
and Averaged Tit for Tat. The Relative Tit for Tat agent mimics the opponent in a
percentage-wise fashion by proportionally replicating the opponent's concession that
was performed   1 steps ago. The decision function of Relative Tit for Tat is as
follows:
x
tn+1
a!b[j] = min(max(
x
tn 2
b!a [j]
x
tn 2+2
b!a [j]
x
tn 1
a!b[j];min
a
j);max
a
j) (2.9)
The formula species the value for each issue j for the next bid for the opponent x
tn+1
a!b
at time step tn+1, and depends on the previous opponent oers x
tn 2
b!a [j] and x
tn 2+2
b!a [j]
in proportion to its own previous oer x
tn 1
b!a[j]. The min and max functions are used
to ensure that the value of each issue stays within the acceptable range. The main
weakness of the decision function is that a percentage concession by the opponent on
a specic issue is in general unequal in utility compared to the same concession by
the agent.
The standard Tit for Tat strategies from [75] do not employ any learning methods,
but this work has been subsequently extended by the Nice Tit for Tat agent [29] and
the Nice Mirroring Strategy [106]. These strategies achieve more eective results
by combining a simple Tit for Tat response mechanism with learning techniques
to propose oers closer to the Pareto frontier. These approaches can be viewed
as simple examples of the ideas we explore in Section 3, where we study arbitrary
combinations of concession strategies with learning methods.
2.3.4 Acceptance Strategies
All negotiation agent implementations have to deal with the question of when to
accept. In many cases, the agent accepts a proposal when the value of the oered
contract is higher than the oer it is ready to send out at that moment in time. This
is a signicant case, in which the bidding strategy eectively dictates the acceptance
strategy. Examples include the time-dependent negotiation strategies dened in
[213] (e.g. the Boulware and Conceder tactics). The same principle is used in the
equilibrium strategies of [83] and for the Trade-o agent [76]. Agent K [131] employs
a more sophisticated method to decide when to accept. Its acceptance strategy (or
acceptance mechanism) is based on the mean and variance of all received oers. It
then tries to determine the best oer it might receive in the future and sets its
proposal target accordingly. We refer to the agent descriptions in C.1 and D.1 in the
Appendix for more descriptions of acceptance strategies.
We treat acceptance mechanism design in more detail in Chapter 4, where we present
a model for accepting oers and where we compare state-of-the-art acceptance
conditions of a large set of negotiation strategies. Our negotiation model builds upon
the model of [229], where one specic acceptance condition is studied. We take a
more general approach in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, in which the agent utilizes a
34generic acceptance mechanism where the current time and the entire bidding history
is considered.
We only consider the alternating oers protocol in this thesis, but there are multiple
other accepting strategies available for other methods of reaching an agreement.
In a multi-party setting, the problem of when to accept is more complex, as the
outside options become dynamic; however, the presence of a mediator can reduce
some of the complexity by taking over the role of nding acceptable agreements,
for example through letting the agents vote on whether a proposed contract is
acceptable [139]. It may then be sucient for an agent to simply accept anything
above its reservation value. In the same way, when richer protocols are employed
(e.g., when communication is possible, for instance in persuasive, or argumentation-
based negotiation [201, 240]), the acceptance dilemma may be easier to resolve, as
agents have more knowledge about the acceptability of oers. Lastly, in traditional
negotiation protocols such as alternating oers, once a contract is settled upon, it is
binding. However, a more general approach is to allow decommitment, i.e. backing
out of the negotiation after nding a superior option elsewhere, usually at the cost
of a penalty [223]. This requires complex acceptance strategies for committing and
decommitting to agreements in a concurrent way, which has recently opened up new
research in this area [143, 259, 262].
Optimal Stopping
When we move from real-time negotiation to round-based negotiations, it becomes
possible to adopt optimal acceptance strategies through backward inductive reasoning;
the most well-known solution being that agreement is reached immediately in the
rst round [217]. In a real-time setting, it is generally unknown when the last oer
has been made, and this makes it dicult to nd optimal acceptance conditions for
this setting.
In Chapter 5 we explore this idea, and we present the rst work that deals with the
optimal decision on the acceptance of an oer in a negotiation setting of incomplete
information. In many settings of complete information ([217] is a typical example)
the deal is usually formed right away and as such, sequential decisions whether to
accept do not come into play. In [270], a sequential decision making framework is
also employed, using similar arguments for using it as we do. Furthermore, they also
choose actions that maximize the expected payo using a recursive formula; however,
their approach uses Bayesian learning techniques and does not provide solutions
specically aimed at acceptance strategies. The work by Fatima et al. [82] also treats
optimal strategies in an incomplete information setting, but it primarily focuses
on bidding strategies in the context of unknown deadlines and reservation values,
and does not deal with acceptance strategies. Research that comes closest to our
work on optimal acceptance strategies is presented in [221], where optimal stopping
is employed to decide when a party should reach an agreement in the context of
35conict resolution. In contrast to our work, the scope of the paper is limited to
simple bargaining games, and deals with one-sided incomplete information only.
We come back to optimal stopping and sequential decision making in Chapter 9 when
we formulate optimal concession curves. To the best of our knowledge, that is the rst
work that makes usage of the optimal stopping rule to generate oers in an incomplete
information setting and compares it to other concession techniques, where other
previous work makes use of optimal stopping theory to formulate acceptance strategies
in dierent settings [142, 155, 265]; for instance deciding to accept sequential job
oers while trying to maximize the sum of the payments of all accepted jobs [265].
The major dierence with optimal acceptance policies and our work in Chapter 9
is that we use the optimal stopping rule for concessions, instead of focusing on the
optimal time to accept. Our work in Chapter 9 is dened more as the complimentary
version of our approach in Chapter 5, in the sense that our formulation of optimal
bidding rules happen to resemble optimal acceptance rules. Another key point is that
we do not assume that the players' strategies are xed, which allows us to formulate
optimal bidding strategies against certain types of accepting strategies.
2.3.5 Opponent Models
An opponent model is an abstracted description of a player (and/or of a player's
behavior) during the game [248]. There are many dierent types of opponent models;
for instance, a model can describe the opponent's preferences, strategy, weaknesses,
knowledge, and so on. We present here a short background on learning techniques and
evaluation techniques in negotiation for our setting; for a more detailed exposition
we refer to our survey on this topic [21].
In negotiation, opponent modeling often revolves around three questions:
 Preference estimation. What does the opponent want?
 Strategy prediction. What will the opponent do, and when?
 Opponent classication. What kind of player is the opponent, and how
should we act accordingly?
The above questions are often highly related. For example, some form of preference
estimation is needed in order to adequately interpret the opponent's actions. Then,
knowing how the opponent acted according to its own utility, we can deduce its
strategy, which in turn can help predict what the agent will do in the future. We will
mainly focus on preference modeling in this thesis, although our architecture can
accommodate for the other types of opponent models as well (see Chapter 6 and 7).
Constructing an opponent model may alternatively be viewed as a classication
problem where the type of the opponent needs to be determined from a range of
possibilities [225]; one example being the work by Lin et al. [165]. Here the type
36of an opponent refers to all opponent attributes that may be modeled to gain an
advantage in the game.
Opponent modeling can be performed online or oine, depending on the availability
of historical data. Oine models are created before the negotiation starts, using
previously obtained data from earlier negotiations. Online models are constructed
from knowledge that is collected during a single negotiation session, which is the
focus of this thesis. A major challenge in online opponent modeling is that the model
needs to be constructed from a limited amount of exchanged bids, and real-time
deadlines may pose the additional challenge of having to construct the model as fast
as possible.
Even though there are large dierences between the models, a common set of high
level motivations behind their construction can be identied. There are the following
motivations for why opponent models are used in automated negotiation:
1. Augment behavior-based tactics [29, 106, 107, 200] An opponent model
can assist in improving the performance of behavior-based tactics, as the op-
ponent's concessions can then be estimated and reciprocated more accurately.
Based on move classication, behavior-based strategies such as the Tit for Tat
strategy (see Section 2.3.3) can be applied. In addition, in a negotiation where
the opponent's preferences are private, an agent's concession might accidentally
result in a decrease in utility for the opponent as well. Such an oer is called
unfortunate [107], and can be avoided by better estimating the opponent's
preferences.
2. Avoid non-agreement [99, 100, 120, 141, 186, 188, 191, 193, 194, 204, 231,
232] In most negotiations, reaching an agreement is preferred over not reaching
a deal. The opponent's previous moves can be analyzed to estimate the minimal
concessions required to ensure acceptance.
3. Find a counter-strategy [2, 42, 43, 54, 55, 73, 99, 100, 103, 114, 176, 181,
184, 192, 206, 219, 260, 263, 267] The opponent can be exploited in multiple
ways with the assistance of an opponent model. One way is to estimate the
opponent's reservation value in an attempt to obtain the minimal negotia-
tion outcome the opponent will settle for. Alternatively, an estimate of the
opponent's deadline can be used to elicit concessions from the opponent by
stalling the negotiation, provided of course that the agent has a later deadline.
Theoretical results are available that specify which counter-strategy to use
depending on the information known about the opponent [77, 82, 177].
4. Maximize social welfare [19, 60, 120, 141, 153, 164, 165, 179, 188, 191, 204,
210, 231, 232, 236, 269, 270, 271] In a cooperative environment, agents aim for
a fair result. An agent can use an estimate of the opponent's preference prole
37to maximize the chances of a good outcome for both.
5. Propose Pareto optimal bids [19, 20, 29, 39, 44, 88, 106, 112, 124, 153,
186, 200, 204, 210, 211, 218, 226, 236, 249, 250, 261] Pareto optimality of an
oer ensures the oer cannot be improved for both players at the same time.
When an agent considers multiple similarly preferred oers to send out to the
opponent, oering a Pareto optimal bid can lead to an earlier and mutually
benecial agreement.
6. Reduce negotiation costs [12, 11, 13, 19, 60, 99, 141, 153, 179, 191, 200,
210, 211, 231, 232, 236, 269, 270, 271] In general it costs time and resources to
negotiate, and using an estimate of the opponent's preference prole or negoti-
ation strategy can aid in reducing these costs. An agent may even decide that
the estimated negotiation costs are too high to warrant a potential agreement,
and prematurely end the negotiation.
We found that existing work on opponent models can fulll any of the goals above by
learning a combination of six opponent attributes, which we have listed in Table 2.1.
The notion of an opponent model as a component of a negotiation strategy has been
discussed by many of these authors. However, to our knowledge, there is limited
work in which the performance of dierent types of opponent models is compared
as we do in Chapter 6 and 7. One example is the work by Papaioannou et al. [193],
who evaluate a set of opponent strategy prediction techniques in terms of resulting
performance gain.
2.4 Evaluation Methodologies
We now introduce the methodologies we use in subsequent chapters to evaluate
negotiation strategies. The rst evaluation method is analytical software to ana-
lyze the performance and dynamics of agents, and the outcome of the negotiation
(Section 2.4.1). The second is a method to benchmark and objectively evaluate
negotiation agents in a competitive setting (Section 2.4.2). Together, they provide
an environment to apply a range of performance measures (Section 2.4.3) to measure
the performance of a negotiation strategy. Lastly, we discuss measures for learning
methods, including accuracy measures (Section 2.4.4).
2.4.1 Environments for Evaluating Negotiating Agents
As we have built a generic environment for designing and evaluating agent negotiators
called Genius [163] (see Appendix A), we briey review related work that is explicitly
38Opponent
Attributes Procedure Learning Techniques
Reservation
Value
Bidding strategy
estimation
Bayesian learning [99, 206, 231, 232, 267, 269,
270, 271]
Non-linear regression [2, 100, 114, 267]
Deadline Bidding strategy
estimation
Bayesian learning [99, 231, 267]
Non-linear regression [99, 114, 231, 267]
Issue
Preference
Order
Measuring
similarity
between oers
Bayesian learning [186]
Kernel density estimation [60, 74]
Heuristics [39, 124]
Knowledge of
bidding strategy
Simplied genetic algorithm [120]
Outcome
Preference
Order
Classication Bayesian learning [29, 45, 46, 112, 164, 165,
200, 226, 261]
Data mining
aggregate
preferences
Random variable estimation [141, 236]
Graph theory [210, 211]
Bayesian network [218]
Logical reasoning
and heuristics
Heuristics [12, 11, 13, 44, 88, 103, 207, 249,
250]
Bidding
Strategy
Regression
analysis
Non-linear regression [2, 43, 100, 114, 193, 205,
267]
Polynomial interpolation [193]
Genetic algorithms [194]
Bayesian networks [181]
Time series
forecasting
Derivatives [42, 179]
Signal processing [54, 55, 175, 192, 260, 263]
Neural networks [49, 50, 154, 176, 188, 193,
194, 204]
Markov chains [184]
Acceptance
Strategy
Interpolation of
acceptance proba-
bility
Polynomial interpolation [219]
Kernel density estimation [191]
Bayesian learning [153]
Neural networks [73]
Table 2.1: An overview of learning techniques and methods that help to learn six
dierent opponent attributes.
39aimed at the evaluation of various agent negotiators. Most of the work reported herein
concerns the evaluation of various strategies for negotiation used by such agents.
Although some results were obtained by game-theoretic analysis (e.g. [149, 214]),
most results were obtained by means of simulation (e.g. [64, 79, 105]). Devaux
and Paraschiv [64] present work that compares agents negotiating in internet agent-
based markets. In particular, they compare a strategy of their own agent with
behavioral based strategies taken from the literature [75]. The simulations are
performed in an abstract domain where agents need to negotiate the price of a
product. Similarly, Henderson et al. [105] present results of the performance of
various negotiation strategies in a simulated car hire scenario. Finally, Matos et
al. [177] conducted experiments to determine the most successful strategies using
an evolutionary approach in an abstract domain called the service-oriented domain.
Even though several of the approaches use an abstract domain with a range of
parameters that may be varied, we argue that the focus on a single domain in most
simulations is restrictive. A similar argument to this end has been put forward
in [113]. The analysis of agent negotiators in multiple domains may signicantly
improve the performance of such agents.
Manistersky et al. [171] discuss how people who design agent negotiators change
their design over time. They study how students changed their design of a trading
agent that negotiates in an open environment. After initial design of their agents,
human designers obtained additional information about the performance of their
agents by receiving logs of negotiations between their agents and agents designed by
others. These logs provided the means to analyze the negotiation behavior, and an
opportunity to improve the performance of the agents. The Genius environment
discussed in Appendix A provides a tool that supports such analysis, subsequent
improvement of the design, and structures the enhancement process.
Part of Genius' functionality has been described in [108, 159], and our work [163]
outlined in Appendix A is a natural extension of this research. Since then, we
have extended Genius with all ANAC resources and new functionality described
in Appendix B (e.g., negotiation strategies, protocols, scenarios, discount factors,
reservation values), the BOA architecture and agent components from Chapter 3,
the acceptance strategies from Chapter 4 and 5, and the performance and accuracy
measures described in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
With regard to systems that facilitate the actual design of agents or agent strategies
in negotiations, few systems are close to Genius. Most of the systems that may
be related to its main focus are negotiation support systems (e.g., the Interactive
Computer-Assisted Negotiation Support system (ICANS) presented in [243], the
InterNeg Support Program for Intercultural REsearch (INSPIRE)), however, Genius
advances the state-of-the-art by also providing evaluation mechanisms that allow a
quick and simple evaluation of strategies and the facilitation of automated negotiator's
design. INSPIRE, by Kersten and Noronha [135], is a Web-based negotiation support
system with the primary goal of facilitating negotiation research in an international
40setting. The system enables negotiation between two people, collects data about
negotiations and has some basic functionality for the analysis of the agreements, such
as calculation of the utility of an agreement and exchanged oers. However, unlike
Genius, it does not allow integration of an automated negotiating agent and thus
does not include repositories of agents as we propose. Perhaps Neg-o-Net [101] is
more similar to Genius than all the other support systems. The Neg-o-Net model
is a generic agent-based computational simulation model for capturing multi-agent
negotiations concerning resource and environmental management decisions. The
Neg-o-Net model includes both a negotiation algorithm and some agent models. An
agent's preferences are modeled using digraphs (scripts). Nodes represent states of
the agent that can be achieved by performing actions (arcs). Each state is evaluated
using utility functions. The user can modify the agent's script to model his/her
preferences w.r.t. states and actions. While Neg-o-Net is similar to Genius, there
are at least two important dierences. First, they currently do not support the
incorporation of human negotiators, but only automated ones. Second, they do not
provide any evaluation mechanism of the strategies as Genius provides.
A recent development worth noting is the Negowiki project [172, 173], which aims
to unify current approaches in negotiation research by creating a collection of stan-
dardized negotiation scenarios. Negowiki is an online framework where researchers
can share negotiation scenarios and results. As in Genius, analysis of the results is
provided, so that researchers can compute a set of metrics over the results of the ne-
gotiation (e.g. Pareto optimality, fairness; we elaborate more on this in Section 2.4.3).
All scenarios oered by Negowiki are also available for download in Genius format.
2.4.2 Negotiating Agent Competitions
A competition can act as a useful and open benchmarking tool to evaluate and
compare negotiation agents, as evidenced by successful competitions to advance the
state-of-the-art in articial intelligence such as the Computer Poker Competition [167],
the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game [9] and the Trading Agent Competition [257].
Following in their footsteps, we organized four annual instances of the International
Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC).
We elaborate on the goals and results of the competition in Appendix B. Here, we
provide a short description of related competitions and outline the dierences with
ANAC.
The Trading Agent Competition
Four games of the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) relate to automated negotiating
agents [97, 138, 187, 238, 257], and some elements of TAC have similar challenges as
posed by ANAC:
41TAC SCM TAC Supply Chain Management was designed to simulate a dynamic
supply chain environment. Agents have to compete to secure customer orders and
components required for production. In order to do so, the agents have to plan and
coordinate their activities across the supply chain. Participants face the complexities
of supply chains, which admits a variety of bidding and negotiation strategies.
TAC Ad Auctions In the TAC Ad Auctions, game entrants design and implement
bidding strategies for advertisers in a simulated sponsoring environment. The agents
have to bid against each other to get an ad placement that is related to certain
keyword combinations in a web search tool. The advertiser strategies have to decide
which keywords to bid on, and what prices to oer. Therefore, the strategies have to
optimize their data analysis and bidding tactics to maximize their prot.
TAC Market Design TAC Market Design or The CAT Competition is a reverse
of the normal TAC game: as an entrant you dene the rules for matching buyers
and sellers, while the trading agents are created by the organizers of the competition.
Entrants have to compete against each other to build a robust market mechanism
that attracts buyers and sellers.
Power TAC Having started in 2011, Power TAC is a fairly recent addition to the
TAC games. It is built around a competitive market simulation platform with the
goal to direct policy making and to develop and validate intelligent agent technology
for trading. It models a electrical energy market, where competing business entities
oer energy services to customers.
The challenges posed by TAC are similar as in ANAC, especially the games of TAC
Ad Auctions and Power TAC. The games of TAC can get very complex and the
domains of the games are specically chosen to model a certain scenario of a trading
agent problem. Contrastingly, the entrants of ANAC have to consider very generic
negotiation domains when they design their agents. On the one hand, this makes
ANAC very accessible, as there are no domain-dependent details the participants
have to know about. On the other hand, it is very dicult to develop an agent that
negotiates well under such a wide variety of circumstances, especially with the unique
challenges ANAC poses, which include one-shot bilateral negotiations with a real
timeline, combined with incomplete information of the opponent's preferences.
The Agent Reputation Trust Competition
The Agent Reputation Trust Competition (ART) [65, 91] is also a negotiating agent
competition with a testbed that allows the comparison of dierent strategies. The
ART competition simulates a business environment for software agents that use the
reputation concept to buy advices about paintings. Each agent in the game is a
42service provider responsible for selling its opinions when requested. The agent can
exchange information with other agents to improve the quality of their appraisals. The
challenge is to perceive when an agent can be trusted and to establish a trustworthy
reputation. Compared to ANAC, the focus of ART is more on trust: the goal is to
perceive which agents can be trusted in a negotiation process and what reputation
should be attributed to each agent.
2.4.3 Evaluating Performance of Negotiation Strategies
The ultimate aim of a negotiation strategy is to increase overall performance of the
negotiation, which is why performance measures are used to evaluate a negotiator's
success. Performance measures evaluate the quality of the outcome, usually measured
in utility gain, or distance of the agreement to the Pareto frontier. With this method,
the success of an opponent model is expressed in terms of the negotiation result (as
opposed to the whole negotiation process; for this we refer to Section 2.4.4) The
paragraphs below provide an overview of the performance measures in related work.
Average utility. Average utility is by far the most popular performance measure
and is used by many authors (e.g., [19, 20, 42, 43, 54, 55, 60, 73, 74, 99, 100, 103,
106, 107, 112, 114, 124, 164, 165, 176, 184, 186, 191, 192, 194, 200, 219, 226, 231,
232, 236, 249, 260, 267, 271]). A common application is to consider the average
utility of an agent with and without opponent model against a group of opponents
on several domains (see for example [55, 103, 186]). Note that the average utility
of an agent directly depends on the negotiation setting (as we will see in following
chapters), which therefore should be chosen with care.
Distance to a fair outcome. Other authors are concerned with achieving a fair
outcome [19, 106, 107, 179], which is especially important if there will be future
negotiations between the parties.
Distance to a fair outcome is then calculated as the average Euclidean distance to a
fair solution (as dened in Section 2.2.4), such as the distance to Nash solution [19,
106, 107, 179] or distance to Kalai-Smorodinsky [19, 106, 107]. As with the average
utility measure, the negotiation setting strongly inuences the result [17, 31].
Distance to Pareto frontier. An opponent model of the opponent's preferences
aids in identifying Pareto optimal bids. For this type of model { assuming it is applied
by a bidding strategy that takes the opponent's utility into account { the distance to
the nearest Pareto optimal bid directly correlates with the model's quality (see for
example [19, 153, 186, 200, 204]). Minimizing this distance to the Pareto-optimal
frontier improves fairness and the probability of acceptance.
43Joint utility. An alternative method to measure the fairness of an outcome is to
calculate the joint utility [60, 120, 141, 153, 165, 164, 179, 188, 191, 204, 231, 232,
269, 270, 271]. The majority of the authors simply use the sum of the utility of the
nal outcome for the agents (see for example [164, 165]). An alternative used by
several authors [188, 269, 270, 271] is to consider the normalized joint utility:
ujoint =
(P   RPS)(RPB   P)
(RPB   RPS)2 : (2.10)
In this equation, P is the agreed upon price, and RPB and RPS are the reservation
prices of the buyer and seller respectively. Note that this denition is only applicable
to single-issue negotiations. An alternative measure for multi-issue negotiations used
by Jazayeriy et al. [120] is the geometric mean:
ujoint =
p
uA  uB; (2.11)
where uA and uB are the utilities achieved by the agents. An attractive property
of this metric is that when the utilities are highly unbalanced, this formula better
reects unfairness than by simply calculating the sum of the utilities.
Percentage of agreements. An opponent model may lead to better bids being
oered to the opponent, possibly avoiding non-agreement. In situations where an
agreement is always better than no agreement, the percentage of agreements is a
direct measure of success (see for example [2, 13, 44, 99, 100, 120, 141, 181, 186,
188, 191, 193, 194, 204, 210, 211, 231, 232, 236, 267]). An important disadvantage is
that the acceptance ratio does not capture the quality of the agreement. Agrawal
and Chari, Buett et al., and Mudgal and Vassileva use a related measure in which
they calculate how often one agent outperforms the other with regard to the nal
outcome [2, 44, 181]. A disadvantage of this method is that an agent might outperform
other agents, but still reach a bad outcome. An alternative metric is applied by
Robu and Poutr e [210, 211], which calculates how often an outcome is reached that
maximizes social welfare.
Time of agreement. Various authors measure the duration of the negotiation
or the communication load (e.g. [12, 11, 13, 19, 60, 99, 141, 153, 179, 188, 191, 200,
210, 211, 231, 232, 236, 269, 270, 271]), because in practical settings there is often
a non-negligible cost associated with both. Opponent models can lead to earlier
agreements, and thereby reduce costs. An important disadvantage of this metric is
that while an opponent model may lead to an earlier agreement, the quality of the
outcome for the agent might be lower.
Trajectory analysis. The quality of bidding strategies can be measured by ana-
lyzing the percentage and relative frequency of certain types of moves [106, 107, 200].
44For example, unfortunate moves are oers that decrease the utility for both agents at
the same time. Theoretically, a perfect opponent model of the opponent's preferences
would allow an agent to prevent any such unfortunate moves. A disadvantage of
this method is that it highly depends on the concession strategy that is used in
combination with the opponent model.
2.4.4 Evaluating Learning Methods
The performance measures discussed in Section 2.3.5 are benchmarks for an entire
negotiation strategy, but they are also often used to test the ecacy of one specic
component, the most prevalent being the learning component. The simplest approach
is to compare a novel learning technique with a set of baseline strategies. In [112]
for example, the performance of the opponent model is estimated by embedding
it in a strategy and comparing the average utility against two baseline strategies.
The modeling technique discussed by [165] introduces a model for a similar protocol,
but in this case the baseline is set by humans. Zeng and Sycara [270] measure
performance in terms of social welfare, but focus on single-issue negotiations in which
they compare the performance of three settings: both learn, neither learn, and only
the buyer learns. Finally, [46] evaluates the accuracy of a model against simple
baseline strategies in terms of the likelihood that the correct class is estimated to
which the opponent's preference prole belongs.
The performance of an opponent model can also be tested against other models or
against a theoretical lower or upper bound, as we do in Chapter 6. For example,
Coehoorn and Jennings [60] evaluate the performance of their opponent model using
a standard bidding strategy that can be used both with and without a model. The
performance of the strategy is evaluated in three settings: without knowledge, with
perfect knowledge, and when using an oine opponent model. This work is similar to
our work in Chapter 6, however, it diers in the fact that we focus on online opponent
modeling, and our setting is especially challenging as it involves the time/exploration
trade-o. Another example is the work by [141], which introduces two opponent
models for e-recommendation in a multi-object negotiation.Finally, [113] denes two
accuracy measures and uses these measures to analyze the accuracy of two opponent
models. The main dierences are that in Chapter 6, we focus on the more general
type of multi-issue negotiations, we focus on a larger set of performance measures,
and pay more attention to the factors that inuence the performance of the model.
Furthermore, as far as we know, our work is the rst to compare and analyze such a
large set of state-of-the art models of the opponent's preference prole.
Accuracy Measures
As performance measures are only indirect measures of the negotiating agent's
quality, other measures, such as accuracy measures can also be included for the
45purpose of benchmarking learning techniques. Accuracy measures are direct measures
of learning quality, as they quantify the dierence between the estimate and the
estimated; i.e., they determine the quality of a model by quantifying how well the
opponent model represents the real preferences of the opponent. An example is the
correlation between the estimated and the real outcome space, or the percentage of
correctly inferred Pareto optimal outcomes. We describe here the accuracy measures
for preference modeling methods, as we come back to them in Chapter 7, where we
compare the accuracy of various preference modeling techniques, using established
accuracy measures.
For example, Carbonneau et al. [49] calculate the Pearson correlation between the
real and estimated utility of the opponent's next bid. Hindriks and Tykhonov [113]
extend this approach by measuring the Pearson correlation of the whole outcome
space and discuss analogous denitions for the ranking distance. Our method in
Chapter 7 incorporates both measures. An alternative approach is to measure the
distance between elements of two preference proles. For example Jazayeriy et
al. [120] introduce such measures for the learning error of issue weights. We have
incorporated these measures in our method, and we also apply the same measures to
quantify the similarity between two full bid spaces.
Finally, there exist accuracy measures tailored to specic learning methods. Buett
and Spencer [45] for example, dene a metric for opponent models that use Bayesian
learning. The measure is dened as the average likelihood that the correct hypothesis
is chosen from the set of candidate hypotheses. Since we employ models in Chapter 6
and 7 that are based on a wide range of learning techniques, we do not incorporate
measures specic to a particular learning method.
We also quantify the relationship between accuracy and performance in Chapter 7. In
related work by Coehoorn and Jennings [60], a model is introduced that estimates the
opponent's issue weights and the inuence of small prediction errors on performance
is investigated. The method in this thesis takes this a step further, as we analyze
the relation between an exhaustive set of accuracy measures { including accuracy of
the issue weights { and performance.
Similarity between issue weights We can measure the accuracy of models that
estimate the issue weights of the opponent's preference prole in several ways [20, 113,
120]. All of them use a distance metric between the issue weights w = (w1;:::;wn)
of the real opponent preferences uop and the issue weights w0 = (w0
1;:::;w0
n) of the
estimated preferences u0
op. One way to do so is to measure the distance between the
issue weight vectors [120]:
dEuclidean(w;w
0) =
v u u t
n X
i=1
(wi   w0
i)2: (2.12)
46Of course, this measure can be used for scalars as well. When modeling the opponent's
deadline (or reservation value) x 2 R with an estimate x0, Equation (2.12) simplies
to
dEuclidean(x;x
0) = jx   x
0j: (2.13)
Another way is to check whether the issue weights are ranked correctly [113] by
evaluating all possible pairs of issues i1;:::;in:
drank(w;w
0) =
1
n2
n X
j=1
n X
k=1
c(ik;ij); (2.14)
where c(ik;ij) is the conict indicator function, which is equal to one when the
ranking of the weights of issues ik and ij diers between the two proles, and zero
otherwise. An alternative is to measure the correlation between the vectors [113]:
dPearson(w;w
0) =
n X
i=1
(wi   w)(w
0
i   w0)
s
n X
i=1
(wi   w)
2
n X
i=1
(w
0
i   w0)
2
: (2.15)
Note that this expression may be undened, for example when all weights are equal.
Similarity between preference proles When opponent models estimate the
opponent's preferences fully (e.g. [20, 45, 46, 113, 207, 211]), the quality of these
models depends on the similarity between the real uop and estimated opponent's
preference prole u0
op for all bids in the outcome space 
. One approach is to calculate
the average distance between all outcomes in 
 [20]:
dabs(uop;u
0
op) =
1
j
j
X
!2

j!   !
0j: (2.16)
However, in practice, the correct ranking of the bids can be sucient already. An
alternative is therefore to use the ranking distance of bids measure that compares all
preference orderings in a pairwise fashion [113]:
drank(uop;u
0
op) =
1
j
j2
X
!2
;!02

cu;u0(!;!
0); (2.17)
where cu;u0 is the conict indicator function, which is equal to one when the
ranking of the outcomes ! and !0 diers between the two proles, and zero other-
wise. Identically, Buett et al. count the amount of correctly estimated preference
relations [45, 46]. A disadvantage of these approaches is their scalability because
all possible outcome pairs need to be compared. This problem can be overcome by
47using a Monte Carlo simulation; however, a more ecient solution can be to use the
Pearson correlation of bids [113], which is dened as follows:
dPearson(uop;u
0
op) =
X
!2

(uop(!)   uop)(u
0
op(!)   u0
op)
sX
!2

(uop(!)   uop)
2 X
!2

(u
0
op(!)   u0
op)
2
(2.18)
A downside of this measure, although unlikely to occur in practice, is that it is not
dened for all inputs, for example when all bids are estimated to have the same
utility.
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A Component-based
Architecture to Explore the
Space of Negotiation
Strategies
In order to study the performance of the individual components of a negotiation strategy,
we introduce an architecture that distinguishes three components which together constitute
a negotiation strategy: the bidding strategy (B), the opponent model (O), and the acceptance
strategy (A). When decoupled, the components of dierent strategies can be recombined
to create new strategies. This then allows to pinpoint additional structure in most agent
designs and to explore the space of automated negotiating agents.
We implemented our BOA architecture in a generic evaluation environment for negotiating
agents (Appendix A), and we amended it with the strategy components of the International
Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (Appendix B). In doing so, we have a rich
evaluation tool at our disposal, together with a repository that contains many negotiating
agents and scenarios.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold: rst, we show that existing state-of-the-art
agents are compatible with this architecture by re-implementing them in the new framework;
second, as an application of our architecture, we systematically explore the space of possible
strategies by recombining dierent strategy components, resulting in negotiation strategies
that improve upon the current state-of-the-art in automated negotiation; nally, we show
how the BOA architecture can be applied to evaluate the performance of strategy components
and create novel negotiation strategies that outperform the state of the art.
51This chapter is based on the following publications:
Tim Baarslag, Koen Hindriks, Mark Hendrikx, Alex Dirkzwager, and Catholijn Jonker.
Decoupling negotiating agents to explore the space of negotiation strategies. In I. Marsa-
Maestre, M.A. Lopez-Carmona, T. Ito, M. Zhang, Q. Bai, and K. Fujita, editors, Novel
Insights in Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation, volume 535 of Studies in Compu-
tational Intelligence, pages 61{84. Springer, Japan, 2014
Tim Baarslag, Koen Hindriks, Mark Hendrikx, Alex Dirkzwager, and Catholijn Jonker.
Decoupling negotiating agents to explore the space of negotiation strategies. In Proceedings
of The Fifth International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations
(ACAN 2012), 2012
523.1 Introduction
In recent years, many new automated negotiation agents have been developed in
the search for an eective, generic automated negotiator. There is now a large
body of negotiation strategies available, and with the emergence of the International
Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC, see Appendix B), new strategies
are generated on a yearly basis.
While methods exist to determine the best negotiation agent given a set of agents
(cf. Section 2.4), we still do not know which type of agent is most eective in general,
and especially why. It is impossible to exhaustively search the large (in fact, innite)
space of negotiation strategies; therefore, there is a need for a systematic way of
searching this space for eective candidates.
Many of the sophisticated agent strategies that currently exist are comprised of a
xed set of modules. Generally, a distinction can be made between three dierent
modules: one module that decides whether the opponent's bid is acceptable; one
that decides what set of bids could be proposed next; and nally, one that tries to
guess the opponent's preferences and takes this into account when selecting an oer
to send out. The negotiation strategy is a result of the complex interaction between
these components, of which the individual performance may vary signicantly. For
instance, an agent may contain a module that predicts the opponent's preferences
very well, but utility-wise, the agent may still perform badly because it concedes far
too quickly.
This entails that overall performance measures, such as average utility obtained in a
tournament, make it hard to pinpoint which components of an agent work well. To
date, no ecient method exists to identify to which of the components the success
of a negotiating agent can be attributed. Finding such a method would allow to
develop better negotiation strategies, resulting in better agreements; the idea being
that well-performing components together will constitute a well-performing agent.
To tackle this problem, we propose to analyze three components of the agent design
separately. We show that most of the currently existing negotiating agents can be
tted into the so-called BOA architecture by putting together three main compo-
nents in a particular way; namely: a Bidding strategy, an Opponent model, and an
Acceptance condition. We support this claim by re-implementing, among others,
the ANAC agents to t into our architecture. Furthermore, we show that the BOA
agents are equivalent to their original counterparts.
The advantages of tting agents into the BOA architecture are threefold: rst, it
allows the study of the behavior and performance of the individual components;
second, it allows to systematically explore the space of possible negotiation strate-
gies; third, the identication of isolated components simplies the creation of new
negotiation strategies.
53Finally, we demonstrate the value of our architecture by assembling, from already
existing components, new negotiating agents that perform better than the agents
from which they are created. This shows that by recombining the best performing
components, the BOA architecture can yield better performing agents.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the BOA agent
architecture is introduced, and we outline a research agenda on how to employ it.
Section 3.3 provides evidence that many of the currently existing agents t into
the BOA architecture, and discusses challenges in decoupling existing negotiation
strategies. Finally, in Section 3.4 we discuss lessons learned and provide directions
on how we will apply the BOA framework in later chapters.
3.2 The BOA Agent Architecture
In the last decade, many dierent negotiation strategies have been introduced in
the pursuit of a versatile and eective automated negotiator (see related work in
Section 2.3). Despite this diversity, there is some common structure to the overall
design of the agents. For example, every agent decides whether the opponent's oer
is acceptable, and if not, what oer should be proposed instead. When the agent
decides to make a counter-oer, it considers its own utility, but it usually also takes
the opponent's utility into account.
Current work often focuses on optimizing the negotiation strategy as a whole. We
propose to direct our attention to a component-based approach, especially now that
we have access to a large repository of mutually comparable negotiation strategies
due to ANAC. This approach has several advantages:
1. Given measures for the eectiveness of the individual components of a negotia-
tion strategy, we are able to pinpoint the most promising components, which
gives insight into the reasons for success of the strategy;
2. Focusing on the most eective components helps to systematically search the
space of negotiation strategies by recombining them into new strategies.
In this section, we outline the key components of the BOA agent framework and we
outline a research agenda on applying it to current agent design.
3.2.1 The BOA Agent
Based on a survey of literature and the implementations of currently existing nego-
tiation agents, we have identied three main components of a general negotiation
strategy: a bidding strategy, possibly an opponent model, and an acceptance condition
(BOA). The elements of a BOA agent are visualized in Figure 3.1.
54Figure 3.1: The BOA architecture negotiation ow.
We make a distinction between two types of components: elements that are part
of the agent's negotiation environment, and components that are part of the agent
itself. The negotiation environment includes the bidding history of the ongoing
negotiation, the negotiation domain, which holds the information of possible bids
and other negotiation constraints, and the preferences described by the utility spaces
of the agents (all of which are dened in Chapter 2).
In order to t an agent into the BOA architecture, it should be possible to distinguish
these components in the agent design:1
1. Bidding strategy (B). At each turn, the bidding strategy determines the
counter oer by rst generating a set of bids, depending on factors such as the
opponent's oers, a target threshold, time, and so on. Note that during this
stage, the agent only considers what concessions it deems appropriate given
its own preferences. The bidding strategy can consult the opponent model (if
present) by passing one or multiple bids to see how they compare within the
estimated opponent's utility space.
Input: opponent utility of bids, negotiation history.
Output: provisional upcoming bid !.
2. Opponent model (O). An opponent model is a learning technique that
constructs a model of the opponent's preferences. In our approach, the opponent
model should be able to estimate the opponent's utility of any given bid. The
BOA architecture focuses on opponent models which estimate the (partial)
preference prole, because most existing available implementations t in this
category; however, in principle, our architecture can accommodate for the other
types of opponent models as well and may use the preference model to learn
other attributes as well (e.g., predicting the opponent's strategy).
Input: set of bids B, negotiation history.
Output: estimated opponent utility of the bids in B.
3. Acceptance Condition (A). The acceptance condition decides whether the
opponent's oer should be accepted. If the opponent's bid is not accepted, the
1An exposition of the agents we tted into our framework is given in the next section, which
will further motivate the choices made below.
55bid generated by the bidding strategy is oered instead.
Input: provisional upcoming bid !, negotiation history.
Output: accept, or send out the upcoming bid !.
The components interact in the following way (the full process is visualized in
Figure 3.1): when receiving the opponent's bid, the BOA agent rst updates the
bidding history and opponent model, maximizing the information known about the
environment and opponent.
Figure 3.2: The bidding strategy sets a target utility range, which is a subset of all
acceptable outcomes. From these outcomes, the opponent model selects the oers
that are also good for the opponent.
Given the opponent bid, the bidding strategy determines the counter oer by rst
generating a set of bids with a similar preference for the agent. Note that during
this stage, the agent only considers what concessions it deems appropriate given its
own preferences. The bidding strategy then uses the opponent model (if present) to
select a bid from this set by taking the opponent's utility into account.
Finally, the acceptance condition decides whether the opponent's action should be
accepted. If the opponent's bid is not accepted by the acceptance condition, then the
bid generated by the bidding strategy is oered instead. At rst glance, it may seem
counter-intuitive to make this decision at the end of the agent's deliberation cycle.
56Clearly, deciding upon acceptance at the beginning would have the advantage of not
wasting resources on generating an oer that might never be sent out. However,
generating an oer rst allows us to employ acceptance conditions that depend on
the utility of the counter bid that is ready to be sent out. This method is widely
used in existing agents, as we shall see in our exposition of acceptance conditions
in Chapter 4. Such acceptance mechanisms can make a more informed decision by
postponing their decision on accepting until the last step; therefore, and given our
aim to incorporate as many agent designs as possible, we adopt this approach in our
architecture.
To better understand how the dierent components work together, we might view the
negotiation process as a search problem, where the negotiation strategy explores the
outcome space for a contract that both parties are willing to agree upon (Figure 3.2).
The bidding strategy controls the rate of concession by setting the target utility
range (B), which determines the general location of the oer in the outcome space
according to the agent's own utility. The opponent model can restrict this area even
further, by rening the possible oers to bids that are near the Pareto frontier, and
hence are good for the opponent (O). Finally, the acceptance condition denes the
area that consists of all acceptable outcomes (A), depending on the jump the agent
is willing to make towards the opponent in order to reach an agreement.
3.2.2 Employing the BOA Architecture
We have implemented the BOA architecture as an extension of the Genius frame-
work [163] that we outline in Appendix A. The framework was developed as a research
tool to facilitate the design of negotiation strategies and to aid in the evaluation of
negotiation algorithms. It provides a exible and easy to use environment for imple-
menting agents and negotiation strategies as well as running negotiations. Genius
can further aid the development of a negotiation agents by acting as an analytical
toolbox, providing a variety of tools to analyze the negotiation agents performance,
based on the outcome and dynamics of the negotiation. The BOA architecture has
been integrated seamlessly into the Genius framework, oering the user the ability
to create and apply newly developed components using a graphical user interface
as depicted in Figure 3.3. From the perspective of Genius, a negotiation agent is
identical to a BOA agent, and therefore both types of agents can participate in the
same tournament.
In addition, we organized four annual negotiation competitions (ANAC) that had
more than 60 international participants in total. ANAC makes a wide variety of
benchmark negotiation strategies and scenarios available to the research community,
which we used to strengthen the capabilities of the BOA architecture. The repository
of strategies currently contains more than 40 automated negotiation strategies,
such as all ANAC 2010{2013 agents described in appendices C{F, the ABMP
strategy [127], the Zero Intelligence strategy [109], the QO-strategy [165], the
57Figure 3.3: The BOA components window in Genius gives an overview of all BOA
components in the repository. New components can be added and removed using a
graphical user interface. All components can be combined to create new negotiation
agents, which then can be evaluated in the analytical toolbox of Genius.
Bayesian strategy [112], and others. The repositories of domains and of agents allows
us to test the agents on the dierent domains and against dierent kinds of strategies.
The framework enables us to follow at least two approaches: rst of all, it allows us
to independently analyze the components of every negotiation strategy that ts in to
our architecture. For example, by re-implementing the ANAC agents in the BOA
architecture, it becomes possible to compare the accuracy of all ANAC opponent
models, and to pinpoint the best opponent model among them. Following this
approach, we are able to identify categories of opponent models that outperform
others; naturally, this helps to build better agents in the future.
Secondly, we can proceed to mix dierent BOA components, e.g.: replace the
opponent model of the runner-up of ANAC by a dierent opponent model and then
examine whether this makes a dierence in placement. Such a procedure enables us
to assess the reasons for an agent's success, and makes it possible to systematically
search for an eective automated negotiator.
The rst part of the approach gives insight in what components are best in isolation;
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the same time, both approaches raise some key theoretical questions, such as:
1. Can the BOA components be identied in all, or at least most, current negoti-
ating agents?
2. How do we measure the performance of the components? Can a single best
component be identied, or does this strongly depend on the other components?
3. If the individual components perform better than others (with respect to some
performance measure), does combining them in an agent also improve the
agent's performance?
In this chapter we do not aim to fully answer all of the above questions; instead,
we outline a research agenda for the rest of this thesis, and introduce the BOA
architecture as a tool that can be used towards answering these questions.
Nonetheless, in the next section, we will provide empirical support for an armative
answer to the rst theoretical question: indeed, in many cases the components of
the BOA architecture can be identied in current agents, and we will also provide
reasons for when this is not the case.
The answer to the second question depends on the component under consideration:
for an opponent model, it is straightforward to measure its eectiveness [113] (and we
will do so in Chapter 6 and 7): the closer the opponent model is to the actual prole
of the opponent, the better it is. The performance of the other two components of
the BOA architecture is better measured in terms of utility obtained in negotiation
(as will do for acceptance strategies in Chapter 4 and 5 and for bidding strategies in
Chapter 8), as there seems no clear alternative method to dene the eectiveness
of the acceptance condition or bidding strategy in isolation. In any case, the BOA
architecture can be used as a research tool to help answer such theoretical questions.
Regarding the third question: suppose we take the best performing bidding strategy,
equip it with the most faithful opponent model, and combine this with the most
eective acceptance condition; it would seem reasonable to assume this combination
results in an eective negotiator. We elaborate on this conjecture in Chapter 10.
3.3 Decoupling Existing Agents
In this section we provide empirical evidence that many of the currently existing
agents can be decoupled by separating the components of a set of state of the art
agents. This section serves three goals: rst, we discuss how existing agents can be
decoupled into a BOA agent; second, we argue that the BOA architecture design is
appropriate, as most agents will turn out to t in our architecture; third, we discuss
and apply a method to determine if the sum of the components { the BOA agent {
is equal in behavior to the original agent.
593.3.1 Identifying the Components
In this section we identify the components of 21 negotiating agents, taken from the
ANAC competition of 2010{2012 as described in Appendix B. We selected these
agents as they represent the state of the art in automated negotiation, having been
implemented by various negotiation experts.
Since the agents were not designed with decoupling in mind, all agents had to be re-
implemented to be supported by the BOA architecture. Our decoupling methodology
was to adapt an agent's algorithm to enable it to switch its components, without
changing the agent's functionality. A method call to specic functionality, such as
code specifying when to accept, was replaced by a more generic call to the acceptance
mechanism, which can then be swapped at will. The contract of the generic calls
are dened by the expected input and output of every component, as outlined in
Section 3.2.1.
As an example to illustrate the components within a strategy, we use IAMhag-
gler2011 [260], which nished third in ANAC 2011 (see Appendix D). When it
receives an oer, the acceptance condition of IAMhaggler2011 will only accept bids
that have a utility higher than a certain predened value. After that, IAMHag-
gler2011 employs an opponent model to approximate the rate at which the opponent
concedes, by inspecting the past oered bids. In order to nally choose a counter bid
to oer to the opponent, IAMhaggler2011 rst decides on a target utility, based on
its own concession rate, which is determined in such a way that the expected utility
is optimized.
The rst step in decoupling an agent is to determine which components can be
identied. For example, in the ANAC 2010 agent FSEGA (Appendix C), an accep-
tance condition, a bidding strategy, and an opponent model can all be identied.
The acceptance condition combines simple, utility{based criteria (dened later in
this thesis as ACconst and ACprev; see Chapter 4), and can be easily decoupled
in our architecture. The opponent model is a variant of the Bayesian opponent
model [112, 261] (which we dene later in Section 6.4.2), which is used to optimize
the opponent utility of a bid. Since this usage is consistent with our architecture
(i.e., the opponent model provides opponent utility information), the model can be
replaced by a call to the generic opponent model interface. The nal step is to change
the bidding strategy to use the generic opponent model and acceptance conditions
instead of its own specic implementation. In addition to this, the opponent model
and acceptance condition need to be altered to allow the other bidding strategies to
use it. Other agents can be decoupled using a similar process.
Unfortunately, some agent implementations contain slight dependencies between
dierent components. These dependencies needed to be resolved to separate the
design into singular components. For example, the acceptance condition and bidding
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such cases, the agent can be decoupled by introducing Shared Agent State (SAS)
classes. A SAS class avoids code duplication, and thus performance loss, by sharing
the code between the components. One of the components uses the SAS to calculate
the values of the required parameters and saves the results, while the other component
simply asks for the saved results instead of repeating the calculation.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of all agents that we re-implemented in our architecture,
and more specically, which components we were able to decouple. In fact, we were
able to decouple all ANAC 2010, and most ANAC 2011 and ANAC 2012 agents.
There were two agents (ValueModelAgent [88] and Meta-Agent [115, 116]) that were
not decoupled due to practical reasons, even though theoretically it is possible. The
ValueModelAgent was not decoupled because there were unusually strong dependen-
cies between its components. Decoupling the strategy would result in computationally
heavy components when trying to combine them with other components, making
them impractical to use. The ANAC 2012 Meta-Agent chooses an oer among 17
agents from the ANAC 2011 qualifying round. This agent was not decoupled because
it requires the decoupling of all 17 agents, of which only 8 optimized versions entered
the nals.
The CUHK Agent, like ValueModelAgent, is heavily coupled with multiple variables
that are shared between the bidding strategy and acceptance condition. This makes
it very hard to decouple and can make components unusable in combination with
other components (e.g. variables might not properly be set). However, since CUHK
Agent was placed rst in the ANAC 2012 competition, we decided to decouple its
bidding strategy, allowing it to work with other acceptance conditions and opponent
models.
Four additional agents were only partially decoupled: AgentLG, BRAMAgent, BRA-
MAgent2, and Gahbininho. As is evident from Table 3.1, the only obstacle in
decoupling these agents fully is their usage of the opponent model, as it can be
employed in many dierent ways. Some agents, such as Nice Tit for Tat, attempt
to estimate the Nash point on the Pareto frontier. Other common applications
include: ranking a set of bids according to the opponent utility, reciprocating in
opponent utility, and extrapolating opponent utility. The generic opponent model
interface needs to suciently accommodate such requirements from the bidding
strategy to make interchangeability possible. For this reason we require the opponent
model interface to be able to produce the estimated opponent utility of an arbitrary
negotiation outcome.
With regard to the opponent model, there are three groups of agents: rst, there
are agents such as FSEGA [226], which use an opponent model that can be freely
interchanged; second, there are agents such as the ANAC 2010 winner Agent K [129],
which do not have an opponent model themselves, but can be extended to use one.
2Descriptions of all ANAC 2011 agents can be found in Appendix D.
61ANAC 2010 B O A
FSEGA [226] X X X
Agent K [130] X ? X
Agent Smith [249] X X X
IAMcrazyHaggler [261] X ? X
HardHeaded [250] X X X
CUHK Agent [103, 102] X { {
IAMhaggler [261] X X X
Nozomi [130] X ? X
Yushu [4] X ? X
ANAC 2011 B O A
Agent K2 [132] X ? X
BRAMAgent [86] X { X
Gahboninho [35] X { X
IAMhaggler2011 [263] X ? X
Nice Tit for Tat [29] X X X
The Negotiator [67] X ? X
ANAC 2012 B O A
AgentLG X ? X
AgentMR [180] X ? X
BRAMAgent2 X { X
IAMhagger2012 X ? X
OMAC Agent [54] X ? X
The Negotiator Reloaded X X X
Table 3.1: Overview of the BOA components found in every agent. X: original has
component, which can be decoupled. ?: original has no such component, but it can
be added. { : no support for such a component.
Such agents typically employ a bidding strategy that rst decides upon a specic
target utility range, and then picks a random bid within that range. These agents
can easily be tted with an opponent model instead, by passing the utility range
through the opponent model before sending out the bid. Lastly, there are agents,
for example Gahboninho and BRAMAgent, that use a similarity heuristic which is
not compatible with our architecture, as their opponent models do not yield enough
information to compute the opponent utility of bids. For these type of agents, we
consider the opponent model part of the bidding strategy. AgentLG also uses an
opponent model which is not compatible with our BOA architecture; however, it has
been adopted to be able to use other opponent models.
When decoupling the agents, we can distinguish dierent classes within each com-
ponent, except for the bidding strategy component, which varies greatly between
62di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main types of opponent models being used: Bayesian models, Frequency models,
and Value models. Bayesian models are an implementation of a (scalable) model of
the opponent preferences that is updated using Bayesian learning [112, 270]. The
main characteristic of frequency based models is that they track the frequency of
occurrence of issues and values in the opponent's bids and use this information to
estimate the opponent's preferences. Value models take this approach a step further
and solely focus on the frequency of the issue values. In practice, Bayesian models
are computationally intensive, whereas frequency and value models are relatively
light-weight.
Similar to the opponent models, most agents use variations and combinations of a
small set of acceptance conditions. Specically, many agents use simple thresholds
for deciding when to accept (called ACconst in Chapter 4) and linear functions
that depend on the utility of the bid under consideration (called ACnext(;) in
Chapter 4).
3.3.2 Testing Equivalence of BOA Agents
A BOA agent should behave identically to the agent from which its components are
derived. Equivalence can be veried in two ways; rst, given the same negotiation
environment and the same state, both agents should behave in exactly identical ways;
second, the performance in a real time negotiation of both agents should be similar.
Identical Behavior Test
Two deterministic agents can be considered equivalent if they perform the same
action given the same negotiation trace. There are two main problems in determining
equivalence: rst, most agents are non-deterministic, as they behave randomly in
certain circumstances; for example, when picking from a set of bids of similar utility;
second, the default protocol in Genius uses real time [163], which is highly inuenced
by CPU performance. This means that in practice, two runs of the same negotiation
are never exactly equivalent.
To be able to run an equivalence test despite agents choosing actions at random, we
xed the seeds of the random functions of the agents. The challenge of working in
real time was dealt with by changing the real time deadline to a maximum amount
of rounds. Since time does not pass within a round, cpu performance does not play
a role.
All agents were evaluated on the ANAC 2011 domains (see Appendix D for a domain
analysis). The ANAC 2011 domains vary widely in characteristics: the number of
issues ranges from 1 to 8, the size from 3 to 390625 possible outcomes, and the
discount from none (1:0) to strong (0:424). Some ANAC 2010 agents, specically
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on a subset of these domains.
The opponent strategies used in the identical behavior test should satisfy two prop-
erties: the opponent strategy should be deterministic, and secondly, the opponent
strategy should not be the rst to accept, to avoid masking errors in the agent's
acceptance condition. Given these two criteria, we used the standard time-dependent
tactics [75, 83] described in Section 2.3.3 for the opponent bidding strategy. Speci-
cally, we use Hardliner (e = 0), Conceder Linear (e = 1), and Conceder (e = 2). In
addition, we use the Oer Decreasing agent, which oers the set of all possible bids
in decreasing order of utility.
All original and BOA agents were evaluated against these four opponents, using both
preference proles dened on all eight ANAC 2011 domains. Both strategies were run
in parallel, making sure that the moves made by both agents were equivalent at each
moment. After the experiments were performed, the results indicated that all BOA
agents were exactly identical to their original counterparts except for AgentMR and
AgentLG. Both these agents do not have identical behavior with its BOA counter-
part because of the order in which the components are called; their implementation
requires that they rst test if the opponent's bid is acceptable, and then determine
the bid to oer. As discussed above, this is exactly the opposite of what the BOA
agent does.
Similar Performance Test
Two agents can perform the same action given the same input, but may still achieve
dierent results because of dierences in their real time performance. When decou-
pling agents, there is a trade-o between the performance and interchangeability
of components. For example, most agents record only a partial negotiation history,
while some acceptance strategies require the full history of the agent and/or its
opponent. In such cases, the agent can be constrained to be incompatible with
these acceptance strategies, or generalized to work with the full set of available
acceptance strategies. We typically elected the most universal approach, even when
this negatively inuenced performance. We will demonstrate that while there is some
performance loss when decoupling existing agents, it does not signicantly impact
the negotiation outcome.
The performance of the BOA agents was tested by letting them participate in a
tournament with the same setup as ANAC 2011. The decoupled ANAC 2011 agents
replaced the original agents, resulting in a tournament with eight participants. For
the other BOA agents this was not possible, as their original counterparts did not
participate in the ANAC 2011 competition. Therefore, for each of these agents we
ran a modied tournament in which we added the original agent to the pool of ANAC
2011 agents, resulting in a tournament with nine participants. Next, we repeated
this process for the BOA agents and evaluated the similarity of the results.
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HardHeaded 0.891 0.818 0.961 0.664 0.725 0.747 0.683 0.571 0.757
Gahboninho 0.912 0.659 0.928 0.681 0.667 0.744 0.726 0.571 0.736
Agent K2 0.759 0.719 0.922 0.467 0.705 0.777 0.703 0.429 0.685
IAMhaggler 2011 0.769 0.724 0.873 0.522 0.725 0.814 0.749 0.300 0.685
BRAMAgent 0.793 0.737 0.815 0.420 0.724 0.744 0.661 0.571 0.683
The Negotiator 0.792 0.744 0.913 0.524 0.716 0.748 0.674 0.320 0.679
Nice Tit for Tat 0.733 0.765 0.796 0.508 0.759 0.767 0.660 0.420 0.676
ValueModelAgent 0.839 0.778 0.935 0.012 0.767 0.762 0.661 0.137 0.611
Table 3.2: ANAC 2011 reference results of the original agents using our hardware (n
= 10). Best results are marked bold.
For our experimental setup we used computers that were slower compared to the
IRIDIS high-performance computing cluster that was used to run ANAC 2011. As
we were therefore unable to reproduce exactly the same data as in Appendix D,
we rst recreated our own ANAC 2011 tournament data as depicted in Table 3.2,
which is used as our baseline to benchmark the decoupled agents. The dierence
in performance caused small changes compared to the ocial ANAC 2011 ranking,
causing Agent K2 to move up from 5th to 3rd place.
Table 3.3 provides an overview of the results. We evaluated the performance in terms
of the the dierence in overall utility as well as the dierence in time of agreement
between the original and the BOA agents. The table does not list the agents that
were not decoupled, and we also omitted The Negotiator Reloaded from the test set,
as this agent was already submitted as a fully decoupled BOA agent.
From the results, we can conclude that the variation between the original and
the BOA version is minimal; the majority of the standard deviations for both the
dierence in overall utility and time of agreement are close to zero. The largest
dierence between the original and decoupled agents with regard to the average
time of agreement is 0.010 (Agent Smith); and for the average utility the largest
dierence is 0.015 (BRAMAgent2). Hence, in all cases the BOA agents and their
original counterparts show comparable performance.
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Di. time
agr.
SD time
agr.
Di.
utility
SD
utility
Agent K [130] 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.006
Agent Smith [249] 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.006
FSEGA [226] 0.001 0.004 0 0.003
IAMcrazyHaggler [261] -0.004 0.012 0.003 0.013
IAMhaggler [261] 0.003 0.015 0.002 0.011
Nozomi 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.008
Yushu [4] 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005
Agent K2 [132] 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.005
BRAMAgent [86] 0.004 0.011 0 0.006
Gahboninho [35] 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.005
HardHeaded [250] -0.003 0.003 -0.009 0.004
IAMhaggler2011 [263] -0.010 0.013 -0.002 0.003
Nice Tit for Tat [29] 0.006 0.010 -0.008 0.005
The Negotiator [67] 0 0.002 0 0.004
BRAMAgent2 0.002 0.011 -0.015 0.012
IAMhaggler2012 -0.005 0.006 -0.013 0.003
OMAC Agent [54] 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.015
Table 3.3: Dierences in overall utility and time of agreement between the origi-
nal agents and their decoupled version. Positive dierence means the BOA agent
performed better.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduces an architecture that distinguishes the bidding strategy, the
opponent model, and the acceptance condition in negotiation agents, and recombines
these components to systematically explore the space of automated negotiation
strategies. The main idea behind the BOA architecture is that we can identify several
components in a negotiating agent, all of which can be optimized individually. Our
motivation in the end is to create a procient negotiating agent by combining the
best components.
We have shown that many of the existing negotiation strategies can be re-tted
into our architecture. We identied and classied the key components in them, and
we have demonstrated that the original agents and their decoupled versions have
identical behavior and similar performance.
With the BOA framework in place, the obvious direction to take is to analyze the
BOA components in isolation, which we will do in the subsequent chapters. After
identifying the best performing components, we answer in Chapter 10 whether
66combining eective components leads to better overall results, and whether an
optimally performing agent can be created by taking the best of every component.
We also answer the question which of the BOA components turns out to be most
important with regard to the overall performance of an agent. Our architecture
allows us to make these questions precise and provides a tool for answering them.
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Effective Acceptance
Conditions
An essential part of our framework outlined in Chapter 3 is the acceptance strategy of an
agent. In every negotiation with a deadline, one of the negotiating parties must accept an
oer to avoid a break o. As a break o is usually an undesirable outcome for both parties,
it is important that a negotiator employs a procient mechanism to decide under which
conditions to accept. When designing such conditions, one is faced with the acceptance
dilemma: accepting the current oer may be suboptimal, as better oers may still be
presented before time runs out. On the other hand, accepting too late may prevent an
agreement from being reached, resulting in a break o with no gain for either party.
Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations between automated agents and by the
results and insights of the automated negotiating agents competition of 2010, we classify and
compare state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions in this chapter. We perform extensive
experiments to compare the performance of various acceptance conditions in combination
with a broad range of bidding strategies and negotiation scenarios. Furthermore, we
propose new acceptance conditions and we demonstrate that they outperform the other
conditions. We also provide insight into why some conditions work better than others and
investigate correlations between the properties of the negotiation scenario and the ecacy
of acceptance conditions.
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704.1 Introduction
In 2010, seven new negotiation strategies were created to participate in the rst auto-
mated negotiating agents competition (ANAC 2010, see Appendix C) in conjunction
with the Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS-10). During post tournament analysis of the results, it became
apparent that dierent agent implementations use various conditions to decide when
to accept an oer. It is important for every negotiator to employ such a mechanism
to decide under which conditions to accept, because in every negotiation with a
deadline, one of the negotiating parties has to accept in order to avoid a break o.
However, designing a proper acceptance condition is a dicult task: accepting too
late may result in the break o of a negotiation, while accepting too early may result
in suboptimal agreements.
The importance of choosing an appropriate acceptance condition is conrmed by the
results of ANAC 2010 (see Table 4.1). Agents with simple acceptance conditions
were ranked at the bottom, while the more sophisticated time- and utility-based
conditions obtained a higher score. For instance, the low ranking of Agent Smith
was due to a mistake in the implementation of the acceptance condition [249].
Despite its importance, the theory and practice of acceptance conditions has not yet
received much attention. The goal of this chapter is to classify current approaches and
to compare acceptance conditions in an experimental setting. Thus in this chapter
we will concentrate on the nal part of the negotiation process: the acceptation of an
oer. We focus on decoupled acceptance conditions: i.e., generic acceptance conditions
that can be used in conjunction with an arbitrary bidding strategy and hence, t into
the BOA architecture described in Chapter 3. The reason for this is straightforward:
we want to be able to re-incorporate the acceptance conditions that have been found
most eective into new agent designs; therefore, the acceptance conditions under
investigation should not be coupled with a specic agent implementation.
The contribution of this chapter is fourfold:
1. We give an overview and provide a categorization of current decoupled accep-
tance conditions.
2. We introduce a formal negotiation model that supports the use of arbitrary
acceptance conditions.
3. We compare a large selection of current generic acceptance conditions and
evaluate them in an experimental setting.
4. We propose new acceptance conditions and test them against established
acceptance conditions, using varying types of bidding techniques.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 denes a formal
model of accepting in negotiation and provides an overview of current acceptance
71Rank Agent Acceptance condition
1 Agent K Time and utility based
2 Yushu Time and utility based
3 Nozomi Time and utility based
4 IAMhaggler Utility based only
5 FSEGA Utility based only
6 IAMcrazyHaggler Utility based only
7 Agent Smith Time and utility based
Table 4.1: An overview of the rank of every agent in ANAC 2010 and the type
of acceptance conditions that they employ. Agents using time and utility based
acceptance conditions were ranked at the top, except for Agent Smith, which had a
faulty acceptance mechanism.
conditions. In Section 4.3, we also consider combinations of acceptance conditions.
Section 4.4 discusses our experimental setup and results, which demonstrate that
some combinations outperform traditional acceptance conditions. Finally, Section 4.5
outlines the conclusions of this chapter.
4.2 Acceptance Conditions in Negotiation
We focus on acceptance conditions that are decoupled: i.e. generic acceptance
conditions that are not tied to a specic agent implementation and hence can be used
in conjunction with an arbitrary bidding strategy. We rst dene a general negotiation
model that ts current decoupled acceptance conditions. We have surveyed existing
negotiation agents to examine the acceptance conditions that they employ. We then
categorize them according to the input that they use in their decision making process.
4.2.1 A Formal Model of Accepting
We briey review our denitions of Section 2.2.2. The interaction between the agents
is regulated by the alternating-oers protocol supplemented with a real time line T ,
represented here by T = [0;1], so that the deadline occurs at t = 1. This is the same
setup as [82], with the exception that issues are not necessarily real-valued and both
agents have the same deadline.
We represent by xt
A!B the negotiation outcome proposed by agent A to agent B
at time t. A negotiation thread (cf. [75, 229]) between two agents A and B at time
t 2 T is dened as a nite sequence
H
t
A$B :=
 
x
t1
p1!p2;x
t2
p2!p3;x
t3
p3!p4;:::;x
tn
pn!pn+1

; (4.1)
72which satises the following constraints:
1. The oers are ordered over time T : tk  tl for k  l.
2. The oers are alternating between the agents: pk = pk+2 2 fA;Bg for all k.
3. All ti represent instances of time T , with tn  t,
4. The agents exchange complete oers: xtk
pk!pk+1 2 
 for k 2 f1;:::;ng.
The last element of Ht
A$B may also be equal to Accept or End. We will say a
negotiation thread is active if this is not the case.
We now formally dene how an agent reaches the decision to accept. When agent
A receives an oer xt
B!A from agent B sent at time t, it has to decide at a later
time t0 > t whether to accept the oer, or to send a counter-oer xt0
A!B. Given a
negotiation thread Ht
A$B between agents A and B, we can formally express the
action performed by A with an action function XA:
XA(t
0;x
t
B!A) =
8
<
:
End if t0  1
Accept if ACA(t0;xt0
A!B;Ht
A$B)
Oer xt0
A!B otherwise
(4.2)
Note that we extend the setting of [82, 229] by introducing the acceptance condition
ACA of an agent A. When used in this way, the model enables us to study arbitrary
decoupled acceptance conditions. The acceptance condition ACA takes as input
I = (t
0;x
t0
A!B;H
t
A$B); (4.3)
the tuple containing the current time t0, the oer xt0
A!B that the agent considers as
a bid (in line with the bidding strategy the agent uses), and the active negotiation
thread Ht
B$A.
The resulting action given by the function XA(t0;xt
B!A) is used to extend the current
negotiation thread between the two agents. If the agent does not accept the current
oer, and the deadline has not been reached, it will prepare a counter-oer xt0
A!B by
using a bidding strategy or tactic to generate new values for the negotiable issues.
As explained in Section 2.3.3, tactics can take many forms, e.g. time-dependent,
resource dependent, imitative, and so on [229]. In our setup we will consider the
tactics as given and try to optimize the accompanying acceptance conditions.
4.2.2 Acceptance Conditions
Let an active negotiation thread
H
t
A$B =

x
t1
p1!p2;x
t2
p2!p3;:::;x
tn 1
A!B;x
tn
B!A

;
be given at time t0 > t = tn, so that it is agent A's turn to perform an action.
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decide whether to accept, as dened by equation (4.2). In practice, most agents do
not use the full negotiation thread to decide whether it is time to accept. For instance
many agent implementations, such as [82, 83, 229], use the following implementation
of ACA(I):
ACA(t
0;x
t0
A!B;H
t
A$B) () uA(x
t
B!A)  uA(x
t0
A!B):
That is, A will accept when the utility uA of the opponent's last oer at time
t is greater than the value of the oer agent A is ready to send out at time t0.
The acceptance condition above depends on the agent's upcoming oer xt0
A!B. For
; 2 R this may be generalized as follows:
AC
I
next(;)
def ()   uA(x
t
B!A) +   uA(x
t0
A!B): (4.4)
We can view  as the scale factor by which we multiply the opponent's bid, while 
species the minimal `utility gap' [125] that is sucient to accept.
Analogously, we have acceptance conditions [112, 125, 226, 261] that rely on the
agent's previous oer x
tn 1
A!B:
AC
I
prev(;)
def ()   uA(x
t
B!A) +   uA(x
tn 1
A!B): (4.5)
Note that this acceptance condition does not take into account the time that is left
in the negotiation, nor any oers made previous to time t. However, it is important
to bear in mind that the behavior of the acceptance condition may still be inuenced
implicitly by these factors, because of the possibility that the bidding strategy takes
such factors into account.
Other acceptance conditions may rely on other measures, such as the remaining
negotiation time or a utility threshold. For example, there is a very simple acceptance
criterion [226, 249, 261] that only compares the opponent's previous oer with a
threshold :
AC
I
const()
def () uA(x
t
B!A)  : (4.6)
Last but not least, instead of considering utility, agents (such as [249]) may employ
a time-based condition to accept after a certain amount of time T 2 T has passed:
AC
I
time(T)
def () t
0  T: (4.7)
We will omit the superscript I in equations (4.4) to (4.7) when it is clear from
the context. We will use these general acceptance conditions to classify existing
acceptance mechanisms in the next section.
74Acceptance Condition   T Agent
ACprev(;) 1.03 0 - FSEGA,
Bayesian Agent
1 0 - Agent Smith
1.02 0 - IAM(crazy)Haggler
1 0.02 - ABMP
ACnext(;) 1 0 - FSEGA, Boulware,
Conceder, Trade-o,
Equilibrium strategies
1.02 0 - IAM(crazy)Haggler
1.03 0 - Bayesian Agent
ACconst() 1 - - FSEGA
0.9 - - Agent Smith
0.88 - - IAM(crazy)Haggler
ACtime(T) - - 0.92 Agent Smith
Table 4.2: A selection of existing decoupled acceptance conditions found in literature
and current agent implementations.
4.2.3 Existing Acceptance Conditions
We give a short overview of decoupled acceptance conditions used in literature and
current agent implementations. We are primarily interested in acceptance conditions
that are not specically designed for a single agent. We do not claim the list
below is complete; however it serves as a good starting point to categorize current
decoupled acceptance conditions. We surveyed the entire pool of agents of ANAC
2010, including Agent K, Nozomi [131], Yushu [4], IAM(crazy)Haggler [261], FSEGA
[226], and Agent Smith [249]. We also examined well-known agents from literature,
such as the Trade-o agent [76], the Bayesian learning agent [112], ABMP [125],
equilibrium strategies of [83], and time-dependent negotiation strategies as dened
in Section 2.3.3, i.e., the Boulware and Conceder tactics.
Listed in Table 4.2 is a selection of generic acceptance conditions found.
Some agents also use logical combinations of dierent acceptance conditions at the
same time. This explains why some agents are listed multiple times in the table. For
example, both IAMHaggler and IAMcrazyHaggler [261] accept precisely when
ACconst(0:88) _ ACnext(1:02;0) _ ACprev(1:02;0):
We will not focus on the many possible combinations of all acceptance conditions
that may thus be obtained; we will study the basic acceptance conditions in isolation
with varying parameters. However in addition to this, we study a small selection of
combinations in Section 4.3. We leave further combinations for future research.
75As can be seen from Table 4.2, the most commonly used acceptance condition in our
sample is ACnext = ACnext(1;0), which is the familiar condition of accepting when
the opponent's last oer is better than the planned oer of the agent. The function
 7! ACprev(1;) can be viewed as an acceptance condition that accepts when the
utility gap [125] between the parties is smaller than . We denote this condition by
ACgap().
4.3 Combined Acceptance Conditions
We dene three acceptance conditions that are designed to perform well in conjunction
with an arbitrary bidding strategy. This will incorporate all ideas behind the
traditional acceptance conditions we have described so far. We will show in Section 4.4
that they work better than the majority of simple generic conditions listed in Table 4.2.
From a negotiation point of view, it makes sense to alter the behavior of an acceptance
condition when time is running short. For example, many ANAC agents such as
Yushu, Nozomi and FSEGA [4, 226, 131] split the negotiation into dierent intervals
of time and apply dierent sub-strategies to each interval.
The basic idea behind combined acceptance conditions ACcombi is similar. In case
the bidding strategy plans to propose a deal that is worse than the opponent's oer,
we have reached a consensus with our opponent and we accept the oer. However, if
there still exists a gap between our oer and time is short, the acceptance condition
should wait for an oer that is not expected to improve in the remaining time. Thus
ACcombi is designed to be a proper extension of ACnext, with adaptive behavior
based on recent bidding behavior near the deadline.
To dene ACcombi, suppose an active negotiation thread
H
t
A$B =

x
t1
p1!p2;x
t2
p2!p3;:::;x
tn 1
A!B;x
tn
B!A

;
is given at time t0 > t = tn > 1
2 near the deadline, when it is agent A's turn. Note
that there is r = 1   t0 time remaining in the negotiation, which we will call the
remaining time window. A good sample of what might be expected in the remaining
time window consists of the bids that were exchanged during the previous time
window W = [t0   r;t0]  T of the same size.
Let
H
W
B!A =

x
s
B!A 2 H
t
A$B j s 2 W
	
denote all bids oered by B to A in time window W. We can now formulate the
average and maximum utility that was oered during the previous time window in
the negotiation thread H = HW
B!A:
MAX
W = max
x2H
uA(x);
76and
AVG
W =
1
jHj
X
x2H
uA(x):
We let ACcombi(T;) accept at time t0 exactly when the following holds: ACnext
indicates that we have to accept, or we have almost reached the deadline (t0  T)
and the current oer suces (i.e. better than ) given the remaining time:
ACcombi(T;)
def ()
ACnext _ ACtime(T) ^ (uA(xt
B!A)  ).
(4.8)
Note that Equation (4.8) denes ACcombi(T;) in such a way that it splits the
negotiation time into two phases: [0;T) and [T;1], with dierent behavior in both
cases.
We will consider three dierent combined acceptance conditions:
1. ACcombi(T;MAX
W): the current oer is good enough when it is better than
all oers seen in the previous time window W,
2. ACcombi(T;AVG
W): the oer is better than the average utility of oers during
the previous time window W,
3. ACcombi(T;MAX
T ): the oer should be better than any bid seen before.
4.4 Experiments
In order to experimentally test the ecacy of an acceptance condition, we considered
a negotiation setup with the following characteristics. We equipped a set of agents
(as dened later) with an acceptance condition, and measured the result against other
agents in the following way. Suppose agent A is equipped with acceptance condition
ACA and negotiates with agent B. The two parties may reach a certain outcome
! 2 
, for which A receives the associated utility uA(!). The score for A is averaged
over all trials on various domains (see Section 4.4.1), alternating between the two
preference proles dened on that domain. E.g., on the negotiation scenario between
England and Zimbabwe, A will play both as England and as Zimbabwe against all
others. This average utility score is then an indication of the ecacy of ACA.
For our experimental setup we employed Genius as described in Appendix A. It
supports the alternating oer protocol with a real-time deadline as outlined in our
negotiation model. The default negotiation time in Genius and in the setup of
ANAC is 3 minutes per negotiation session; therefore we use the same value in our
experiments.
774.4.1 Detailed Experimental Setup
Agents
We use the negotiation strategies that were submitted to The Automated Negotiating
Agents Competition (ANAC 2010, see Appendix C). The seven agents that partici-
pated in ANAC 2010 were implemented by various international research groups of
negotiation experts. Firstly, we removed the built-in acceptance mechanism from
this representative group of agents; this left us with its pure bidding strategies. In
terms of our BOA architecture described in Chapter 3, we replaced the acceptance
strategy of the agents, but we left the bidding strategy and opponent modeling
component intact. As outlined in our negotiation model, this procedure allowed us
to test arbitrary acceptance conditions in tandem with any ANAC tactic.
We aimed to tune our acceptance conditions to the top performing ANAC 2010
agents. Therefore we selected the top 3 of ANAC agents that were submitted by
dierent research groups, namely Agent K, Yushu and IAMhaggler (we omitted
Nozomi as the designing group also implemented Agent K, cf. Table 4.1). For the set
of opponents, we selected all agents from ANAC 2010, for the acceptance conditions
should be tested against a wide array of strategies. The opponents also had their
built-in acceptance conditions removed (and hence were not able to accept), so
that dierences in results would depend entirely on the acceptance condition under
consideration. To test the ecacy of an acceptance condition, we equipped the top 3
bidding strategies with this condition and compared the average utility obtained by
the three agents when negotiating against their opponents.
Domains
The specics of a negotiation domain can be of great inuence on the negotiation
outcome [113]. Acceptance conditions have to be assessed on negotiation domains of
dierent size and complexity. Negotiation results also depend on the opposition of the
parties' preferences (see Section 2.2.4). Strong opposition is typical of competitive
domains, when a gain for one party can be achieved only at a loss for the other party.
Conversely, weak opposition means that both parties achieve either losses or gains
simultaneously.
With this in mind, we aimed for a good spread of negotiation characteristics by
selecting four dierent negotiation scenarios with two preference proles each (see
Table 4.3). We picked two domains from the three that were used in ANAC 2010
(cf. Appendix C). We also selected two negotiation scenarios from the ANAC 2011
competition (cf. Appendix D) to include both a smaller and a larger domain to our
experimental setup.
We omitted the largest domains that featured in ANAC 2010 and 2011, as some
78Laptop Itex{Cyp Eng{Zim Grocery
Size 27 180 576 1600
Opposition Weak Strong Medium Medium
Mean utility 0.67 0.48 0.58 0.44
Nash Point (1.00, 0.82) (0.72, 0.67) (0.91, 0.73) (0.84, 0.90)
K-S Point (0.87, 0.87) (0.72, 0.67) (0.82, 0.79) (0.84, 0.90)
Table 4.3: The eight preference proles from ANAC 2010 and ANAC 2011, as used in
the experiments. The rows indicate respectively: the size of the outcome space, the
level of opposition, the arithmetic mean utility that can be obtained in the scenario,
and the location of the Nash point and Kalai Smorodinsky point.
ANAC 2010 agents did not scale well and had too many diculties to make these
scenarios reliable for testing. Additionally, in contrast to the 2010 competition,
ANAC 2011 introduced discount factors for some of the scenarios. We removed these
discount factors to ensure compatibility with the ANAC 2010 agents.
We shortly describe our negotiation scenarios here; for more detailed information, we
refer to Appendix C and D.
Our smallest scenario is called Laptop. In this scenario, a seller and a buyer, negotiate
over the specications of a laptop. There are three issues: the laptop brand, the
size of the hard disk, and the size of the external monitor. Each issue has only
three options, making 27 possible outcomes. If the two parties are able to nd the
outcomes that are mutually benecial to both, then they are happy to do business
together with high utility scores on both sides. This can be conrmed in Table 4.3:
the scenario has the highest arithmetic mean utility, and the most favorable Nash
and Kalai-Smorodinsky point.
Our second scenario is taken from [137], which describes a buyer{seller business
negotiation. There are four issues that both sides have to discuss: the price of
the components, delivery times, payment arrangements and terms for the return of
possibly defective parts. The opposition between the parties is strong in this domain,
as the manufacturer and consumer have naturally opposing requirements. Even the
Nash point utilities are quite low for both parties. Altogether, there are 180 potential
oers that contain all combinations of values for the four issues.
Third, the domain taken from [159, 165] involves a case where England and Zimbabwe
negotiate an agreement on tobacco control. The leaders of both countries must reach
an agreement on ve issues. England and Zimbabwe have contradictory preferences
for the rst two issues, but the other issues have options that are jointly preferred by
both sides. The domain has a total of 576 possible agreements.
Our nal negotiation case concerns the Grocery scenario, which models a shopping
negotiation in a local supermarket. The negotiation is between two persons having
79dierent tastes, who wish to buy groceries together. The discussion is about ve
product categories with four to ve possible options, resulting in a scenario with
1600 possible outcomes. The preferences are modeled in such a way that a good
outcome is achievable for both, so the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky point utilities
are high for both parties; however, the outcome space is scattered (resulting in a
relatively low mean utility), so agents must explore it considerably to nd the jointly
protable ones.
To compensate for any utility dierences in the preference proles, the agents play
both sides of every scenario.
Acceptance Conditions
For each acceptance condition we tested all 37 = 21 pairings of agents, playing with
each of the 8 dierent preference proles. We ran every experiment a total of N = 15
times, so that altogether each acceptance condition was tested 21  8  15 = 2520
times in total. This resulted in running as many negotiations, and as every negotiation
lasts 3 minutes, the experiments took 126 hours of cpu time. We selected a wide
range of 102 acceptance conditions for experimental testing, as shown in Table 4.4.
The dierent values of parameters will be discussed in the section below.
Acceptance Condition Ranges Increments
ACprev(;)  2 [1;1:05); 2 [0;0:1) for : 0.01, for : 0.02
ACnext(;)  2 [1;1:05); 2 [0;0:1) for : 0.01, for : 0.02
ACconst()  2 [0;1) 0:05
ACtime(T) T 2 [0;1) 0:05
ACcombi(T;MAX
W) T 2 [0:95;1) 0:01
ACcombi(T;AVG
W) T 2 [0:95;1) 0:01
ACcombi(T;MAX
T ) T = 0:99 -
Table 4.4: The selected ranges and increments for the parameters of dierent accep-
tance conditions in the experimental setup.
Additionally, we ran ve more experiments with agents having their original, built-in
acceptance mechanism in place. That is, we also tested the original agents' coupled
acceptance mechanism for comparison purposes. As we cannot for example, equip
Agent K with the coupled acceptance condition of Yushu, we tested the built-in
mechanism by having each agent employ its own mechanism.
4.4.2 Hypotheses and Experimental Results
The experiments considered here are designed to discuss the main properties and
drawbacks of the acceptance conditions listed above. We formulate several hypotheses
80Acceptance Agt.
Condition   T Utility SD Agt.% utility
ACprev(;) 1 0 - 0.680 0.0084 80% 0.851
1 0.04 - 0.711 0.0094 84% 0.842
1 0.08 - 0.722 0.0076 87% 0.827
1.02 0.04 - 0.723 0.0085 86% 0.837
ACnext(;) 1 0 - 0.683 0.0112 81% 0.843
1 0.04 - 0.727 0.0067 87% 0.833
1 0.08 - 0.731 0.0057 89% 0.819
1.02 0.04 - 0.737 0.0060 89% 0.830
ACconst() 0.20 - - 0.492 0.0025 100% 0.492
0.55 - - 0.619 0.0027 92% 0.671
0.80 - - 0.501 0.0078 60% 0.842
0.90 - - 0.343 0.0080 36% 0.952
Built-in mechanism - - - 0.737 0.0057 89% 0.774
ACtime(T) - - 0.10 0.533 0.0035 100% 0.533
- - 0.40 0.548 0.0064 100% 0.548
- - 0.70 0.602 0.0062 100% 0.602
- - 0.95 0.648 0.0063 100% 0.648
ACcombi(T;MAX
W) - - 0.97 0.756 0.0019 100% 0.756
- - 0.98 0.762 0.0031 100% 0.764
- - 0.99 0.761 0.0046 98% 0.776
ACcombi(T;AVG
W) - - 0.97 0.739 0.0050 100% 0.739
- - 0.98 0.754 0.0037 100% 0.757
- - 0.99 0.759 0.0056 98% 0.774
ACcombi(T;MAX
T ) - - 0.99 0.737 0.0083 93% 0.796
Table 4.5: A small selection of the various acceptance conditions that were tested,
together with average utility obtained and standard deviation. The utility of the
best scoring AC of each category is represented in bold. The two right-hand side
columns show agreement percentages and the utility obtained when an agreement is
reached.
81with respect to the acceptance conditions we have discussed.
To evaluate the hypotheses below, we have carried out a large number of experiments.
A small selection of the results is summarized in Table 4.5. The table shows the
average utility obtained by the agents, and the standard deviation (of the N = 15
experiments), when equipped with several acceptance conditions. The\average utility
of agreements"column represents the average utility obtained by the agent given the
fact that they have reached an agreement. When they do not reach an agreement
(due to reaching the deadline), they get zero utility. Thus, as a general observation,
the following holds:
(The acceptance dilemma)
Total average utility = Agreement percentage

Average utility of agreements.
This formula captures the essence of the acceptance dilemma: accepting bad to
mediocre oers yields more agreements of relatively low utility; while accepting only
the best oers produces less agreements, but of higher utility.
Our rst hypothesis is about the simplest condition, ACconst(), and reads as follows:
Hypothesis 4.1
There is no single choice for  that makes ACconst() an eective acceptance
condition; this is mainly because the optimal choice of  is very domain-
dependent.
First, consider ACconst(0:9) and ACconst(0:8) by consulting Table 4.5. When they
reach an agreement, they receive a very high utility (at least 0.9 or 0.8 respectively),
but this happens so infrequently (resp. 60% and 36% of all negotiations), that they
are ranked at the bottom when we consider total average utility. On the other
hand, choosing a low value for , such as using ACconst(0:2), will always result in an
immediate agreement, but with one of the lowest possible scores of 0:492.
The best possible choice for  should therefore be somewhere in the middle between
zero and one, and is found to be 0:55 (see Figure 4.1), yielding a payo of 0:619.
Firstly, this is still a suboptimal outcome compared to other AC's, such as the ACnext
and ACcombi variants.
Moreover, it is worth noting that this optimal value may be best on average, but
in this case, averaging over all scenarios also hides a lot of information. When we
break down our analysis and look at the four domains separately (see the four gures
of Figure 4.2), we see that the optimal range of  diers greatly per domain. For
example, on Itex vs. Cypress, the optimal choice for  is around 0:6, while on Grocery,
82Figure 4.1: The average utility obtained by agents using ACconst(). The vertical
error bars indicate one standard deviation to the mean.
the best performing value is in the range of [0:7;0:8]. On the Laptop domain, any
choice for  2 [0;0:8] is the best ACconst() can do in this scenario, and will cause
the agent to instantly accept most oers.
We conclude that our hypothesis is conrmed: in isolation, ACconst() is not very
advantageous to use. The main reason is that the choice of the constant  is highly
domain-dependent. A very cooperative scenario may have multiple win{win outcomes
with utilities above . ACconst() would then accept an oer which is relatively
bad, i.e. it could have done much better. On the other hand, in highly competitive
domains, it may simply `ask for too much' and may rarely obtain an agreement. Its
value lies mostly in using it in combination with other acceptance conditions such as
ACnext. It can then benet the agent by accepting an unexpectedly good oer or a
mistake by the opponent.
As we discussed earlier in Section 4.2.3, the acceptance conditions ACprev(;) and
ACnext(;) are standard in literature for  2 [1;1:03] and  2 [0;0:2]. Many
agents tend to use these acceptance conditions, as they are well-known and easy to
implement. We have formed Hypothesis 4.2 about them.
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Figure 4.2: The average utility of ACconst() per negotiation scenario, for  2 [0;1).
Hypothesis 4.2
ACnext(;) will outperform ACprev(;) for all  and . However, both
conditions will perform worse than combined acceptance conditions, which also
take the remaining time into account.
To test this hypothesis, we considered many dierent values for  and  in our
experiments, with ranges chosen around the values we had found in existing agents
84(cf. Table 4.2).
Consulting Table 4.5, the rst observation is that ACprev(;) as well as ACnext(;)
already perform much better than ACconst for all tested values of  and . Higher
values for  and  generally yield a better result, although the dierences are quite
small. However, given that we average the utility over 15 runs, we are able to
statistically distinguish the performance for dierent values of  and . We have
found ACnext(;) does indeed outperform ACprev(;) for all tested values of 
and , except for  = 0 (two-tailed t-test, p < 0:01), thereby partially conrming the
hypothesis.
As an example, we have plotted ACnext(1;) = ACgap() and ACnext(1;) for
 2 [0;1) in Figure 4.3. We can conrm that ACnext(1;) obtains scores that are
signicantly higher (using p < 0:01) scores than ACprev(1;), for  6= 0.
It makes sense that comparing the opponent's oer to our upcoming oer is more
benecial than comparing it to our previous oer, as ACnext is always `one step
ahead' of ACprev. In general, ACnext is never worse than ACprev, and therefore there
seems no reason to use the latter.
One of the top choices for both ACnext and ACprev, is setting  = 1:02, and  = 0:04
(interestingly, IAM(crazy)haggler makes the same choice for , cf. Table 4.2). How-
ever, even for this choice, the combined acceptance conditions ACcombi(T;MAX
W)
outperform both of them for all tested values of T (two-tailed t-test, p < 0:01). This
also settles the second part of the hypothesis.
The reason for the relatively bad performance of ACnext and ACprev is that many
bidding strategies focus on the `negotiation dance' [202]. That is, modeling the
opponent, trying to make equal concessions and so on. When a strategy does not
explicitly take time considerations into account when making an oer, this poses
a problem for these two standard acceptance conditions: they rely completely on
the bidding strategy to concede to the opponent before the deadline occurs. When
the agent or the opponent does not concede enough near the deadline, the standard
conditions lead to poor performance.
Our third hypothesis with respect to the time-dependent condition is as follows:
Hypothesis 4.3
ACtime(T) always reaches an agreement, but of relatively low utility. This utility
improves when T gets closer to the deadline.
To evaluate this hypothesis we tested ACtime(T) for many possible values of T 2 [0;1),
a selection of which can be examined in Table 4.5. We have found that the obtained
utility increases monotonously with larger T, i.e.: it is optimal to choose the value of
T suciently close to the deadline, while still allowing enough time to reach a win-win
85Figure 4.3: The average utility obtained by agents using ACnext(1;) (in black), and
ACprev(1;) (in white). The vertical error bars indicate one standard deviation to
the average utility of N = 15 dierent runs.
agreement. The fact that one has to accept as late as possible when using ACtime(T)
clearly stems from the fact that we are dealing with undiscounted domains only; see
our overall conclusions (Section 11.3.4) for a discussion on possible extensions in this
regard.
From observing the acceptance probability of ACtime(T) in the experimental results,
we see that the agent will always reach an agreement, therefore we consider this part
of the hypothesis conrmed.
Regarding the utility of the agreement, ACtime(T) with T < 1 is a sensible criterion
to avoid a break o at all costs. It is rational to prefer any outcome over a break o
of zero utility. However, the resulting deal can be anything. As we can see from the
table, this is the reverse situation of ACconst(0:9): ACconst(0:9) rarely gets a deal,
but when it does, it is of high utility. Conversely, ACtime(T) yields a low agreement
score (0:648 for T = 0:95), but with certainty of agreement. The overall score is the
same (0:648), but it is interesting to note that this score is worse than all scores by
either ACnext or ACprev (two-tailed t-test, p < 0:01). This phenomenon can again be
explained by the acceptance dilemma: by accepting any oer near the deadline, it
86reaches more agreements, but of relatively low utility.
This insight led us to believe that more consideration has to be given to the remaining
time when deciding to accept an oer. That is why we conclude our analysis with
combined acceptance conditions, which expand upon the idea to get better deals
near the deadline.
When evaluating ACcombi(T;), we expected the following characteristics. First,
ACcombi(T;) is an extension of ACnext in the sense that it will accept under broader
circumstances. It alleviates some of the mentioned drawbacks of ACnext by also
accepting when the utility gap between the parties is positive. Also note that in
addition to the parameters that current acceptance conditions use, such as my
previous bid x
tn 1
A!B, my next bid xt0
A!B, the remaining time, and the opponent's
bid xt
B!A, this condition employs the entire bidding history Ht
A$B to compute
the acceptability of an oer. Therefore we expect better results than with ACnext,
with more agreements, and when it agrees, we expect a better deal than by using
ACtime(T).
We capture this last statement in our nal hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.4
The combination ACcombi(T;) outperform other acceptance conditions, such
as ACtime(T) and ACnext(;), primarily by getting deals of higher utility.
As is evident from the experimental results, there are two acceptance conditions
that dominate the others, namely ACcombi(T;MAX
W), as well as ACcombi(T;AVG
W)
with T close to the deadline. The results are not statistically dierent for the dierent
values of T, but any of the tested values performs quite well. One of the best AC's of
the test is ACcombi(0:98;MAX
W) with a score of 0:762, which is even better than the
built-in mechanisms of the agents, and also surpasses the performance of ACnext(;)
for any  and  (signicantly so, using a two-tailed t-test, p < 0:01). In particular, it
is at least 12% better than ACnext (two-tailed t-test, p < 0:01).
Similar to ACtime, the combined conditions still get a deal almost every time, but
with a higher payo. However, the average utility of an agreement is not the highest:
the built-in mechanisms and several ACconst() conditions get better agreements.
But again, we can observe that their agreement rate is also lower, resulting in a
higher overall score for the combined conditions. This settles our last hypothesis.
Finally, aiming for the highest utility that has been oered so far (i.e., using
ACcombi(T;MAX
T )) is not as successful, mostly due to a big decrease in agree-
ments. The higher utility that is obtained with this condition does not compensate
for the loss of utility that is caused by a break o.
874.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we aimed to classify current approaches to generic acceptance
conditions and to compare a selection of acceptance conditions in a real-time setting.
We presented the challenges and proposed new solutions for accepting oers in current
state-of-the-art automated negotiations. The focus of this chapter is on decoupled
acceptance conditions (i.e.: general conditions that do not depend on a particular
bidding strategy), for which we have dened a formal negotiation model.
Designing an eective acceptance condition is challenging because of the acceptance
dilemma: better oers may arrive in the future, but waiting for too long can result
in a break o of the negotiation, which is undesirable for both parties.
We have presented and classied many of the standard acceptance conditions that are
currently used by negotiating agents, including ACnext, ACprev, and ACconst. From
our results, it is apparent that they do not always yield optimal agreements, and we
established that they perform worse than more sophisticated acceptance conditions.
In addition to classifying and comparing existing acceptance conditions, we have
devised three new acceptance conditions by combining existing ones. This included
two acceptance conditions that estimate whether a better oer might occur in the
future based on recent bidding behavior. These conditions obtained the highest
utility in our experiments and hence performed better than the other conditions
we investigated. In particular, they outperform the acceptance mechanisms that
are used by the top ANAC 2010 agents, and even the winner, Agent K, performs
better when equipped with our combined acceptance conditions than with its built-in
mechanism.
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Accepting Optimally with
Incomplete Information
In the previous chapter we classied generic acceptance conditions, and we formulated
new ones that performed better in an experimental setting. This chapter takes a dierent
approach by devising theoretically optimal solutions. We approach the decision of whether
to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic
process. We argue that this is a natural choice in the context of a negotiation with
incomplete information, where the future behavior of the opponent is uncertain. We
determine the optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes and we present an
approach to estimate the expected range of oers when the type of opponent is unknown.
We apply our method against a wide range of opponents, and compare its performance
with acceptance mechanisms of state-of-the-art negotiation strategies. The experiments
show that the proposed approach is able to nd the optimal time to accept, and improves
upon widely used existing acceptance mechanisms.
89This chapter is based on the following publication:
Tim Baarslag and Koen V. Hindriks. Accepting optimally in automated negotiation
with incomplete information. In Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on
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905.1 Introduction
Suppose two parties A and B are conducting a negotiation, and B has just proposed
an oer to A. A is now faced with a decision: she must decide whether to continue,
or to accept the oer that is currently on the table. On the one hand, accepting the
oer and ending the negotiation means running the risk of missing out on a better
deal in the future. On the other hand, carrying on with the negotiation involves a
risk as well, as this gives up the possibility of accepting one of the previous oers.
How then, should A decide whether to end or to continue the negotiation?
Of course, A's decision making process will depend on the current oer, as well as the
oers that A can expect to receive from B in the future. However, in most realistic
cases, agents have only incomplete information about each other [60, 78, 151]. In this
chapter, we explore in particular the setting where the opponent has only limited
or no knowledge of A's preferences, and the proposals that A receives will therefore
be necessarily uncertain. This makes A's task of predicting B's future oers by no
means an easy one.
Moreover, predicting B's future oers is only part of the solution: even when A can
predict B's moves reasonably well, A still has to decide how to put this information
to good use. In other words, even when a probability distribution over the opponent's
actions is known, it is not straightforward to translate this into eective negotiation
behavior. As an extreme example, consider an opponent R (for Random) who will
make random oers with utility uniformly distributed in [0;1]. Suppose furthermore
that we can expect to receive two more bids from R until the deadline occurs. R
currently makes an oer of utility x 2 [0;1]; for what x should we accept? Of course,
an even better bid than x might come up in one of the two remaining rounds; on
the other hand, it might be safer to settle for this bid if x is large enough. For this
particular case, we will prove that there is an optimal acceptance strategy, and we
show exactly for what x to accept (see Section 5.3).
The main contribution of this chapter is that we address both of A's problems: rst,
at every stage of the negotiation, we provide a technique to estimate the bidding
behavior of various opponent classes by modeling A's dilemma as a stochastic decision
problem. For particular opponent classes we are able to provide precise models, and
to formulate exact mathematical solutions to our problem. For the second step, using
the ranges found earlier, we borrow techniques from optimal stopping theory to nd
generic, optimal rules for when to accept against a variety of opponents in a bilateral
negotiation setting with incomplete information. The solutions proposed are optimal
in the sense that there can be no better strategy in terms of utility.
We begin by introducing our approach in Section 5.2, and we apply our methods to
nd optimal rules in the specic case of opponents that bid randomly in Section 5.3.
We then build upon these cases and subsequently work out more realistic scenarios
in the following sections. In Section 5.4, we explore opponents that change their
91behavior over time, and we determine optimal stopping rules when good estimates
of their bidding behavior are known. We extend these results by combining our
approach with a state-of-the-art prediction mechanism, and we demonstrate that
our approach outperforms existing accepting mechanisms, even when the opponent's
behavior is unknown.
5.2 Decision Making in Negotiation under Uncer-
tainty
As dened in Section 2.2.2, we focus on a bilateral negotiation, wherein two agents try
to reach an agreement while maximizing their own utility using the alternating-oers
protocol. However, instead of a real time line, the negotiating parties take turns in
exchanging oers for a xed number of rounds N. In case this deadline is reached
before both parties come to an agreement, both receive zero utility. A preference
prole is described by a utility function u(x), which maps each possible outcome
x in the negotiation domain to a utility in the range [0;1]. If an agent receives an
oer x, its acceptance mechanism has to decide whether u(x) is high enough to be
acceptable.
5.2.1 Stochastic Behavior in Negotiation
Suppose player B is involved in a bilateral negotiation with private preference
information, and at some point in time, he has decided that he is satised with a
utility around u, called his target utility. However, there are many possible bids
with approximately this utility for player B. As usual, we call this set of bids X
the iso-level bids with utility u. As player B is indierent between these bids, B
may attempt to optimize player A's utility in order to maximize the chance of an
agreement. But this is dicult for B to achieve, as he does not know A's preferences.
When using the alternating oers protocol, player B cannot simply send out all
considered oers as one bundle, but instead, he can only oer them sequentially.
Player B typically continues to select dierent bids from X until his target utility
changes; then a new set of iso-level bids is generated, and the process starts again.
The order in which player B picks bids from the set of equally preferred bids X will
dier per player, but due to incomplete information, he can only select a bid with
a particular opponent utility with limited certainty. Therefore, we can reasonably
model the oers that are presented to A as a stochastic process.
This kind of stochastic behavior can be observed in practice in the Automated
Negotiating Agents Competition (Appendix B). ANAC is a yearly international
competition in which negotiation agents compete in an incomplete information setting.
Half of the participants of ANAC 2011 [17, 35, 67, 132, 260] were not designed to
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available, simply selected a random element from X; others used opponent modeling
techniques that estimate the opponent's preferences in order to select bids closer
to the Pareto optimal frontier. However, opponent modeling is seldom capable
of making perfect estimates [181]. Consequently, even when player B employs an
opponent modeling technique, A will still receive bids of varying utility. Moreover,
the agents usually already anticipated the limitations of their opponent model, and
therefore randomly chose among the estimated top bids for the opponent [88, 250],
adding even further to the random appearance of the utility of their bids. As a result,
the negotiation traces of ANAC 2011 showed to a very large extent the stochastic
behavior discussed above (see also Figure 5.1). Only 25% of the negotiation moves
were an improvement for the opponent over the previous bid; the other 75% of the
moves could be classied as selsh, unfortunate, or silent [38].
Figure 5.1: Despite the fact that Side B concedes predictably over time, the utility
of the oers seem to be randomly distributed around the [0:4;0:8] interval for Side
A, and as a result, the best bids for A occur during the middle of the negotiation.
In the next paragraph, we present our model of bid reception as a stochastic process,
and then present optimal stopping techniques to optimize A's expected utility.
5.2.2 Optimal Stopping in Negotiation
In 1613, the celebrated astronomer Johannes Kepler wrote a long letter to Strahlendorf
in which he describes a great problem that he faced [84, 87]. Kepler had lost his
wife and set about nding a new wife through a series of interviews among eleven
93candidates. In order not to hurt the feelings of his potential wives, he would have to
interview them sequentially and make a decision to marry them before moving on to
the next candidate. His problem was: how do I decide to stop looking and settle for
one of the candidates? Kepler's problem is now known as an instance of an optimal
stopping problem: a stochastic decision problem of determining whether to accept
among oers appearing sequentially and randomly.
We can frame the problem of accepting a bid as an optimal stopping problem [61],
in which an agent is faced with the dilemma of choosing when to take a particular
action, in order to maximize an expected reward or minimize an expected cost. In
such problems, observations are taken sequentially, and at each stage, one either
chooses to stop to collect, or to continue and take the next observation (usually at
some specied sampling cost).
The model of bid reception is as follows: at each of a total of N rounds, we receive a
bid, which has an associated utility, or value, drawn from a random variable over
the unit interval. At this point, we must decide whether to accept the bid, or not.
Once we accept, the deal is settled and the negotiation ends. If we continue, then
there is no possibility of recalling passed-up oers; i.e., previous oers are unavailable
unless they are presented to us again. Hence, at each round, we must decide to
either continue or to stop participating in the negotiation, and we wish to act so as
to maximize the expected net gain. Once an oer is turned down, and we decide
to wait for another bid (at a cost C), the total number of remaining observations
decreases by one. We will develop the theory here for arbitrary sampling cost C, but
in the remainder of the thesis, we will assume the cost to be zero.
At every stage, the current situation may be described by a state (j;x), which is
characterized by two parameters: the number of remaining observations j 2 N, and
the latest received oer x 2 [0;1]. Let the utility distribution with j rounds remaining
be given by a random variable Xj, with associated distribution function Fj. We can
think of Xj as the possible utilities we receive when the opponent makes iso-level
bids, and Fj(u) represents the probability of receiving a bid with utility less than or
equal to u. The expected payo is then given by
V (j;x) = max(x;E(V (j   1;Xj 1))   C); (5.1)
where we abbreviate the second term E(V (j   1;Xj 1))   C as vj. This represents
the expected value of rejecting the oer at (j;x), and going on for (at least) one more
period. Note that vj does not depend on x. Thus, using the substitution, we get
vj = E(max(Xj 1;E(V (j   2;Xj 2))   C)   C;
which leads to the following recurrence relation:

v0 = 0;
vj = E(max(Xj 1;vj 1))   C: (5.2)
94In [61, 155] it is proven that for any s 2 R, and for any random variable X with
distribution function F for which E(X) is nite, the following holds:
E(max(X;s)) = s + TF(s);
with
TF(s) =
Z 1
s
(1   F(t))dt:
And therefore the recurrence relation describing vj can be written as
vj = vj 1 +
Z 1
vj 1
(1   Fj 1(t))dt   C: (5.3)
Thus, if we know the distribution Fj for every j, we can compute the values vj using
the above recurrence relation. Then, deciding whether to accept an oer x is simple:
if x  vj we accept, otherwise we reject the oer (see Algorithm 1).
There is however, a serious impediment to using our stochastic decision model in
practice: we do not know the distributions of the utility that the opponent will
present to us in the upcoming rounds; furthermore, the distributions are highly
inuenced by the specics of the negotiation scenario.
However, against specic classes of opponents, we are able to establish these proba-
bilities, and in an exact way. We will rst focus our attention on theoretical cases
that resemble the relevant cases encountered in practice. In order to develop the
theory, we will rst take on the extreme case of random opponent behavior, and
gradually add complexity as we proceed.
Of course, in a general setting we do not know the opponent's behavior, and in that
case we require a method to determine the distributions Xj for every remaining
round j. This means that for every round, we need to estimate the probability of
receiving certain utility in our utility space. This is the most dicult case, which we
will cover at the end of the chapter.
All in all, we consider three dierent opponent classes:
1. Random behavior: xed and known uniform Xj in every round; this is solved
mathematically in Section 5.3.
2. Known time-dependent behavior: changing, but known uniform Xj; this is
optimally solved in Section 5.4.1.
3. Unknown time-dependent behavior: changing and unknown arbitrary Xj;
covered in Section 5.4.2.
We will start with the rst case, where we consider random opponent behavior.
955.3 Accepting Random Oers
Suppose an agent A is negotiating with its opponent, and the deadline is approaching,
so both agents have only a few more oers to exchange. As argued above, the
opponent will often oer bids with varying utility for A, due to its incomplete
information of what A exactly wants. This means that from A's point of view, the
utility of the presented oers will have a particular stochastic distribution. The aim
of A is then to pick the best one given the limited time that is left.
We start by studying the extreme case of a maximally unpredictable opponent,
or Random Walker (see Section 2.3.3), who makes random bids at every stage of
the negotiation. We rst solve this case analytically, before moving on to more
complicated settings.
There are two crucial properties of Random Walker that make it a simplied case:
rst, it picks random bids uniformly from the bid space; second, it is stateless; i.e.,
it uses the same decision function in every round of the negotiation, regardless of
the behavior of the other party or the time that has passed. We will weaken both
constraints in later stages of this chapter.
5.3.1 Uniformly Random Behavior
Using equation (5.2), we can determine the optimal solution against Random Walker,
using the added knowledge that every Xj does not depend on the number of rounds
left, and assuming every Xj is uniformly distributed:
Proposition 5.1
Against an opponent who makes random bids of utility uniformly distributed in
[0;1], and with j oers still to be observed, one should accept an oer of utility
x exactly when x  vj, where vj satises the following equation:

v0 = 0;
vj = 1
2 + 1
2v2
j 1; (5.4)
This recurrence relation has the following properties: vj is monotonically in-
creasing, and
lim
j!1
vj = 1:
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Let X be the uniform distribution over [0;1] with distribution function F.
Playing against Random Walker, all Xj's are uniform distributions over [0;1]
and hence equal to X. This yields:
TF(s) =
Z 1
s
(1   F(t))dt (5.5)
=
8
<
:
1
2   s; s < 0:
1
2(1   s)2; 0  s  1:
0; s > 1:
(5.6)
Since we are in the case 0  s  1, we get:
vj = vj 1 +
1
2
(1   vj 1)
2 =
1
2
+
1
2
v
2
j 1:
It is easy to show with recursion that
1  
2
j
< vj 1 < vj < 1;
and therefore,
lim
j!1
vj = 1:
When we substitute vj = 1   2xj in equation (5.4), we get the equivalent relation of
the logistic map xj = xj 1(1 xj 1) at r = 1, which due to its chaotic behavior does
not in general have an analytical solution. However, we have visualized its behavior
for j 2 [0;200] in Figure 5.3 (uniform case). From this, we see that the answer to the
question posed in the introduction is as follows: with two rounds to go, one should
accept an oer x exactly when x  v2 = 0:625.
Note that limj!1 vj = 1 means we can expect to receive utility arbitrarily close to
the maximum given enough time, and that this limit v = 1 is also the xpoint of
recurrence relation (5.4).
5.3.2 Non-Uniform Random Behavior
In Proposition 5.1, we consider random behavior by the opponent in a uniform way;
i.e., a scenario where every received utility is equally likely. However, in practice such
situations rarely occur. Negotiation scenarios usually enable agents to make trade-os
between multiple issues, resulting in clustering of potential outcomes. Hence, in a
typical scenario, even when the opponent chooses bids randomly, the utilities of those
bids are not distributed uniformly.
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Figure 5.3: The optimal stopping values vj for dierent rounds j versus uniformly
random (Uniform case) and non-uniformly random (E-Z) behavior.
that against Random Walker, bidding strategies with the same acceptance policy
perform equally, as it does not matter which oers are sent out. This holds because
of three properties:
1. Random Walker's oers do not depend on the opponent's behavior; hence, it is
not sensitive to the other's bidding strategy;
2. Random Walker does not accept any oers; in our experiments, opponents are
not allowed to accept, as this could prematurely end the negotiation, without
revealing anything about the performance of the acceptance strategies.
3. The optimal stopping condition works independently of bids that are sent out.
Taking this into account in our experiments, we opted for an accompanying bidding
strategy that is as simple as possible, namely Hardliner (see Section 2.3.3). This
strategy simply makes a bid of maximum utility for itself and never concedes. Clearly,
in a real negotiation setting, this is not a viable bidding tactic as it generally
negatively inuences the opponent's behavior, but this is of no concern against a
non-behavior-based opponent.
Using the BOA framework described in Chapter 3, we combined the Hardliner
bidding strategy (using no opponent model) with the optimal stopping condition as
the acceptance strategy. We then compared its performance with the strategies of
other state-of-the-art agents currently available for our setting. We selected all agents
from the ANAC 2010 and 2011 editions (cf. Section C.1 and D.1). We also included
the time-dependent tactics (TDT's) as described in Section 2.3.3, such as Hardliner
(with concession factor e = 0), Boulware (e = 1
2), Conceder Linear (e = 1), and
Conceder (e = 2) taken from [75]. To analyze the performance of dierent agents,
we employed our Genius environment [163] (cf. Appendix A).
99Algorithm 1: Optimal Stopping main decision body
Input: The number of remaining rounds j, and the last received bid x by the
opponent.
Output: Acceptance or rejection of x.
begin
oeredUtility    getUtility(x);
target    determine(vj);
if oeredUtility  target then
return Accept
else
return Reject // And send a counter-offer
For our negotiation scenarios, we opted for the England{Zimbabwe domain described
in Section C.2 of the Appendix, and a discretized version of Split the Pie [217, 237],
where two players have to reach an agreement on the partition of a pie of size 1. The
pie will be partitioned only after the players reach an agreement, in which case one
gets x 2 [0;1], and the other gets 1   x. In this scenario, Random Walker makes
bids of utility uniformly distributed in [0;1], since it proposes random partitions of
the pie.
The results of our experiment in the uniform case and on England{Zimbabwe are
plotted in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 respectively, both for N = 10 and N = 100
negotiation rounds. The optimal stopping condition signicantly outperforms all
agents (one-tailed t-test, p < 0:01) in all cases.
In the uniform case (cf. Figure 5.4), it obtains the highest score possible both in 10
and in 100 rounds, getting respectively 86% and 98% of the pie on average. Note
that this is exactly equal to the theoretical values v10 and v100 shown in the uniform
case of Figure 5.3.
On England{Zimbabwe (cf. Figure 5.5), the optimal stopper obtains less utility for
N = 10 in an absolute sense compared to the uniform case, but the results are even
more pronounced relative to the other agents. A moment of reection makes clear
why: given the clustering of bids of medium utility (see Figure 5.2a), there is less
chance for Random Walker to propose a very fortunate bid for the opponent. This
explains why the acceptance strategies of the other agents perform relatively worse.
Note that the end result obtained by the optimal stopper is approximately 0:79 and
0:93 for N = 10 and N = 100 respectively, which is again equal to the optimal values
v10 and v100 shown in the E-Z case of Figure 5.3.
1000.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
N = 10
N = 100
Figure 5.4: The optimal stopping condition outperforms all ANAC agents against
uniform Random Walker for 10 and 100 rounds. Average utility plotted over 5000
runs; the errors bars indicate one standard deviation to the mean.
5.3.4 When Optimal Stopping Is Most Eective
As is evident from the results, optimal stopping performs better than the other
agents against Random Walker. This is to be expected given the fact that no agent
could possibly do better; however, the dierence with the current state-of-the-art
is surprisingly big in some cases, for example compared to the ANAC 2010 winner,
Agent K [132], and even more so when the number of rounds is limited. The reason
is that many of the currently used acceptance mechanisms are rather straightforward,
and only become successful against Random Walker when enough time is available.
This can be illustrated by considering the baseline acceptance condition where an
agent accepts if and only if the oered utility is above a xed threshold , as is done by
various agents [132, 249, 260, 261]. In the uniform case, its expected utility obtained
over N rounds equals the probability it will obtain an oer above  multiplied by
the expected utility above :
(1   
N) 
 + 1
2
(5.7)
This is not a very ecient acceptance condition for small N; for example, for N = 2,
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Figure 5.5: The optimal stopping condition outperforms all ANAC agents against
Random Walker on England{Zimbabwe for N = 10 and N = 100 rounds; utility
averaged over 5000 runs.
the optimal value of  (i.e., the value of  that maximizes formula (5.7)) is 1
3, with
expected utility of 0:593, while the optimal value that can be obtained is v2 = 0:625.
However, for large N, choosing  close to one is already surprisingly ecient. For
example, for N = 100, the optimal value of  is 0:948, with expected utility of 0:969.
This is already quite close to the optimal value of v100 = 0:981; this indicates that in
case bids are randomly distributed, the added value of our solution lies primarily in
negotiations with a limited amount of total rounds, or when only limited time is left
in a negotiation. Therefore, in the next sections, we extend our results in order to
tackle more generic circumstances. Some earlier solutions can be derived from the
more general ones treated later; however, we have elected to go from simple to the
more complicated.
5.4 Time Dependent Oers
One of the most restrictive assumptions so far was to assume the opponent plays
completely randomly. As we argued, this is a sensible assumption when modeling
102an opponent that is extremely unpredictable due to imperfect information, but the
general case is more complicated. Almost all negotiation agents change their range of
oers over time; i.e., they are time dependent strategies.1 Hence, we require optimal
stopping policies for these cases as well.
The challenge of the more general case is that we have to account for the fact that
not only the presented utilities may uctuate, but also the range of future oers
may be dierent at dierent times. Establishing this range is not easy, because
the strategy used by the opponent is of course unknown to us. The oers of any
time dependent opponent with incomplete information can again be modeled by a
stochastic distribution, but this time the distribution will change over time. In terms
of optimal stopping, this means that the bid distribution Xj can be dierent for
every j.
5.4.1 Uniformly Unpredictable Oers
If we assume that the opponent's oers are uniformly distributed, we only need to
know the interval of utilities we can expect in every round. If this is the case, then
we are able to compute the optimal time to accept, as is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.2
Against a time-dependent opponent who, with j rounds still to be observed,
makes bids uniformly distributed in Xj = [aj;bj], the optimal stopping cut-o is
vj, where vj satises the following equation:
vj =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0; if j = 0
vj 1; if vj 1  bj 1
bj 1+aj 1
2 ; if vj 1  aj 1
vj 1 + 1
2 
(bj 1 vj 1)2
bj 1 aj 1 ; if aj 1 < vj 1 < bj 1:
1Note that these should not be confused with the well-known time-dependent tactics as described
in Section 2.3.3, which are particular kinds of time dependent strategies.
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From equation (5.2), we have
vj = E(max(Xj 1;vj 1));
so immediately, if vj 1  bj 1, then vj 1  Xj 1, and thus vj = vj 1. On the
other hand, if vj 1  aj 1, then vj = E(X) =
bj 1+aj 1
2 . So therefore, the only
case left is aj 1 < vj 1 < bj 1, in which case we derive the following:
vj = P(Xj 1  vj 1)  vj 1 +
P(Xj 1 > vj 1)  P(Xj 1 j Xj 1 > vj 1)
=
vj 1   aj 1
bj 1   aj 1
 vj 1 +
1
2

bj 1   vj 1
bj 1   aj 1
 (vj 1 + bj 1)
= vj 1 +
1
2

(bj 1   vj 1)2
bj 1   aj 1
:
Note how this proposition is an extension of Proposition 5.1: if we set Xj = [0;1] for
every j, the equation simplies to vj = 1
2 + 1
2v2
j 1 again.
Also, we observe that in the special case of perfect information, the distributions
would be singletons of the form Xj = fxjg, with probability 1 for the outcome xj.
The equation of Proposition 5.2 then simplies to
vj =

0; if j = 0
max(xj 1;vj 1); otherwise:
= max
0k<j
xk:
This means that the optimal stopping procedure has the desirable property that
when it gets perfect estimates as input, it will also produce perfect output.
5.4.2 Arbitrarily Unpredictable Oers
Proposition 5.2 is useful to gain insight into the optimal acceptance policy, but in
practice, the distributions Xj are neither known, nor uniformly distributed, and
therefore an estimation method is required against arbitrary opponents. Of course,
the success of the optimal stopping rules will greatly depend on the delity of the
estimating technique used to predict the opponent's behavior. Therefore, we rst
examine the case of a perfect estimator, to see how our method performs in the ideal
case. After that, we will move our focus to an estimator that can be used in practice.
104Opponent Prediction Using Perfect Estimates
The perfect estimation method that we employ divides the number of rounds N
into a number of time slots S. Then, by momentarily using perfect information, it
gets the minimum and maximum utility that will be oered by the opponent during
that time slot. This allows us to control exactly the precision of the estimate, where
using more slots emulates having more information about the opponent's behavior.
If we set the number of slots equal to the total number of rounds, we are in a full
information state and the performance should be theoretically optimal. If we use
only one slot, we have less information, knowing only the opponent's utility range
over the entire N rounds.
Opponent Prediction Using Gaussian Process Regression
Finally, we consider an estimation method that uses as input only the information
that can be observed during the negotiation, namely the utility of the oers made by
the opponent. For this, we opted for a Gaussian process regression (GPR) technique
as described in [260]. We selected the GPR technique because it can be computed
in real time during the negotiation, and it is specically designed to be robust with
respect to signicantly varying observations. It works as follows: for each oer made
by the opponent, the round at which the oer was made is recorded, along with the
oered utility. From this, the future concessions of the opponent are estimated using
regression with a Gaussian process. To reduce the eect of noise, the oers received
are aggregated in a number of time windows, and only the maximum value that is
received in each time window is used as input for the Gaussian process.
The output of the Gaussian process regression is a normal distribution for every
upcoming round k, with mean k and standard deviation k. The mean k gives
a prediction of the most likely oered utility value in round k, whilst the standard
deviation k gives an indication of how accurate the prediction is. When using GPR,
the opponent bid distribution is estimated in real-time by a normal distribution,
truncated to t in the range [0;1].
5.4.3 Experiments
To analyze the performance of optimal stopping (OS) against time dependent ne-
gotiation strategies, we adopted the same experimental setup as before, this time
testing it with both perfect estimates and the GPR technique. We set the number of
Gaussian process regressions to 10, and we set the number of samples equal to the
number of rounds (for details, see [260]).
We used two versions of perfect estimation: the full information state by setting
S = N (called \perfect estimation with full slots"), and a version with S = 1 (called
105Algorithm 2: Determining vj
Input: The number of remaining rounds j, and all negotiation outcomes 
.
Output: vj.
begin
if j = 0 then
return 0
// Use either perfect estimation, or GPR
Yj 1    estimated utility distribution at j   1;
// Use either uniform, or Gaussian distribution for Xj 1
Xj 1    utility distribution of Yj 1 over 
;
// Recursively determine vj 1
return E(max(Xj 1;vj 1))
\perfect estimation with one slot"). We also tested two variants of the GPR technique:
in one, we simply set Xj equal to the truncated Gaussian distribution with mean
j and standard deviation j as predicted by the GPR technique (called\Gaussian
GPR prediction"). These predictions turned out to be overly optimistic in most cases,
since the GPR technique uses as input the maximum utility received in each time
slot. Therefore, we opted to include a simplied second version, which produces a
uniform distribution between zero and the estimated maximum oered utility, which
we set to  + 2 (called\uniform GPR prediction"). See also Algorithm 2.
As the specics of the negotiation scenario inuences the behavior of the opponent, we
picked a total of six negotiation scenarios from ANAC 2010 and 2011 (see Appendix C
and D), aiming for a large spread of negotiation characteristics (see Table 5.1).
Scenario Size Opposition
Car 15625 Low
Amsterdam 3024 Medium
England{Zimbabwe [165] 527 Medium
Nice Or Die [35] 3 High
Itex vs. Cypress [137] 180 High
Travel 188160 Medium
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the negotiation scenarios used in the experiments.
For the opponents, we selected various TDT's from [75], as dened in Section 2.3.3.
Our optimal stopping policy works against any type of time dependent negotiation
strategy, but we selected TDT's because they are typical, well-known examples of
strategies that change their range of bids over time. Additionally, as in the case
of Random Walker, TDT's are non-adaptive and hence it is not important what
counter-oers are sent out to them.
We selected the same TDT's used earlier, namely: Hardliner, Boulware, Conceder
106Linear, and Conceder. We generated many variants of each opponent by choosing the
values 0:7, 0:8, and 0:9 for the min parameter (which controls the utility threshold
up to where the agent will concede [75]). Note that this creates quite a competitive
opponent pool, as the opponents will never fully concede. This leads to only small
utility dierences between the dierent acceptance strategies, but this should be
regarded an artifact of our competitive setup. The average score of all agents is
shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: The utilities obtained by ANAC agents and optimal stopping conditions
with dierent estimation methods against time dependent opponents for 10 and 100
rounds.
Optimal stopping with perfect estimation with full slots should be considered the
theoretical upper bound here; and indeed, it outperforms all other methods. Among
the agents that act with incomplete information, the Boulware agent obtains a
surprisingly good score. Its strategy turns out to be particularly successful against
TDT's since it waits for a long time to let the opponent concede as much as possible,
until it quickly concedes in the end to obtain an agreement. However, because it
waits for so long, it misses out on good oers that are oered earlier.
Gaussian GPR prediction is not as successful, mainly because it was found to
overestimate the opponent's willingness to concede, and hence it aimed for too much
during the negotiation. It is optimal stopping with uniform GPR that performs
107signicantly best (one-tailed t-test, p < 0:01), which shows that the optimal stopping
policy is indeed a robust mechanism that can still perform well in an incomplete
information setting.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter deals with the question of when to accept in a bilateral negotiation
with incomplete information. Our approach has been to model the opponent's bids
as a stochastic process, and to regard the decision of when to accept as a sequential
decision problem. We rst determined the optimal acceptance policies for particular
opponent classes of which we were able to predict the behavior well. Of course, in the
general case of unknown opponents, the solutions are only as good as the estimation
of the opponent's behavior. We have shown however, that our techniques are robust,
in the sense that they also perform well in practice. This demonstrates that our
optimal stopping mechanism is a valuable element of a negotiating agent's strategy,
whether in a complete or incomplete information setting.
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Measuring the Performance
of Online Opponent Models
Decoupling agents as we have done in Chapter 3 helps us to focus on the individual
components of a negotiating agent's design. One principal component of a negotiating
agent's strategy is its ability to take the opponent's preferences into account. Every
year, new negotiation agents are introduced with better learning techniques to model
the opponent's preferences. Our main goal in this chapter is to evaluate and compare
the performance of a selection of state-of-the-art online opponent modeling techniques
in negotiation, and to determine under which circumstances they are benecial in a real-
time, online negotiation setting. Towards this end, we provide an overview of the factors
inuencing the quality of a model and we analyze how the performance of opponent models
depends on the negotiation setting. This results in better insight into the performance of
opponent models, and allows us to pinpoint a class of simple and surprisingly eective
opponent modeling techniques that did not receive much previous attention in literature.
109This chapter is based on the following publication:
Tim Baarslag, Mark Hendrikx, Koen Hindriks, and Catholijn Jonker. Measuring the
performance of online opponent models in automated bilateral negotiation. In Michael
Thielscher and Dongmo Zhang, editors, AI 2012: Advances in Articial Intelligence, volume
7691 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1{14. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012
1106.1 Introduction
Negotiating agents often keep their preferences private during the negotiation in order
to avoid exploitation [60]; however, if an agent has no knowledge about the opponent's
preferences, then this can result in a suboptimal outcome [112]. A common technique
to counter this is learning the opponent's preference prole during the negotiation,
which aids in increasing the quality of the negotiation outcome by identifying bids
that are more likely to be accepted by the opponent [60, 112, 270].
If there have been previous negotiations with a similar opponent, the opponent model
can be prepared before the start of the negotiation; we will refer to these models
as oine models (for example [60]). Contrastingly, if the agent has to learn the
preferences during the negotiation it performs online modeling (for example [249,
112, 250]).
We focus on online opponent models in a single-shot negotiation with private
preference proles; i.e., a setting in which an agent has no knowledge about the
opponent's preference prole and no history of previous negotiations is available.
There are opponent modeling techniques available for such settings, for example in
the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) described in Appendix B.
Despite ongoing research in this area, it is not yet clear how dierent approaches
compare, and empirical evidence has raised the question whether using an opponent
model is benecial at all in such a setting. To illustrate: state-of-the-art agents,
such as the top three agents of both ANAC 2010 (Appendix C) and ANAC 2011
(Appendix D) do not model the opponent, yet outperformed agents that do. One
reason that opponent modeling does not guarantee a better outcome for an agent
is that the model can be a poor representation of the opponent's preferences. If
the model consistently suggests unattractive bids for the opponent, it may even be
preferable to not employ one at all. Secondly, a time-based deadline introduces an
additional challenge for online opponent modeling, as learning the model can be
computationally expensive and can therefore inuence the amount of bids that can
be explored. More precisely, the gain in using the model should be higher than the
loss in utility due to decreased exploration of the outcome space. We will refer to
this as the time/exploration trade-o.
Apart from the inherent trade-o in opponent modeling, we are interested whether
opponent models are accurate enough to provide gains at all, even when ignoring
computational costs. To this end, we evaluate opponent models in two settings: a
time-based and round-based negotiation protocol. This chapter compares a large
set of opponent modeling techniques, which were isolated from state-of-the-art
negotiation strategies. We measure their performance in various negotiation settings,
and we provide a detailed overview of how the dierent factors inuence the nal
negotiation outcome.
We introduce the negotiation setting and consider the diculties in evaluating
111opponent models in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 we introduce a method to quantify
opponent model performance, after which we apply it to a set of models in Section 6.4.
We formulate hypotheses and analyze the results in Section 6.5, and our chapter
conclusions are outlined in Section 6.6.
6.2 Evaluating Opponent Models
We focus on a bilateral negotiations governed by the alternating-oers protocol,
consistent with our denitions in Chapter 2. Recall from Section 2.2.3 that a
negotiation scenario consists of the negotiation domain, which is common knowledge,
together with a privately-known preference prole for each party. A preference prole
is described by a utility function u(x), which maps each possible outcome x in the
negotiation domain to a utility in the range [0;1]. We discuss opponent models that
attempt to estimate the opponent's utility function u0(x) during the negotiation.
The main goal of this chapter is to answer the following research question: \Under
what circumstances is it benecial to use an online opponent model in a real-time
negotiation setting?". An answer to this question is not straightforward due to the
time/exploration trade-o and potentially poor accuracy of a model. In particular,
we want to answer the following:
1. Assuming perfect knowledge about the opponent's preferences, is there a
signicant performance gain in using this information compared with ignoring
it?
2. Is there a signicant performance gain from using an online opponent model in
comparison to not using a model, assuming no prior knowledge is available?
The main diculty in nding a conclusive answer to these questions, is that the
performance of an opponent model depends on the negotiation setting. Therefore,
we study an third, overarching research question:
3. How does the performance of using an opponent model depend on the negotia-
tion setting?
6.2.1 Inuence of the Agent's Strategy
Dierent agents apply their opponent model in dierent ways. There are two main
factors in which the application of an opponent model by a bidding strategy can
dier:
 Type of information gained from the opponent model. A bidding strategy
can employ an opponent model for dierent reasons: for example, it can be
employed to select the best bid for the opponent out of a set of similarly
112preferred bids [29, 261]; to select a bid that optimizes a weighted combination
of both utility functions [249]; or to help estimate the utility of a specic
outcome, such as the Nash-point [29].
 Selecting a bid using an opponent model. When a model is used to select a
bid from a set of similarly preferred bids, the question still remains which
one to choose. One can select the best bid for the opponent, but this may be
suboptimal, as models may be inaccurate. An alternative is to select a bid
from the set of n best bids [29].
Even when the factors above are taken into account, still care has to be taken to
properly compare dierent models. We can only be fairly compare opponent models
if the other components, such as bidding strategy and acceptance strategy are xed.
6.2.2 Inuence of the Opponent's Strategy
All opponent modeling techniques make certain assumptions about the opponent,
so as to assign meaning to the observed behavior. If the opponent does not adhere
to these assumptions, the model may not reect reality well. The set of strategies
against which a model is tested is a decisive factor when measuring its performance.
Therefore, a set of opponents should contain both agents that fulll the model's
assumptions to determine its ecacy in optimal conditions; and agents that test the
model's robustness by violating its assumptions.
The following assumptions were found by analyzing the models in Section 6.4.2:
1. The concession of the opponent follows a particular function. Some opponent
modeling techniques assume that the opponent uses a given time-based bidding
strategy. Modeling the opponent then reduces to estimating all issue weights
such that the predicted utility by the modeled preference prole is close to the
assumed utility. This assumption is violated when the utility of the opponent's
bids strongly deviate from what is assumed.
2. The rst bid made by the opponent is the most preferred bid. The best bid is the
selection of the most preferred value for each issue, and thereby immediately
reveals which values are the best for each issue. Many agents start with the
best bid. This assumption is violated when the opponent's rst bid is not the
best; for example when an agent oers random bids with a utility above a
constant.
3. There is a direct relation between the preference of an issue and the times its
value is signicantly changed. To learn the issue weights, some models assume
that the amount of times the value of an issue is changed is an indicator for
the importance of the issue. The validity of this assumption depends on the
distribution of the issue and value weights of the opponent's preference prole
and its bidding strategy.
1134. There is a direct relation between the preference of a value and the frequency
it is oered. A common assumption to learn the value weights is to assume
that values that are more preferred are oered more often. Similar to the issue
weights assumption, this assumption strongly depends on the agent's strategy
and domain.
To summarize, to construct an opponent model a set of assumptions about the
opponent's preference prole are required. The assumptions introduced above vary
in validity and robustness depending on the opponent and negotiation scenario.
6.2.3 Inuence of the Negotiation Scenario
We distinguish three main factors of a scenario that can inuence the quality of an
opponent model (see also Section 2.2.4):
1. Domain size. In general, the larger the domain, the less likely a bid is a Pareto-
bid. Furthermore, domains with more bids are likely more computationally
expensive to model. Therefore, the inuence of the time/exploration trade-o
is higher.
2. Bid distribution. The bid distribution quanties how bids are distributed. We
dene bid distribution as the average distance of all bids to the nearest Pareto-
bid. The bid distribution directly inuences the performance gain attainable
by a model.
3. Opposition. We dene opposition as the distance from the Kalai-point to
complete satisfaction (1;1). The opposition of a domain inuences the number
of possible agreements, and opponent models may be help in locating them
more easily.
6.3 Measuring the Performance of Opponent Mod-
els
As we noted in the previous section, the eectiveness of an agent's opponent model
is heavily inuenced by the negotiation setting. In this chapter, we propose a careful
measurement method of opponent modeling performance that can be interpreted as a
rst step towards creating a generic performance benchmark for the type of opponent
models that we study here. The following sections discuss the four components of
the method.
1146.3.1 Negotiation Strategies of the Agents
We tested the performance of the opponent models by coupling them with a variety
of negotiation strategies using our BOA architecture (Chapter 3). For the negotiation
strategies of the agents in which the opponent models are embedded, we elected a
variant of the standard time-dependent tactic [75] as dened in Section 2.3.3. This
strategy is chosen for its simple behavior, which elicits regular behavior from its
opponents; furthermore, adding a model may signicantly increase its performance.
Given a target utility, the adapted agent generates a set of similarly preferred bids
and then selects one using the opponent model. We focus on selecting a bid from a set
of similarly preferred bids, as this usage is commonly applied, for example in [261] and
[250]. We embedded the models in four time-dependent agents (e = 0:1;0:2;1:0;2:0).
We opted for multiple agents as we believed that the concession speed can inuence
the performance gain.
The remaining issue in using an opponent model is which bid to select for the opponent
given a set of similarly preferred bids. Given the approaches in Section 6.2.1, we
opted to have the models select the best bid for the opponent, as this approach is
most dierentiating: it leads to better performance of the more accurate opponent
models.
6.3.2 Negotiation Strategies of the Opponents
This section discusses the opponents selected using the guidelines outlined in Sec-
tion 6.2.2. The set of opponent strategies consists of three cooperative agents, which
should be easy to model as their concession speed is high, and ve competitive
agents. The set of conceding agents consists of two time-dependent agents with high
concession speeds e 2 f1;2g, and the Oer Decreasing agent, which oers the set of
all possible bids in decreasing order of utility. The set of competitive agents contains
two time-dependent agents with low concession speeds e 2 f0:0;0:2g, and the ANAC
agents Gahboninho, HardHeaded, and IAMcrazyHaggler.
Given the ve opponent modeling assumptions introduced in Section 6.2.2, the rst
assumption about the opponent's decision function fails in general, as an opponent
in practice never completely adheres to the assumed decision function. The second
assumption holds for all agents except IAMcrazyHaggler, whose rst bid is randomly
picked. The other three assumptions are typical for the frequency models. It is not
possible to adhere to or violate these assumptions completely, as they depend both
on the negotiation scenario structure and opponents.
115Scenario name Size Bid distrib. Opposition
Car [17] 15625 (med.) 0.136 (low) 0.095 (low)
Grocery [17] 1600 (med.) 0.492 (high) 0.191 (med.)
Company Acquisition [17] 384 (low) 0.121 (low) 0.125 (low)
Itex vs. Cypress [137] 180 (low) 0.222 (med.) 0.431 (high)
Laptop [17] 27 (low) 0.295 (med.) 0.178 (med.)
Employment contract [245] 3125 (med.) 0.267 (med.) 0.325 (high)
Travel [31] 188160 (high) 0.416 (high) 0.230 (med.)
Table 6.1: Characteristics of the negotiation scenarios.
6.3.3 Negotiation Scenarios
As we stated in Section 6.2.3, the domain size, bid distribution, and opposition of a
negotiation scenario are all expected to inuence an opponent model's performance,
and therefore we aimed for a large spread of the characteristics of the scenarios.
In total seven negotiation scenarios were selected, as depicted in Table 6.1. Full
details on the scenarios can be found in the references provided in Table 6.1, and in
Appendix C and D.
6.3.4 Quality Measures for Opponent Models
The quality of an opponent model can be measured in two ways: a black box approach,
in which performance measures evaluate the quality of the outcome; and a white box
view, which uses accuracy measures capable of considering the internal design of a
strategy and revealing the accuracy of the estimation of the opponent's preferences.
The work in this chapter focuses on the performance measures shown in Table 6.2
(for more information on performance measures we refer to Section 2.4.3). We will
compare models using a white box approach in Chapter 7.
We employ six dierent performance measures. First, we keep track of the utility
performance of an individual opponent model, which is measured as the average
score of the agents employing it against the selected opponents on all negotiation
scenarios. We also measure the average time of agreement and the average amount
of rounds that the negotiation takes. Finally, we test the average distance from the
outcome to the Pareto-frontier, Kalai-point, and Nash-point of all negotiations that
result in an agreement.
116Performance measure Description
Average utility [17, 141, 112] Average score of the agents against selected
opponents on all negotiation scenarios.
Average time of agreement [22] Average time required to reach an agreement.
Average rounds [141, 270] Average rounds a negotiation lasts. In a
rounds-based setting, less means more accu-
rate.
Average Pareto distance of agree-
ment [17, 113]
Average minimal distance to the Pareto-
frontier. Lower is better.
Average Kalai distance of agree-
ment [113]
Average distance to the Kalai-point. Lower
means more fair.
Average Nash distance of agree-
ment [113]
Average distance to the Nash-point. Lower
means more fair.
Table 6.2: Overview of the performance measures.
6.4 Experiments
We applied the method described in the previous section to our experimental setup
below in order to answer the research questions introduced in Section 6.2.
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
To analyze the performance of dierent opponent models, we employed Genius to
evaluate the automated negotiators' strategies and their components. The experi-
ments are subdivided into two categories: we use a standard time-based protocol, as
well as a round-based protocol. In total, we ran 17920 matches, which on a single
computer takes nearly two months.
Our main interest goes out to the real-time setting, as this protocol features the
time/exploration trade-o. We applied our benchmark to the set of models using the
time-based protocol. Each match features a real-time deadline set at three minutes.
The full tournament consists of 17920 matches, which takes more than an month to
run on a single computer.
In the round-based protocol the same approach is applied, but in this case, time does
not pass within a round, giving the agent innite time to update its model. This
provides valuable insights into the best theoretical result an opponent model can
achieve.
1176.4.2 Opponent Models
We compare the performance of the opponent models used in ANAC (Appendix B),
which is a yearly international competition in which negotiating agents compete
on multiple domains. Each year, the competition leads to the introduction of new
negotiation strategies with novel opponent models, as the utility function of each
player is private information and hence has to be learned. The utility functions of
the agents are linearly additive; that is, the overall utility consists of a weighted sum
of the utility for each individual issue. The setting of ANAC is consistent with the
preliminaries in this chapter; i.e., the negotiation setting consists of an alternating
oers protocol with discrete negotiation scenarios and real-time deadlines.
We specically opted to use agents that participated in ANAC for the following
reasons: the agents are designed for one consistent negotiation setting, which makes it
possible to compare them fairly; their implementation is publicly available; and nally,
we believe that the agents and opponent models represent the current state-of-the-art.
We used modeling techniques from ANAC 2010, ANAC 2011, and a selection of
opponent models designed for ANAC 2012.
We isolated the opponent models from the agents and reimplemented them as separate
generic components to be compatible with all other agents using our BOA framework
(Chapter 3). As discussed in Section 6.2.1, this setup allows us to equip a single
negotiation strategy with various opponent models, which makes it straightforward
to fairly compare the dierent modeling techniques.
Table 6.3 provides a summary of the online opponent models used in our experiments,
with references to the work in which they are described. We did not include the
Bayesian Model from [112] and the FSEGA Bayesian Model [226], even though they
tted our setup, as both models were not designed to handle domains containing
more than a 1000 bids. We are aware that many alternative opponent modeling
techniques exist [46, 112, 165, 270]; however, for our negotiation setting, this was
the largest set available of comparable opponent modeling techniques.
Based on our analysis, we found that in our selection two approaches to opponent
modeling are prominent: Bayesian opponent models and Frequency models.
Bayesian opponent models generate hypotheses about the opponent's preferences [112].
The models presuppose that the opponent's strategy adheres to a specic decision
function; for example a time-dependent strategy with a linear concession speed. This
is then used to update the hypotheses using Bayesian learning.
Frequency models learn the issue and value weights separately. The issue weights are
usually calculated based on the frequency that an issue changes between two oers.
The value weights are oten calculated based on the frequency of appearance in oers.
Both modeling approaches are prone to failure as they rely on a subset of the
assumptions introduced in Section 6.2.2. More specically, Bayesian models make
118strong assumptions about the opponent's strategy, whereas frequency models assume
knowledge about the value distribution of the issues of a preference prole and place
weak restrictions on the opponent's negotiation strategy. Generally, the Bayesian
models are far more computationally expensive; however, it is unknown if they are
more accurate.
Model Description M
No Model No knowledge about the preference prole. -
Perfect
Model
Perfect knowledge about the preference prole. -
Bayesian
Scalable
Model [112]
This model learns the issue and value weights separately
using Bayesian learning. Each round, the hypotheses
about the preference prole are updated based assuming
that the opponent conceded a constant amount.
1
IAMhaggler
Bay.
Model [261]
Ecient implementation of the Bayesian Scalable Model
in which the opponent is assumed to use a particular
time-dependent decision function.
1
HardHeaded
Freq.
Model [250]
This model learns the issue weights based on how often
the value of an issue changes between turns. The value
weights are determined based on the frequency in which
they have been oered.
3, 4
Smith
Freq.
Model [249]
Similar to the HardHeaded Frequency Model, but less
ecient. The issue weights depends on the relative fre-
quency of the most oered values.
3, 5
Agent X
Freq. Model
This model is a more complex variant of the HardHeaded
Frequency Model that also takes the opponent's tendency
to repeat bids into account.
3, 4
N.A.S.H.
Freq. Model
In contrast to HardHeaded Frequency Model, this model
learns the issue weights based on the frequency that the
assumed best value is oered.
2, 4
Table 6.3: Overview of the online opponent models and their modeling assumptions
(M).
6.5 Results
Below we analyze the outcomes of the experiment to provide an answer to the
research questions in the form of Hypotheses 1 through 6. We rst discuss the overall
gain in performance when using perfect knowledge versus online opponent modeling.
119Quality
Measures Perfect
HH.
FM
Ag.X
FM
Nash
FM
IAH.
BM
Smith
FM None
Scal.
BM
Time-based
Avg. utility .7285 .7260 .7257 .7257 .7178 .7156 .7125 .7077
Avg. time of agr. .4834 .4865 .4867 .4865 .4958 .4937 .5022 .5055
Avg. rounds 7220 7218 7231 7198 7004 4745 7352 4836
Avg. Pareto dist.
of agr.
.0007 .0017 .0015 .0018 .0069 .0068 .0059 .0071
Avg. Kalai dist.
of agr.
.2408 .2434 .2447 .2428 .2515 .2474 .2683 .2561
Avg. Nash dist.
of agr.
.2442 .2471 .2481 .2483 .2541 .2500 .2721 .2594
Rounds-based
Avg. utility .7235 .7196 .7191 .7192 .7111 .7199 .7050 .7124
Avg. time of agr. .4928 .4975 .4978 .4977 .5058 .4974 .5136 .5038
Avg. rounds 2508 2531 2533 2533 2572 2531 2567 2562
Avg. Pareto dist.
of agr.
.0010 .0029 .0023 .0028 .0073 .0026 .0066 .0063
Avg. Kalai dist.
of agr.
.2332 .2380 .2395 .2380 .2456 .2369 .2614 .2445
Avg. Nash dist.
of agr.
.2370 .2403 .2437 .2404 .2516 .2403 .2644 .2472
Table 6.4: Performance of all models on a set of quality measures for both protocols.
A bold item indicates the lowest value for a quality measure, a underlined item the
highest.
Section 6.5.2 provides an answer to the nal research question on how the negotiation
setting inuences the performance of an opponent model.
6.5.1 Overall Performance of Opponent Models
Our experimental results for a selection of the quality measures described in Sec-
tion 6.3.4 are shown in Table 6.4 for both the time-based and round-based protocol.
Before we analyze the performance gain of online opponent models, we rst answer
the question whether perfect knowledge aids in improving the negotiation outcome
at all:
Hypothesis 6.1
Usage of the perfect model by a negotiation strategy leads to a signicant perfor-
mance gain in comparison to not using an opponent model.
120We expected that perfect knowledge about the opponent's preferences would signi-
cantly improve performance of an agent. Our main aim here was not to reconrm
the already widely acknowledged benets of integrative bargaining, but to analyze
whether our experimental setup is a valid instrument for measuring the learning
eect in other types of settings. Our expectation is conrmed by the experiment, as
the Perfect Model yields a signicant performance increase on all quality measures
(except average rounds) for both protocols. For the real-time protocol, the dierence
between the best online opponent model (HardHeaded Frequency Model) and No
Model is 0.0135; for the round-based protocol it is 0.0144 (Smith Frequency Model).
Note that while the gains are small, there are three small domains where opponent
modeling does not result in signicant gains. If we solely focus on the large Travel
negotiation scenario, then the gain relative to No Model becomes 0.0413 for the
Perfect Model. Especially note the improvement in distance between the outcome and
Pareto-frontier, and the earlier agreements, in Table 6.4. This leads us to conclude
that using an opponent model leads to better performance as it aids in increasing
the quality of the outcome.
Hypothesis 6.2
Usage of an online opponent model leads to a signicant performance gain when
time is not an issue. Online opponent modeling does not yield the same benet
in a real-time setting because of the time/exploration trade-o.
We noted previously that in some cases, ANAC agents that do not model the opponent
can outperform agents that do, and such agents have even won the competition (see
Table C.2 and D.2). This led us to believe that online modeling does not benet the
agents, either because it misrepresents the preferences, or by taking too much time
in a time-sensitive setting.
This is why it came as a surprise that in both the time- and round-based protocol,
online opponent models performed signicantly better on all quality measures. For
the time-based protocol the best online opponent models are the frequency models,
except for the Smith Frequency Model who scores badly in this case. However, for
the round-based protocol, the Smith Frequency Model is actually best. This is caused
by the time/exploration trade-o, because the model is computationally expensive
as indicated by the small amount of bids oered in the time-based protocol.
Surprisingly the worst performance on a quality measure is not always made by
using No Model. For example in the time-based experiment the Bayesian Scalable
Model has the worst performance. The Bayesian model of IAMhaggler however,
performs much better, but disappoints in the round-based protocol. We believe this
can be attributed to its updating mechanism: only unique bids are used to update
the model, which speeds-up updating but can result in poor performance against
slowly conceding agents that oer the same bid multiple times.
121Agents
Opponent model e = 0:1 e = 0:2 e = 1 e = 2
Perfect Model 0.0180 0.0164 0.0152 0.0144
HardHeaded Freq. Model 0.0156 0.0137 0.0118 0.0128
Agent X Freq. Model 0.0161 0.0137 0.0116 0.0113
N.A.S.H. Freq. Model 0.0166 0.0129 0.0108 0.0121
IAMhaggler Bay. Model 0.0084 0.0055 0.0033 0.0039
Smith Freq. Model -0.0031 0.0020 0.0071 0.0063
Bayesian Scalable Model -0.0050 -0.0058 -0.0032 -0.0053
Table 6.5: Utility of each opponent model relative to using No Model for each agent.
In conclusion, online opponent model can result in signicant gains and surprisingly,
frequency models lead to the largest gains, outperforming the Bayesian models. We
believe that the winners of ANAC could have performed even better by learning the
opponent's preferences with a frequency model. The success of the frequency model
can be attributed to its simplicity and hence faster performance, and to the fact that
it is more robust by making weaker assumptions about the strategy of the opponent
in comparison to the Bayesian modeling approaches.
6.5.2 Inuence of the Negotiation Setting
We will now discuss the inuence of each of the three components of the negotiation
setting on the quality of an opponent model, following the structure of Section 6.2.
6.5.3 Inuence of the Agent's Strategy
The performance gain of using an opponent model necessarily depends on the strat-
egy in which it is embedded (cf. Chapter 3). Table 6.5 provides an overview of the
relative gain in comparison to No Model for all opponent models in the time-based
experiment. Based on the results, we have tested the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.3
The more competitive an agent, the more it benets from using an opponent
model.
At each turn of a negotiation session, a set of possible agreements can be dened.
This is the intersection of two sets: the set of bids that an agent considers for oering,
and the set of all bids acceptable to the opponent. The more competitive the agent,
122Opponent agents
Opponent model
TDT
0.0
TDT
0.2
TDT
1.0
TDT
2.0 OD Gah. HH. IcH.
Perfect .0085 .0015 .0008 .0022 .0060 .0676 .0015 .0399
HH. Freq. Model .0085 .0013 -.0002 .0019 .0060 .0515 .0000 .0388
Agent X Freq. Model .0085 .0019 .0002 .0036 .0058 .0561 .0009 .0285
N.A.S.H. Freq. Model .0085 .0005 -.0005 .0020 .0065 .0507 .0037 .0336
IAH. Bay. Model .0000 .0003 -.0021 -.0001 -.0046 .0511 .0039 -.0066
Smith Frequency -.0038 -.0023 -.0019 .0007 -.0113 .0357 -.0224 .0297
Bay. Scalable Model .0000 -.0033 -.0055 -.0058 -.0535 .0458 -.0128 -.0036
Table 6.6: Utility of each opponent model relative to using No Model for each
opponent. A bold item indicates the lowest value for a domain, a underlined item
the highest.
the smaller the intersection between the two sets. When an agent concedes, the
number of possible agreements increases at the cost of utility. An opponent model
can help in nding possible agreements, preventing concession and therefore loss
in utility. We therefore expected the gain for competitive agents to be higher, as
the set of possible agreements each turn is smaller, and therefore an optimal bid is
more easily missed by an agent not employing an opponent model. This is especially
decisive in the last few seconds of the negotiation, when many agents concede rapidly
to avoid non-agreement.
The hypothesis is conrmed by our experiments. In Table 6.5 there is a negative
correlation between the concession speed and relative gain in performance. If we
ignore the results of the three worst performing models, a small { albeit statistically
signicant { negative correlation of  0:508 is found.
6.5.4 Inuence of the Opponent's Strategy
The opponent's behavior also has an important impact on the performance of an op-
ponent model. Based on the results shown in Table 6.6, we test the three hypotheses
below.
Hypothesis 6.4
An agent benets more from an opponent model against competitive agents.
Intuitively, the more competitive the opponent, the more useful the opponent model as
the set of possible agreements is smaller, analogous to Hypothesis 6.3. Therefore, we
expected the highest gain against the competitive agents Gahboninho, HardHeaded,
and IAMcrazyHaggler. However, in Table 6.6 only the gain for Gahboninho and
IAMcrazyHaggler is very high.
123For HardHeaded, we believe this can be attributed to the agent using an opponent
model itself. If the opponent uses a well-performing opponent model, then the
performance gain of an opponent model can be expected to be lower, as the opponent
is already able to make Pareto-optimal bids. Our experiment appears to the conrm
this hypothesis in the case of playing against HardHeaded, whose well-performing
opponent model seems to diminish the eect of opponent modeling by the other side.
Concluding, given the results of our experiment, we believe that the hypothesis holds,
at least for consistently competitive opponents without an opponent model.
Hypothesis 6.5
Frequency models are more robust against opponents employing a random tactic
than the Bayesian models.
In order to estimate the opponent's utility of a certain bid, both types of models make
certain assumptions about the opponent. The Bayesian opponent models assume
that the opponent follows a particular decision function through time (cf. modeling
assumption 1 in Section 6.2.2), while the frequency models assume higher valued
bids are oered more often (cf. modeling assumptions 3 and 4). Many opponent
strategies do not adhere to these assumptions, which causes the learning models
to make wrong predictions when playing against them. For example, opponents
such as IAMcrazyHaggler who employ a random negotiation strategy, explicitly
violate the assumptions of both models. For the Bayesian learning models, this
means the opponent preferences will be estimated incorrectly, and more so through
time. The frequency models however, are much more robust, not only in the sense
that a negotiation tactic has a greater chance to satisfy its assumptions, but more
signicantly: it is less sensitive to a tactic violating its assumptions. For instance, in
the case of IAMcrazyHaggler, it will deduce that it equally prefers any bid it has
oered so far { which, in this case, is exactly right.
We therefore expected relatively poor performance from the Bayesian models. This
hypothesis is conrmed by our experiment: the frequency models have a high
performance gain against IAMcrazyHaggler, whereas using the Bayesian models is
even worse than not using an opponent model at all.
6.5.5 Inuence of the Negotiation Scenario
The performance of an opponent model is inuenced by the characteristics of the
negotiation scenario, such as amount of bids, distribution of the bids, and the opposi-
tion of the domain. Table 6.7 provides an overview of the relative gain of all opponent
models in comparison to No Model for in the time-based experiment. Based on these
results, we formulate Hypothesis 6.6.
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Parameter Model Low Medium High
Size Perfect 0.001 0.022 0.041
Best 4 0.002 0.018 0.039
Bid Distribution Perfect 0.001 0.013 0.035
Best 4 -0.001 0.010 0.034
Opposition Perfect 0.001 0.023 0.020
Best 4 -0.001 0.022 0.016
Table 6.7: Gain of each model relative to using No Model for each scenario parameter.
Hypothesis 6.6
The higher the amount of bids, bid distribution, or opposition of a scenario, the
more an agent benets from using an opponent model.
We anticipated the bid distribution to be the major factor determining the per-
formance gain of an opponent model. If the bid distribution is high, then the
Pareto-frontier is more sparse. This means a higher gain can be expected of utilizing
an opponent model to locate bids close to the Pareto-frontier. This is conrmed by
our experiments, as we found a strong Pearson correlation of 0:778 between the bid
distribution and the performance gain of the best four models, and 0:701 if we solely
focus on the perfect opponent model. Therefore we conrm this sub-hypothesis.
Another factor is the size of the negotiation domain. If a domain contains more bids,
then there are relatively less bids that are Pareto-optimal, so an opponent model
can aid more in identifying them. On the other hand, opponent models are more
computationally expensive on the larger domains. Despite this eect, we found a
strong Pearson correlation between the amount of bids and the performance gain:
0:631 for the best four models, and 0:596 when using the perfect model.
The nal factor is the opposition of the scenario. Intuitively, if the opposition
is higher, then there are less possible agreements. Opponent models can aid in
identifying these rare acceptable bids, thereby preventing break-os and unnecessary
concessions. Nevertheless, if the opposition is high, then the bids are also relatively
closer to the Pareto-optimal frontier, which renders it more dicult for an opponent
model to make a signicant impact on the negotiation outcome. Despite this eect,
we expected that higher opposition would lead to higher performance gain. However,
in our experiments we noted only a small positive Pearson correlation of 0:256 for
the best four models and 0:262 for the perfect model. Based on these results we are
unable to draw a conclusion, which leads us to believe the two mentioned eects
cancel each other out, making the other two characteristics of the scenario decisive
125in the eectiveness of a model.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates and compares the performance of a selection of state-of-the-
art online opponent models. Our main goal was to evaluate if, and under what
circumstances, opponent modeling is benecial.
Measuring the performance of an opponent model is not trivial, as the details of
the negotiation setting aects the eectiveness of the model. Furthermore, while we
know an opponent model improves the negotiation outcome in general, the role of
time should be taken into account when considering online opponent modeling in a
real-time negotiation because of the time/exploration trade-o: a computationally
expensive model may produce predictions of better quality, but in a real-time setting it
may lead to less bids being explored, which may harm the outcome of the negotiation.
Based on an analysis of the contributing factors to the quality of an opponent
model, we formulated a measurement method to quantify the performance of online
opponent models and applied it to a large set of state-of-the-art opponent models.
We analyzed two main types of opponent models: frequency models and Bayesian
models. We noted that the time/exploration trade-o is indeed an important factor
to consider in opponent model design of both types. However, we found that the
best performing models did not suer from the trade-o, and that most { but not
all { online opponent models result in a signicant improvement in performance
compared with not using a model; not only because the deals are made faster, but
also because the outcomes are on average signicantly closer to the Pareto-frontier.
A main conclusion of our work is that we noted that frequency models consistently
outperform Bayesian models. This is not only because they are faster, because the
eect remains in a round-based setting. This suggests that frequency models combine
the best of both worlds. Surprisingly, despite their performance, frequency models
have not received much attention in literature.
Our other main conclusion concerns the eects of the negotiation setting on an
opponent model's eectiveness. We found that the more competitive an agent, or its
opponent, the more benet an opponent model provides. In addition, we found that
the higher the size or the bid distribution of a scenario, the higher the gain of using
a model. In the next chapter, we investigate this more thoroughly, by studying the
interaction between the performance of an opponent model and its accuracy through
time.
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Predicting the Performance
of Opponent Models
The quality of an opponent model can be measured in two dierent ways. One, which we
extensively covered in Chapter 6, is to use the agent's performance as a benchmark for the
model's quality. The other is to directly evaluate its accuracy by using similarity measures.
Both methods have been used extensively, and both have their distinct advantages and
drawbacks. Our work in this chapter bridges the gap between the two approaches by
investigating a large set of opponent modeling techniques in dierent negotiation settings,
measuring both their accuracy through time and their performance. We review all ways to
measure the accuracy of an opponent model and we then analyze how changes in accuracy
translate into performance dierences. Moreover, we pinpoint the best predictors for good
performance. This leads us to new insights in how to construct an opponent model, and
what we need to measure when optimizing performance.
127This chapter is based on the following publication:
Tim Baarslag, Mark Hendrikx, Koen Hindriks, and Catholijn Jonker. Predicting the
performance of opponent models in automated negotiation. In Web Intelligence (WI)
and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT), 2013 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint
Conferences on, volume 2, pages 59{66, 2013
1287.1 Introduction
A major challenge in automated negotiation is that agents usually keep their pref-
erence information private to avoid exploitation [60, 270]. When the agents have
limited knowledge of the other's preferences, the agents may fail to reach an optimal
outcome as they cannot take the opponent's desires into account [112].
In order to improve the eciency of the negotiation and the quality of the outcome,
agents may construct a model of the opponent's preferences, which aids them in
estimating the information that is kept private [60, 112, 270]. Over time, a large
number of such opponent models have been introduced, based on dierent learning
techniques and underlying assumptions, and multiple methods have been used to
compare their quality. The dierent evaluation methods for opponent models make
it hard to compare dierent approaches, as each method has its unique scope of
application, together with dierent advantages and drawbacks. From an engineering
perspective, it still remains unclear which opponent model to choose in a particular
negotiation setting.
As we outlined in Section 2.4.3 and 2.4.4, there are two popular ways to measure the
quality of an opponent model:
1. Performance measures evaluate the quality of the outcome, usually measured
in utility gain, or distance of the agreement to the Pareto frontier. With
this method, the success of an opponent model is expressed in terms of the
negotiation result (as opposed to the whole negotiation process).
2. Accuracy measures aim to determine the quality of a model in a more funda-
mental way, by quantifying how well the opponent model represents the real
preferences of the opponent, using a certain similarity measure. An example
is the correlation between the estimated and the real outcome space, or the
percentage of correctly inferred Pareto optimal outcomes.
There are various authors that evaluate their opponent model with performance
measures (e.g. [60, 112, 270]). Using a performance measure has one very important
quality: it measures exactly what needs to optimized, namely the net eect an oppo-
nent model has on the negotiation result. On the other hand, because performance
measures are only able to demonstrate improvement of the end result, they may not
provide insight into why or how an opponent model works; that is, they measure the
result obtained by the negotiation agent as a whole, of which the opponent model is
only a single component. This makes the performance measure very sensitive to the
specics of the experimental setup. Moreover, there is usually no clear upper bound
in performance gain, so it remains unclear what the highest attainable result is.
Other authors prefer to use accuracy measures to evaluate their model (for exam-
ple [45, 49, 113, 120]). The main advantage of this approach is that it directly
assesses the quality of a model, independent of other factors such as bidding strategy
129or acceptance strategy. Secondly, it is easier to compare accuracy results between
dierent experimental setups, and to track the accuracy of a model over the course
of the negotiation. This, in turn, can reveal valuable information about the reasons
for a model's success.
There are also drawbacks of using accuracy measures in negotiation, two of which we
will address in this chapter. First, it is currently unclear what eect a more accurate
opponent model has on the negotiation outcome. It could very well be that from
some point, increased accuracy does not translate into better performance. An 80%
accurate model for example, could perform just as well as a perfect model. Second,
there are many accuracy measures to choose from, and it is currently unknown
which accuracy measure should be selected to ensure a good overall end result; that
is, we would like to know what accuracy measure best predicts an improvement in
performance.
Our work in this chapter bridges the gap between both approaches by considering
opponent models from both a performance and an accuracy perspective. We rst
test many current opponent modeling techniques in dierent negotiation settings,
measuring both their accuracy through time and their performance. We then analyze
how changes in accuracy translate into performance dierences. Moreover, we review
all ways to measure the accuracy of an opponent model, and we pinpoint the best
predictors for good performance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 the setting
and terminology used in this chapter and introduces our research questions and
experiments, followed by a discussion of the results in Section 7.3. Finally, Section 7.4
outlines the conclusions of this chapter.
7.2 Measuring the Quality of Opponent Models
The aim of this chapter is to answer three research questions:
1. How does the accuracy of opponent models depend on negotiation factors, such
as domain size, or time?
2. What is the relationship between the accuracy of an opponent model and its
expected performance gain?
3. What accuracy measures are the best predictors for performance gain?
To answer our three questions, we rst outline our selection of opponent models
(Section 7.2.2) and the accuracy measures incorporated in our method (Section 7.2.3).
Next, we discuss the experimental setup (Section 7.2.4 and 7.2.5). We start with the
preliminaries of this chapter.
1307.2.1 Preliminaries
We use the same negotiation setting as in Chapter 6; however, instead of a continuous
time line, we use a discrete time line here, since we want to sample not only the
performance, but also the quality of opponent models at regular time intervals. This
means a deadline occurs after a specied number of rounds N, and both agents
receive utility 0 if they do not succeed in reaching an agreement before this time.
Recall from Section 2.2.3 that the negotiation domain, which species all possible
bids, is common knowledge, while the preferences for each party is private information.
We discuss opponent models that attempt to estimate the opponent's utility function
uop(!) while relying solely on the information gathered during the negotiation. We
restrict ourselves to linear additive preference proles in this work, as there exists
no large set of comparable models for non-linear preferences. The utility u(!) of an
outcome ! 2 
 is therefore assumed to be computed as a weighted sum (as specied
by the issue weights wi) of value weights ei(!i):
u(!) =
n X
i=1
wi  ei(!i): (7.1)
7.2.2 Selection of Opponent Models
We compare a large set of state of the art opponent models, which were applied in
the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC, Appendix B). ANAC is
a yearly international competition in which negotiation agents compete on a set of
scenarios that are unknown beforehand. As in Chapter 6, our reason for including
this set of models is threefold: rst, they represent the state of the art; second, to our
knowledge, they are the largest set of techniques designed for one common setting
consistent with ours; and nally, their code is publicly available. Table 7.1 gives
an overview of all models we evaluated, including three theoretical baselines. We
distinguish four types of opponent models:
1. Bayesian models estimate the opponent's preferences by rst generating a set
of candidate preference proles. Next, Bayesian learning is used to continually
update the model, based on certain assumptions about the opponent's conces-
sion function. For these models, we also include Perfect variants, which use
perfect knowledge about the opponent's concessions, but are still unaware of
the opponent's exact preferences.
2. Frequency models estimate both the issue and value weights separately. The
issue weights are estimated based on how often their value is changed between
sequential bids. The value weights are derived from the frequency they are
oered.
1313. Value models are similar to the frequency models, except that the issue weights
are assumed to be equal.
4. Theoretical baselines are used to compare the quality of the models. The
Perfect Model and Worst Model act as an upper and lower bound on quality
respectively, while the Opposite Model functions as a baseline, since it serves
as a good initial guess of the opponent's preferences.
Using the decoupling technique of our BOA architecture (Chapter 3), each model
was isolated from existing negotiation agents (as indicated in Table 7.1), and then
generalized to be compatible with any bidding strategy. The advantage of using
the BOA framework is that we can interchange the opponent modeling component
of each negotiation strategy, so that we can compare the performance of dierent
opponent models while keeping the bidding and acceptance strategy xed.
7.2.3 Selection of Accuracy Measures
We compare the accuracy of opponent models by evaluating how well the models
estimate the opponent's preferences when provided with various negotiation traces.
In eect, we treat the opponent model as an isolated BOA component that receives
oers as input, and yields an estimate of the opponent's preference prole as output,
which (hopefully) gets increasingly accurate with every processed bid.
When we assess opponent model accuracy, we require an accuracy measure that
quanties the similarity between the opponent's actual preference prole uop and
the estimation u0
op. We employed all accuracy measures currently in use (see also
Section 2.4.4), as shown in Table 7.2. The rst two sets of measures are derived
from literature, to which we have added a set of metrics based on the Pareto optimal
frontier.
We briey review the denitions of Section 2.4.4 of the accuracy measures for outcome
spaces and issue weights. Many of the measures are formulated in terms of the
combined properties of the opponent's utility space and the agent's own utility space
{ together called the bid space. The real bid space B is dened as
B = f(uown(!);uop(!)) j ! 2 
g:
The estimated bid space B0 is dened in terms of the estimated opponent utility
function u0
op:
B
0 =
 
uown(!);u
0
op(!)

j ! 2 

	
:
To quantify how well u0
op approximates the opponent's preferences, we might consider
the dierences between u0
op and uop directly. Alternatively, we can analyze the
resulting bid spaces B and B0, or we might concentrate on subsets.
Outcome space accuracy measures quantify the dierence between uop and u0
op by
considering all bids in the outcome space 
. A straightforward measure is the average
132Bayesian Models
Bayesian Scalable Model [112] Estimates the issue and value weights separately, using
Bayesian learning. The opponent is assumed to concede
a constant amount per round.
IAMhaggler Bayesian Model [261] A Bayesian model in which the opponent is assumed
to use a particular time-dependent strategy and only
unique bids are used to update the model.
Frequency Models
HardHeaded Frequency Model [250] Learns the issue weights based on how often the value
of an issue changes. The value weights are estimated
based on the frequency they are oered.
Smith Frequency Model [249] Learns the value weights based on frequency they are
oered. The issue weights are estimated based on the
distribution of the values.
Agent X
Frequency Model
A variant of the HardHeaded Frequency Model that
takes the opponent's tendency to repeat bids into ac-
count.
N.A.S.H. Frequency Model Learns the issue weights based on how often the best
value for each issue is oered. The value weights are
estimated based on their frequency.
Value Models
AgentLG Value Model Estimates the value weights based on the frequency
they are oered.
CUHK Agent Value Model Counts how often each value is oered. The utility of
a bid is the sum of the score of its values divided by
the best possible score. The model only uses the rst
100 unique bids for its estimation.
Theoretical Baselines
Opposite Model Denes the opponent's utility as one minus the agent's
utility.
Perfect Model Perfect knowledge of the opponent's preferences.
Worst Model Denes the estimated utility as one minus the real
utility.
Table 7.1: Overview of opponent models.
133Outcome Space
Pearson correlation
of bids [113]
Pearson correlation coecient between real and estimated preferences.
Ranking distance
of bids [45, 113]
Ranking distance between real and estimated preference.
Average dierence
between bids
Average dierence between the real and estimated utility of all bids.
Issue Weights
Pearson correlation
of issue
weights [113]
Pearson correlation coecient between real and estimated issue
weights.
Ranking distance
of issue
weights [113]
Ranking distance between real and estimated issue weights.
Average
dierence between
issue weights [120]
Average dierence between the real and estimated issue weights.
Pareto Frontier
Average dierence
of Pareto frontier
The average dierence between the real and estimated utility of the
Pareto bids.
Percentage of found
Pareto bids
Percentage of real Pareto bids that are also estimated to be a Pareto
bid.
Percentage of
correct
Pareto bids
Percentage of estimated Pareto bids that are also real Pareto bids.
Dierence in Pareto
frontier surface
Absolute dierence in surface under the real and estimated Pareto
frontier.
Table 7.2: Overview of accuracy measures.
distance between bids metric, which calculates the average absolute dierence between
uop and u0
op over 
. However, as models are usually only concerned with the ranking
of outcomes, a more suitable metric is the Pearson correlation of bids that measures
the correlation between two outcome spaces, which is dened as follows:
dp(uop;u
0
op)=
X
!2

(uop(!) uop)(u
0
op(!) u0
op)
sX
!2

(uop(!) uop)
2 X
w2

(u
0
op(!) u0
op)
2
; (7.2)
where uop and u0
op denote the real and estimated average utility over all outcomes.
134Alternatively, the ranking distance of bids compares all pairwise preference orderings:
dr(uop;u
0
op) =
1
j
j2
X
!2
;!02

cu;u0(!;!
0); (7.3)
where cu;u0 is the conict indicator function, which is equal to one when the ranking
of the outcomes ! and !0 diers between the two proles, and zero otherwise.
Issue weight accuracy measures quantify the dierence between the issue weights
of uop and u0
op. The underlying idea is that these variables are most important to
estimate correctly. The metrics used are identical to the metrics above.
Pareto frontier accuracy measures focus only on the similarity between two Pareto
frontiers. This is more challenging since their sizes can be dierent, so two sets of
Pareto frontiers cannot be compared in the same way as outcome spaces or weight
vectors. The average dierence of Pareto frontier metric calculates the dierence
in utility over all Pareto bids of bid space B. The percentage of found Pareto bids
measure gives the percentage of Pareto optimal bids of space B that are also in B0.
Conversely, the percentage of correct Pareto bids metric yields the percentage of
Pareto optimal bids in B0 that are correct (i.e., in B).
Finally, we introduce the dierence in Pareto frontier surface measure, which is
dened as follows: we take all outcomes in 
 that form the estimated Pareto frontier
in B0; we then map these points onto B. Finally, we compute the absolute dierence
in surface below these points and the actual Pareto frontier, as shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Visualization of the dierence in Pareto frontier surface.
7.2.4 Quantifying the Estimation Accuracy
The goal of our rst experiment is to quantify the accuracy of opponent models, both
in dierent domains and through time. We outline in detail below the factors of the
experimental setup that we believe are important to consider.
Inuence of the Opponent Model on the Opponent's Actions
When an agent uses an opponent model, it indirectly inuences the opponent in two
ways: rst, a model may inuence the time of agreement, as a more accurate model
135may lead to better oers, resulting in earlier agreement; second, a model may cause
changes in the opponent's strategy.
Both factors inuence the bids presented by the opponent, and thus the information
available for the model. To ensure every model learns from the same information,
and therefore can be compared with the others, we selected non-adaptive opponents
that never accept a bid.
Inuence of the Opponent's Strategy on the Opponent Model
Opponents dier in how well their behavior corresponds to a model's assumptions.
For instance, a model that assumes that the opponent concedes will likely have
problems modeling a very competitive agent. Therefore, we should select a balanced
set of opponents to avoid favoring any model. One of the dening factors here is
how much information an opponent reveals over time. For example, a conceding
opponent reveals more of its preferences than an agent who makes random bids.
Furthermore, we should include agents that strongly violate the modeling assumptions
as to evaluate the robustness of the models. Taking both factors into account, we
selected the following agents:
1. Conceding agents are time-dependent agents (see Section 2.3.3 and Faratin et
al. [75]) that select a bid depending on the current time t 2 [0;1] according to
a target utility of the form ut = Pmax  (1   t1=e) [75]. We selected four agents
with Pmax = 1 and dierent concession rates e 2 f0:1;0:2;1:0;2:0g. These
agents make up the predictable opponents.
2. Random agents oer a random bid above a target utility m, where we selected
m 2 f0;0:25;0:50;0:75g. This type of agent and the others below form the
unpredictable opponents.
3. Conceding agents with an oset are time-dependent agents that do not start
with their best bid. For this category we use a linear concession rate (e = 1)
and starting point Pmax 2 f0:7;0:8;0:9g.
4. Non-conceding agents start with a minimum target utility that increases to the
maximum over time. The target utility is calculated as follows: ut = Pmin +
(1   Pmin)  t. We use four agents with parameters Pmin 2 f0;0:25;0:50;0:75g.
Inuence of the Scenario on the Opponent Model
We distinguish three features of the negotiation scenario that can signicantly
inuence how well the opponent model is able to estimate the opponent's preferences:
1. Domain size. The total possible bids directly relates to the amount of parame-
ters of the preference prole.
1362. Bid distribution. The bid distribution is dened as the average distance to the
nearest Pareto optimal bid. A high bid distribution indicates a high percentage
of outcomes far from the Pareto frontier.
3. Opposition. The opposition is dened as the distance from the Kalai-Smorodinsky
point to the point of perfect satisfaction (maximum utility for both parties).
The higher the opposition is, the more competitive the domain.
We refer to Chapter 2.2.4 for the formal denitions. We made sure to select a
balanced set of scenarios that display all characteristics. We chose ve domains based
on their size (see Table C.2 and D.2): Itex vs. Cypress (small: 180 bids), Employment
contract [245] (small: 3125 bids), Car (medium: 15625 bids), Supermarket (large:
98784 bids), and Travel (large: 188160 bids). For each domain we created a set of
scenarios varying in bid distribution and opposition. As we dened three levels of
degree for both factors, 45 scenarios are used in total.
For the experiment, we ensured that each model processes exactly the same opponent
traces, using a maximum amount of N = 5000 rounds. For the three groups of
deterministic agents we recorded their (unique) negotiation trace, amounting to a
total of 495 unique traces. For the random agents we recorded ve dierent traces
per agent, thus 900 traces in total. Combined, this amounts to 1395 traces that were
used to train every opponent model.
7.2.5 Quantifying the Accuracy/Performance Relationship
The goal of the second experiment is to investigate the relation between accuracy
and performance measures, thereby answering our nal two research questions. For
this experiment, we used a realistic set of opponents whose acceptance strategies are
enabled. With realistic opponents, every negotiation is unique, so for this investigation
we had to scale down the experimental setup. We selected a set of bidding strategies
and scenarios where using a good opponent model would have added value; i.e., tough
bidding strategies with limited learning capabilities (i.e., no opponent model), and
large, competitive negotiation scenarios. We selected four of the top bidding strategies
from ANAC: Agent K2, HardHeaded, IAMhaggler2011, and The Negotiator; and
four time-dependent agents with concession rate e 2 f0:1;0:2;1:0;2:0g. These eight
bidding strategies were combined with all thirteen models (the models in Table 7.1
and the two Bayesian models with perfect strategy knowledge) and no model. Each
agent competed ve times against all opponents (the eight bidding strategies without
model) on ve scenarios: Grocery, Employment contract [245], Travel, Energy Small,
and Supermarket. The rst scenarios were used in ANAC 2010 and 2011 (see
Table C.2 and D.2) and the last two scenarios were rst used in ANAC 2012; see
Section E.1.
Each agent played both sides of the ve scenarios using a round-based protocol of
1000 rounds. Since 112 agents competed 5 times against 8 opponents on 5 scenarios
137Figure 7.2: Accuracy over time (measured with Pearson correlation of bids) against
predictable (i.e., conceding) opponents. The numbers next to a cluster of lines are
ordered from high to low accuracy.
for both preference proles, 44800 matches were ran in total.
7.3 Experimental Analysis
We will now answer our three research questions by analyzing the results of both
experiments. Each section corresponds to one of the research questions.
7.3.1 Evaluating the Estimation Accuracy of Opponent Mod-
els
As outlined in Section 7.2.4, we measured the accuracy of a large set of opponent
models to answer our rst research question, the results of which are shown in
Figure 7.2{7.6.
138Figure 7.3: Accuracy over time (measured with Pearson correlation of bids) against
the unpredictable opponents (i.e., non-conceding agents). The numbers next to a
cluster of lines are ordered from high to low accuracy.
Accuracy over Time
The graphs in Figure 7.2 and 7.3 show the average accuracy of the opponent models
over time. Figure 7.2 shows the accuracy over time when playing against predictable
opponents; Figure 7.3 shows the results again the unpredictable opponents.
First of all, it is surprising to see that many of the state of the art models actually
become less accurate over time. The main cause of this phenomenon is that the bids
presented later on in the negotiation are incorrectly handled. The value models and
frequency models for example, treat every received bid the same way, independent of
the time it is received. In eect, this means that when the opponent is conceding,
the models increase the estimated utility of less preferred outcomes. This does not
hold for the CUHK Agent Value Model, which incidentally also performs best, as
this model only takes the rst 100 unique bids into account. For Bayesian models,
the problem is that they assume very particular opponent behavior, which is likely
139Figure 7.4: Accuracy of the best four opponent models against dierent types of
opponents, measured using the average dierence of Pareto surface measure.
to become increasingly invalid as time progresses, and they perform very poorly as
a result. When we disregard this shortcoming by considering the perfect Bayesian
models, they perform better, and their accuracy then increases monotonically over
time. However, even in this case, they come second to the CUHK Agent Value Model
by a large margin.
Another interesting result is that despite their simplicity, the frequency models and
value models perform best against both types of opponents. We believe that this due
to the small number of assumptions they make; i.e., only assuming that values with
high utility are oered relatively more often. As the right graph illustrates, these
models are rather robust, even though it is clear from the nal accuracy that it is
harder to model unpredictable agents.
The lesson to take away from this is that to be robust, opponent models need to
minimize their assumptions about the opponent's behavior. Of course, every model
needs to make certain educated guesses, but when it does, the model should at
least be highly adaptable, paying close attention to the opponent's strategy. The
predictions should be revised if, over time, the opponent behavior does not seem to
t the assumptions anymore.
Accuracy per Opponent
We now analyze in more detail the accuracy of the best performing models in every
category against dierent opponents; that is, the best value model (CUHK Value
Model), the best frequency model (Smith Frequency Model), and the best performing
Bayesian models (Perfect Scalable Bayesian Model and IAMhaggler Bayesian Model).
The results are shown in Figure 7.4 and 7.5. While the best value model perform
140Figure 7.5: Accuracy of the best four opponent models against dierent types of
opponents, measured using the Pearson correlation of bids measure.
best on average, there is no opponent model that dominates all others.
An interesting result is that the technique of the best value model to only take a
limited amount of bids into account does not always pay o. The model performs
poorly against the non-conceding agents, who show their most preferred values later
in the negotiation. This means that the model can be fooled, which can be a concern
in practice.
Accuracy per Scenario
We are also interested in exactly how the specics of the negotiation scenario inuences
accuracy. We focus on the same four opponent models as above, and evaluate their
accuracy against predictable opponents. Figure 7.6 summarizes the results. Note
that we consider the average accuracy over all four models here, but we have veried
that our conclusions also hold for each model individually.
One of the rst observations is that there is a high variance in accuracy over dierent
scenarios, and each factor seems to be equally important to consider. This underlines
the importance of using a balanced set of negotiation scenarios. Clearly, domain size
is a signicant factor, as the domain size relates directly to the amount of unknown
variables to be learnt. But also for the bid distribution and opposition we nd a
strong correlation with learning accuracy. The reasons for both are very similar:
when the bid distribution or opposition is low, there are many outcomes of similar
utility because the average distance to the Pareto frontier is small. This in turn,
entails that the values of an issue are relatively close to each other in utility, which
is harder for the models to learn than more extreme preferences.
141Figure 7.6: The average accuracy of the best four opponent models on varying
scenarios.
Figure 7.7: Accuracy versus performance for all opponent models. Accuracy is
measured using the dierence in Pareto frontier surface (range [0;1], where 0 is best)
and Pearson correlation of bids (range [ 1;1], where 1 is best).
7.3.2 Evaluating the Accuracy vs. Performance Relation-
ship
Our second goal was to investigate the relationship between accuracy and performance
of opponent models. Figure 7.7 visualizes the results for two accuracy measures:
Pearson correlation of bids and dierence in Pareto frontier surface. The performance
is expressed in terms of obtained utility by the agents that employ the opponent
models, normalized such that the Worst model's performance is zero, and the Perfect
model's performance is 1. Using no model falls somewhere in between, since this is
still better than using a wrong model.
The rst thing to notice is the cluster of the best performers: the value and frequency
models. The performance of these models is already quite close to that of the perfect
model. To put it dierently, we cannot anticipate a signicant improvement from any
142other preference modeling technique over what is already achieved by these rather
simple techniques.
The other types of opponent models also form clusters in the diagram. The (Perfect)
Bayesian Model perform even worse than not using an opponent model; and only
slightly better than simply assuming opposite preferences.
The almost linear relationship between accuracy and performance is the second
thing that stands out. This shows that there is always added value to increasing the
accuracy of an opponent model, even when the accuracy is already high. Nevertheless,
the added value will necessarily be small, as the performance is already at 90% of its
upper limit when the accuracy is at 70%.
An interesting comparison can be made with the results of the previous experiment.
Figure 7.2 clearly shows the decrease in accuracy over time of many of the frequency
and value models. How is it that they still manage to perform close to optimally?
The reason is that many negotiations end in agreement, and this occurs somewhere
before the deadline by denition. In these cases, the models are updated with less
bids of poor value for the opponent. Therefore, the deciding factor in the success of
the value and frequency models lies in their higher initial accuracy.
Finally, it is interesting that the results for the Pearson correlation of bids and
dierence in Pareto frontier surface metrics are in fact very similar when we ignore
their orientation. Despite that the latter only measures the quality of the Pareto
optimal frontier instead of the full outcome space, it seems to be a suitable predictor
for performance as well. We explore this idea further in the next paragraph.
7.3.3 Evaluating the Usefulness of Accuracy Measures
Our nal goal was to nd a strong predictor for performance of opponent models,
since there are so many dierent accuracy measures to pick from. Towards this
end, we applied all of the accuracy measures shown in Table 7.2 and analyzed their
correlation with performance; see Figure 7.8.
The dark line represents the predictive power of each accuracy measure, which is
dened by the absolute correlation coecient jj between the accuracy measure score
and the model's performance. We take the absolute value because some accuracy
measures are negatively correlated with performance, while others are positively
correlated.
The light gray line indicates what portion of the bid space is learned by each accuracy
measure. For this, we calculate the absolute correlation coecient jj between each
accuracy measure and the Pearson correlation of bids. At the lower end of the scale
we see the accuracy measures that only consider issue weights, which means they are
not correlated at all with learning the space as a whole. These measures should not
143Figure 7.8: Absolute correlation between accuracy measure scores and two other
measures: performance and Pearson correlation of bids.
be used to make predictions about performance because they do not convey enough
information about the accuracy of a model.
We found three measures that correlate strongly with performance, as indicated by the
dark gray line, and therefore are good performance predictors; these are: dierence
in Pareto frontier surface, Pearson correlation of bids, and Ranking distance of bids.
These measures codify sucient information about the relationship between the real
preferences and the learned preferences, and therefore, we can translate these notions
to statements about performance. The performance of the top three measures are
signicantly better than the other measures (one-tailed t-test, p < 0:01).
Even though it only quanties the similarity of the Pareto frontier, the dierence in
Pareto frontier surface metric performs best of all (one-tailed t-test, p < 0:02). This
means that for an opponent model, it is sucient to predict which bids are Pareto
optimal. The reason being that the Pareto frontier is a crucial component of the
outcome space, and that many bidding strategies seek Pareto optimal agreements. It
is less computationally expensive to calculate than the ranking distance of bids, and it
has the lowest standard deviation between the runs. Furthermore, it is dened for all
inputs, in contrast to the Pearson correlation measures, whose results are undened
when all bids are estimated to have the same utility. Therefore, we recommend the
dierence in Pareto frontier surface as a suitable measure for accuracy.
1447.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we evaluated a large set of accuracy measures to identify the best
method to predict the performance of opponent modeling techniques in negotiation.
We introduced a procedure to quantify the accuracy of state of the art opponent
models and we identied their strengths and weaknesses. One of our main conclusions
is that there is an almost linear correspondence between accuracy and performance
of models when we employ the proper accuracy measures. Moreover, the best models
are close to being perfectly accurate, which means there is only limited room for
improvement with regard to performance.
Surprisingly, the accuracy of most opponent models decays over time due to the
incorrect handling of the opponent's less preferred bids, which are usually oered at
a later stage of the negotiation. Especially then, good strategy prediction is needed
in order to be eective at preference modeling.
Finally, we analyzed how well accuracy measures can predict the performance of an
opponent model. Three measures in particular are useful predictors of performance,
and this can be best achieved by limiting the analysis to dierence in Pareto frontier
surface between the real and the learned bid space.
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A Quantitative
Concession-Based
Classification Method of
Bidding Strategies
In this chapter, we cover the last agent strategy component of the BOA architecture of
Chapter 3, namely the bidding strategy; i.e., the strategy component that decides the
concessions to be made during the negotiation. Every negotiator needs to make concessions
to successfully reach an agreement, and the willingness to do so depends in large part on
the opponent. A concession by the opponent may be reciprocated, but the negotiation
process may also be frustrated if the opponent does not concede at all.
This process of concession making is a central theme in many automated negotiation
strategies. In this chapter, we present a quantitative classication method of negotiation
strategies that measures the willingness of an agent to concede against dierent types
of opponents. We classify some well-known negotiating strategies with respect to their
concession behavior, including the ANAC agents we described in Appendix B. We show
that our technique makes it easy to identify the main characteristics of negotiation agents,
and that it can be used to group negotiation strategies into four categories with common
negotiation characteristics, namely Inverter, Conceder, Competitor, and Matcher. We are
able to conclude, among other things, that dierent kinds of opponents call for adopting a
dierent negotiation orientation. Our analysis allows us to highlight several interesting
insights for the broader automated negotiation community. In particular, we show that the
most adaptive negotiation strategies are not necessarily the ones that win the competition.
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1488.1 Introduction
When two agents are conducting a negotiation, the opening oer and rst counteroer
dene the initial bargaining range [156] of the negotiation. Sometimes the other
party will immediately accept the oer, or will state that the set of demands is
unacceptable, breaking o the negotiation. But usually, after the rst round of
oers, the question is: what concession is to be made next? One can choose to
signal a position of rmness and stick to the original oer. Or one can take a more
cooperative stance, and choose to make a concession. If one side is not prepared to
make concessions, the other side must capitulate, or more commonly, the negotiation
will end up in a break o. Making concessions is key to a successful negotiation:
without them, negotiations would not exist [156].
Negotiation can even be dened in terms of making concessions: Pruitt [198] denes
it as a process by which a joint decision is made by two or more parties that rst
verbalize contradictory demands and then move towards agreement by a process of
concession making or search for new alternatives.
Many of the classic negotiation strategies are characterized by the way they make
concessions throughout the negotiation. For example, the time-dependent tactics
such as Boulware and Conceder [75] are characterized by the fact that they steadily
concede throughout the negotiation process. Concessions made by such tactics
depend on various factors, such as the opening bid, the reservation value, and the
remaining time. Where possible, it can be benecial to use prior information about
the negotiation setting in selecting a suitable concession strategy. However, when
there is no such prior information available to the agents, deciding what concessions
to make depends in large part on the opponent. One can either choose to signal
a position of rmness and stick to an oer. Alternatively, one can take a more
cooperative stance, and choose to make a concession. Such a concession may, in turn,
be reciprocated by the opponent, leading to a progression of concessions. On the
other hand, the negotiation process can easily be frustrated if the opponent adopts a
take-it-or-leave-it approach.
Against this background, we study the ANAC negotiation strategies according to
the way they concede towards dierent types of opponents. The competition results
of ANAC (Table C.2 and D.2 of the Appendix) only give a fairly narrow view of the
performance of the agents. In order to consider their behavior in more detail, and
also to explore the interactions between dierent strategies in a tournament setting,
we use a more sophisticated evaluation method in this chapter. As will become
evident, the performance of an agent depends heavily on the opponent.
The work in this chapter advances the state-of-the-art in automated negotiation
in the following ways. We present a new classication method for negotiation
strategies, based on their pattern of concession making when faced with dierent
kinds of opponents. We introduce a denition of Concession Rate (CR) which
149measures the cooperativeness of an agent. We present a technique to quantitatively
measure the CR against two extreme types of strategies: a take-it-or-leave-it strategy,
and a conceding tactic. We then apply this technique to classify some well-known
negotiating strategies, including the agents of ANAC. We present an in-depth analysis
of the strategies from the nalists of ANAC and the techniques employed by the
dierent agents. This provides, for the rst time, insight into the negotiation
strategy space of the ANAC agents and what type of behavior (e.g. being adaptive
or hardheaded) is more likely to do well in dierent situations. It also aids our
understanding of what concession making strategies are eective in settings such as
ANAC.
Analyzing the competition results yields some interesting insights into the properties
exhibited by agents which successfully negotiate in realistic negotiation environments.
We compare, for each strategy, the correlation between the total amount of concession
made during the negotiation, and the utility it achieves. Among other things, we
observe that dierent kinds of opponents call for a dierent approach in making
concessions. For instance, a successful negotiating agent should behave competitively,
especially against very cooperative strategies. We nd that there is a direct correlation
between the performance of a strategy and its concession rate against a simple
Conceder Linear strategy, but there is less correlation between performance and
concession against a non-concessive Hardliner strategy. This shows that the best
strategies try to exploit concessive opponents, but against a non-concessive opponent,
some aim to reach any agreement (even with a low utility) while others prefer not
to concede and may therefore may receive the disagreement payo (which is zero).
Moreover, we conclude that our technique has the desirable property of grouping
negotiation strategies into categories with common negotiation characteristics.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 provides an overview
of concession making in negotiation, including our adopted model of negotiation. In
Section 8.3 we give the denition of concession rate, and we outline a method it.
This is followed by Section 8.4 that presents our experimental results, and collects
the insights gathered by this analysis. Finally, Section 8.5 presents this chapter's
conclusions.
8.2 Concession Making in Negotiation
In earlier work on conict management through negotiation, the negotiation stance
is characterized by two orientations: cooperative and competitive [63]. The theory
relates to two basic types of goal interdependence that negotiators might have. It is
either positive, where the negotiators' goals are linked in such a way that their goal
attainments are positively correlated (`sink or swim together'), or the interdependence
is negative, namely when the goal attainments are negatively correlated (`when one
swims, one sinks').
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Figure 8.1: The diagram of conceding behavior against cooperative and competitive
opponents.
However, a negotiator's stance is usually not limited to one of the two orientations,
because negotiation is a dynamic process and the position of the negotiators can
change in response to the other party's information or behavior [156]. In this chapter,
we take the stance that negotiators can exhibit a mixture of the two orientations,
mainly depending on the type of opponent (see Figure 8.1). For example, a negotiator
may cooperate with a cooperative opponent, but the same negotiator may be very
competitive when facing competition. That is, in this case it matches the behavior
of the opponent.
Conversely, a negotiator can be cooperative towards a competitive opponent and at
the same time exploit cooperative opponents by playing competitive against them.
In that case, it inverts the opponent's behavior.
This way, we distinguish four types of negotiation orientations depending on the
behavior against the opponent (see Table 8.1): Inverter, Conceder, Competitor, and
Matcher. Every negotiation orientation corresponds to a dierent stance towards
either of the two types of opponents. One of the main contributions of this chapter
is to dene a formal, mathematical procedure for classifying agents into one of the
four categories.
151Orientation vs. Conceder vs. Hardliner
Inverter Exploiting Yielding
Conceder Cooperating Yielding
Competitor Exploiting Competing
Matcher Cooperating Competing
Table 8.1: Four types of negotiation orientations.
8.3 Concession Rate
In this section we introduce the notion of concession rate, which quanties the amount
an agent has conceded towards the opponent during a negotiation. We will dene
the concession rate of an agent A as a normalized measure CRt
A 2 [0;1] with the
following meaning: if CRt
A = 0, then A did not concede at all up to time point t,
while CRt
A = 1 means that player A yielded completely to the opponent by oering
the opponent its best oer.
Note that it is generally not enough to simply consider the utility of the agreement
as a measure for the concession rate. For instance, a negotiator may not get an
agreement before the deadline. In that case, both parties receive zero utility, but
this gives no information about the concessions that were made. Also, the last oer
made by a negotiator is not necessarily the oer to which he was ultimately willing
to concede. To capture the notion of concession rate, we dene it in terms of the
minimum utility m a negotiator has demanded during the negotiation, as this is a
measure of the total amount the negotiator was willing to concede.
We dene the concession rate CRt
A for arbitrary time t, but our work only deals
with the concession rate of a player A at the end of the negotiation thread. We shall
denote this simply by CRA. We also omit the subscript A when it is clear from the
context.
8.3.1 An Example
We illustrate the concept of CR by considering the Nice or Die scenario as described
in Section D.2 of the Appendix. Nice or Die has only three possible outcomes:
!1 = h0:16;1i, !2 = h0:3;0:3i, and !3 = h1;0:16i (see Figure 8.2).
Let us rst consider the case where agent A sticks to the same oer !3 throughout
the negotiation, demanding the highest possible utility for itself. In this case, the
minimum utility m that player A has demanded is equal to 1, so A has not conceded
anything, therefore the corresponding concession rate of agent A should be equal to
zero:
CRA = 0, for m = 1: (8.1)
152Figure 8.2: The three possible outcomes of the Nice or Die scenario, with the utility
of agent A plotted on the horizontal axis.
On the other hand, when A concedes all the way to the opponent's best option (which
is !1), CRA should be equal to 1. Note however, that conceding all the way does not
necessarily mean demanding zero utility, or the lowest possible utility. For instance
in this example, A would still receive 0.16 utility when bidding !1 (see Figure 8.2).
In general, there may also be bids with even lower utility for A that are, for example,
also bad for its opponent. However, player A should be able to always obtain at least
an agreement that is the best outcome for the opponent, as any rational player B
will accept it. We shall refer to this utility as the full yield utility (FYUA) of player
A. Intuitively, it is the worst score player A can expect to obtain in the negotiation.
Player A's concession rate is therefore maximal if he makes a bid on or below the
full yield utility:
CRA = 1, for m  FY UA: (8.2)
Between the two extremes, we dene CRA to decrease linearly from 1 to 0. There is
only one function that satises this constraint, along with the equations (8.1) and
(8.2) above, namely:
CRA(m) =

1 if m  FY UA;
1 m
1 FY UA otherwise.
By using normalization, it is guaranteed that if CRA = 0, then A has not conceded
153at all, while for CRA = 1, player A has conceded fully (i.e., up to its full yield
utility). Normalizing has the added benet of reducing bias in the scenarios: in a
typical scenario with strong opposition such as Energy, players may obtain utilities
anywhere between 0.1 and 1, while in scenarios with weak opposition such as Company
Acquisition, utility ranges are much more narrow. Normalization ensures that the
concession rate can be compared over such dierent scenarios.
Note that CR is a measure of the bidding strategy, so in particular it does not take
into account the conditions under which an agent accepts an oer.
Example
Suppose player A has made the following bids: h!3;!3;!2;!3i (see Figure 8.2).
Then its minimum demanded utility m is equal to the utility of !2, which is 0.3.
The full yield utility FY UA is equal to the utility of !1, which is 0.16. Therefore,
CRA =
1   0:3
1   0:16
=
5
6
:
8.3.2 Formal Denition
Suppose a player A has a utility function uA, mapping any outcome in 
 into the
range [0;1]. As we have assumed that the utility function is normalized in our setting,
there will exist an optimal outcome !A 2 
1 for which uA(!A) = 1 (see Section 2.2.4).
In typical negotiation domains, the corresponding utility uB(!A) of this outcome is
far from optimal for player B, because the best outcome for A is typically not the
best outcome for B. Player B should be able to always obtain at least this outcome
in a negotiation, as A will always be inclined to accept it. We shall refer to this
utility as the full yield utility (FYUB) of player B (see Fig. 8.3). Intuitively, it is
equal to his bottom line utility.
As dened in Section 2.2.2, we use the alternating-oers protocol supplemented
with a real time line T with a deadline. We represent by xt
A!B the negotiation
outcome proposed by agent A to agent B at time t. Recall from Section 2.2.2 that
a negotiation thread (cf. [75, 229]) between two agents A and B at time t 2 T is
dened as a nite sequence
H
t
A$B :=
 
x
t1
p1!p2;x
t2
p2!p3;x
t3
p3!p4;:::;x
tn
pn!pn+1

;
where
1. The oers are ordered over time: tk  tl for k  l.
1Note that an optimal outcome !A is not necessarily unique, but typical domains (including
those considered in ANAC and hence, in this chapter) all have unique optimal outcomes for both
players, so that the full yield utility is well-dened.
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2. The oers are alternating between the agents: pk = pk+2 2 fA;Bg for all k.
3. All ti represent instances of time T , with tn  t,
4. The agents exchange complete oers: xtk
pk!pk+1 2 
 for k 2 f1;:::;ng.
For any t 2 T , let
H
t
A!B =

x
s
A!B 2 H
t
A$B j s  t
	
denote all bids oered by A to B until time t in an active negotiation thread. We can
now formulate the minimum utility that agent A demanded during the negotiation
thread Ht
A!B. That is to say, we consider the largest concession the player has made
so far:
MIN
t
A = minfuA(x) j x 2 H
t
A!Bg
Informally, MIN
t
A denotes the lowest that A is willing to bid up until time t. The
inverse of this is called the yield of player A. The lower player B is willing to go, the
larger the yield. A yield of zero means the player has made no concession whatsoever
(and therefore his demanded utility remains equal to one); A yield of 1 FYU means
the player has yielded fully (see Fig. 8.3). That is, it is dened as:
Yield
t
A = 1   max
 
MIN
t
A;FYUA

:
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t
A 2 [0;1] of player A up until time t is then simply the
normalized yield:
CR
t
A =
Yield
t
A
1   FYUA
:
8.3.3 Classifying the Agents According to their Concession
Rates
In order to classify agents according to their concession rate, we must consider a
number of characteristics of the negotiation setup. To be able to compare the results,
we need to x the set of opponents that are used to measure the CR. This raises
the question which agents can be used for this purpose. To test both sides of the
spectrum, we let the nalists negotiate against both a very cooperative and a very
competitive opponent. The opponent tactics that we use to measure concession
rates are simple, non-adaptive negotiation tactics. We do so because we want to
ensure that the concession rate results depend as much as possible on the agent's
own negotiating tactic, and not on the opponent's. To be more precise, we aim for
three opponent characteristics when measuring the concession rate:
1. Simplicity: The concession rate results of an agent are less sensitive to the
opponent, and hence easier to interpret, if the opponent negotiation tactic is
simple and easy to understand.
2. Regularity: We want to give the agent sucient time to show its bidding
behavior; therefore, the opponent should not end the negotiation prematurely by
either reaching an agreement too fast or breaking o the negotiation. Another
issue here is that the opponent should generate sucient bids. This requires
computationally ecient agents that respond within a reasonable amount of
time and excludes extreme agents that only make a limited number of oers.
3. Deterministic behavior: In order to reduce variance in experimental results,
we prefer deterministic agents to those that demonstrate random bidding
behavior.
For the competitive opponent, we chose Hardliner (also known as take-it-or-leave-it,
or Hardball [156]). This strategy simply makes a bid of maximum utility for itself
and never concedes. This is the most simple competitive strategy that can be
implemented and it ts the other two criteria as well: it is deterministic and it gives
the agent the full negotiation time to make concessions.
For the cooperative opponent, we selected Conceder Linear; i.e., the time-dependent
tactic adapted from [75, 82] with parameter e = 1 (see also Section 2.3.3). Both
strategies accept if and only if their planned oer has already been proposed by the
opponent in the previous round.
156There exist even simpler conceding tactics such as Random Walker2 (which generates
random bids), or an agent that accepts immediately. However, both opponent
strategies are not regular in the sense that they do not give the agent enough time
to show its bidding behavior. Random Walker has the additional disadvantage
of not being deterministic. Therefore, we believe Random Walker can serve as a
useful baseline strategy to test the ecacy of a negotiation strategy, but not as a
useful opponent strategy to measure an agent's willingness to concede. Consequently,
we selected Conceder Linear as the cooperative opponent, as it fullls the three
requirements listed above.
8.4 Experiments
When looking at the results of the ANAC 2010 and 2011 competitions listed in
Table C.2 and D.2, it is natural to ask which agent characteristics were decisive
factors in the nal ranking of the agents. Which agents behaved very competitively
and which ones were more cooperative? Were they successful because of it, and if
so, against whom? In order to answer such questions, we characterize the ANAC
agents by analyzing their bidding behavior and utility gain against dierent types of
opponents. In particular, we focus on the amount they are willing to concede to the
opponent, as this is a key determinant of an agent's bidding behavior.
8.4.1 Experimental Setup
For our experimental setup we employed Genius to simulate tournaments between
negotiating agents, using the same negotiation parameters as described in ANAC
(see Appendix B). In our experimental setup we included all the negotiation tactics
that were submitted to ANAC 2010 and 2011, which we analyze separately.
In addition to the ANAC agents, we included some well-known agents to explore some
extreme cases. First, we included the Hardliner strategy described in Section 2.3.3,
which consistently makes the maximum bid for itself. We also studied three members
of the time-dependent-tactics family [75] as dened in Section 2.3.3, namely: Boulware
(e = 0:2), Conceder Linear (e = 1), and Conceder (e = 2). Finally, we included the
Random Walker strategy, which randomly jumps through the negotiation space. We
shall refer to these ve strategies as our benchmark strategies. For the ANAC 2010
experiment, we also included a variant of the Relative Tit for Tat agent from [75].
This strategy, called Simple Nice Tit for Tat, tries to reproduce the behavior that its
opponent performed in the previous step.
We measured the concession rate of an agent A playing against Conceder Linear
and Hardliner. The two parties attain a certain outcome, or reach the deadline. In
2The Random Walker strategy is also known as the Zero Intelligence strategy [96]
157Agent CR vs. Conceder CR vs. Hardliner
Agent K 0.12 0.18
Agent Smith 0.46 1.00
Boulware 0.14 1.00
Conceder Linear 0.43 1.00
Conceder 0.63 1.00
FSEGA 0.33 0.76
Hardliner 0.00 0.00
IAMcrazyHaggler 0.05 0.05
IAMhaggler 0.02 0.27
Nozomi 0.20 0.22
Random Walker 0.97 1.00
Simple Nice Tit for Tat Agent 0.42 0.01
Yushu 0.11 0.95
Table 8.2: An overview of the concession rate of every agent in the ANAC 2010
experiments.
both cases, at the end of the negotiation, A has reached a certain concession rate
as dened in Section 8.3.2. The concession rate is then averaged over all trials on
all scenarios, alternating between the two preference proles dened as part of that
scenario. For example, in the Energy scenario, A will play both as the electricity
distribution company and as the consumer. We then repeated every negotiation
30 times to increase the statistical signicance of our results. We have taken the
averages and standard deviations over these 30 data points, where each data point is
the average taken over all scenarios.
For the ANAC 2010 agents, we picked two out of the three domains that were used
in ANAC 2010 (see Table C.2). We omitted the third domain (Travel) as some of
the ANAC agents did not scale well and had too many diculties with it to make it
a reliable testing domain. For the ANAC 2011 agents, we used all eight scenarios of
the nals (see Table D.2).
8.4.2 Experimental Results for ANAC 2010
We present the results of the experiments for ANAC 2010 in Table 8.2 and its
graphical representation is depicted in Fig. 8.4.
General Observations
We start with the general observations (which also hold for the ANAC 2011 results)
regarding the clustering of dierent strategies in Figure 8.4. In particular, the
158Figure 8.4: A graphical overview of the concession rates of the ANAC 2010 agents.
Hardliner strategy and the Random Walker strategy are at the opposite sides of the
concession rate spectrum. Hardliner will not concede to any type of strategy, so by
denition it has CR = 0 against both Hardliner and Conceder Linear. Consequently,
Hardliner is the least conceding strategy possible.
On the other hand, Random Walker will make arbitrary concessions given enough
time. This makes Random Walker one of the most concessive strategies possible.
Against Hardliner, it is just a matter of time for Random Walker to randomly produce
a bid with which it fully concedes, so Random Walker has CR = 1 against Hardliner
when it manages to reach an agreement. In large domains, however, it may not be
able to produce such a bid in time, as we will see when we discuss the results of
ANAC 2011, which featured larger domains. Against Conceder, it may not have as
much time to fully concede, but it generally will produce oers of very low utility in
this case as well, resulting in a CR of 0:97.
We included three members of the time-dependent tactics family in our experiments:
Boulware (e = 0:2), Conceder Linear (e = 1), and Conceder (e = 2). They are all
located in the top of the chart because they all share the same concession rate of
1 when playing against Hardliner. This is to be expected, as any agent from the
time-dependent family will oer the reservation value when the deadline is reached
[82], resulting in full concession to the opponent. In general, all time-dependent
tactics will lie on the line CR = 1 against Hardliner.
In addition to the time-dependent tactics, at the top of the chart we see two more
159strategies: Agent Smith and Random Walker. All the strategies that lie on the line
CR = 1 give in fully to Hardliner and are thus fully exploited by a strategy that does
not give in at all. All of these four strategies have a very simple bidding strategy and
are clearly not optimized to deal with minimally conceding strategies or strategies
that do not concede at all.
Against Conceder Linear, the results are also intuitively clear: concessions of the
agents get bigger when the parameter e 2 (0;1) gets bigger, so Boulware concedes
the least, while Conceder concedes the most. More generally, when e ! 0, then
CR ! 0. Conversely, when e ! 1, then CR ! 1. An agent that has CR = 1
against both Hardliner and Conceder Linear is an agent that would jump to the
opponent's best bid immediately.
Observations for ANAC 2010 Agents
Agent Smith and Conceder Linear are very close in the chart and this is no coincidence:
Agent Smith uses essentially the same strategy as Conceder Linear, by rst making
a proposal of maximum utility and subsequently conceding linearly towards the
opponent.
The same holds for Yushu and Boulware: the strategies are very similar, as is
indicated by their close vicinity in the chart. Like Boulware, Yushu adopts a very
competitive time dependent strategy, making larger concessions when the negotiation
deadline approaches. Both adopt a conservative concession making strategy and are
not willing to make large concession at the beginning, but prefer to wait for their
opponent to make concessions. These two examples show that this chart can be useful
to cluster strategy types, as similar strategies have similar concession characteristics.
Finally, there is a big cluster of strategies in the left part of the chart, which is
populated by the top four strategies in ANAC 2010: Agent K, IAMhaggler, Nozomi
and Yushu. The better performing strategies of ANAC 2010 have dierent approaches
towards the Hardliner, but they seem to have one trait in common: they all concede
very little to the Conceder. In other words: they exploit the Conceder by waiting
for even bigger concessions. The fact that these strategies did very well in ANAC
2010 seems to indicate that in order to be successful in an automated negotiation
competition, an agent should behave competitively, especially against very cooperative
strategies. We explore this theme more deeply in our ANAC 2011 experiment.
Four Negotiation Orientations
This section makes observations regarding the clustering of dierent strategies in
Fig. 8.4, and then classies them into the four negotiation orientations of Fig. 8.1. This
procedure is necessarily arbitrary; nevertheless, we propose the following grouping.
160The top left agents in the diagram can be considered to be Inverters: Yushu, Boulware,
and FSEGA. The remaining agents in the top right are then Conceders, namely:
Conceder Linear, Agent Smith, Conceder, and Random Walker.
The Simple Nice Tit for Tat strategy is the only strategy that can be considered
a Matcher, i.e.: it does not concede to a Hardliner, but it does concede to the
Conceder. Clearly, this is to be expected from a Tit for Tat strategy, as it is based
on cooperation through reciprocity: it matches whatever the other player did on
the preceding move. The fact that this type of strategy does not occur naturally in
ANAC 2010 can be explained by our previous comments on clustering: following a
Tit for Tat strategy is not as successful in negotiation, because it does not exploit
the conceding strategies.
All of the remaining strategies are Competitors, i.e. they do not concede much,
whether it is against a cooperative or a competitive agent. The majority of strategies
that performed well during ANAC are located in this region. Again, we observe that
the successful strategies are very competitive.
8.4.3 Experimental Results for ANAC 2011
We present the results of the concession rate experiments for ANAC 2011 in Table 8.3,
and its graphical representation is depicted in Figure 8.5. In Figure 8.6 to Figure 8.9,
we present the connection between the concession rate of the agents and their average
negotiation results against Conceder Linear and Hardliner. In all gures, the error
bars represent one standard deviation from the mean.
Observations for ANAC 2011 Agents
If we consider the agents submitted, most of them were indeed adaptive to some degree,
in that they take into account the strategy of their opponent. Several of these (such
as IAMHaggler2011, Gahboninho, Nice Tit for Tat Agent or ValueModelAgent) make
use of machine learning techniques to try and predict the concession or preferences
of the opponent. Another important impact of a bidding strategy is how it aects
subsequent oers by the negotiating counterpart. For example, Nice Tit for Tat
Agent tries to entice the opponent into cooperative behavior by reciprocating the
opponent's concessions. Such behavior is a form of second-level adaptivity, in the
sense that it not only adapts to the opponent, but also attempts to inuence the
opponent's behavior.
All ANAC 2011 strategies reside in the left part of the chart, which means they
play quite competitively against a conceding strategy. The top left of the chart is
populated by the four `nicer' strategies of ANAC 2011: The Negotiator, Nice Tit for
Tat, Gahboninho, and IAMhaggler2011. Note that in addition to the time-dependent
tactics, The Negotiator is located in the top of the chart, which indicates it is very
161CR vs Conceder Linear CR vs Hardliner
Agent Mean
Standard
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation
Agent K2 0.232 0.029 0.435 0.019
BRAMAgent 0.141 0.042 0.642 0.002
Gahboninho 0.219 0.041 0.907 0.032
HardHeaded 0.041 0.027 0.622 0.039
IAMhaggler2011 0.419 0.058 0.987 0.005
Nice Tit for Tat Agent 0.169 0.033 0.876 0.031
The Negotiator 0.071 0.011 1.000 0.000
ValueModelAgent 0.239 0.013 0.667 0.030
Random Walker 0.848 0.040 0.904 0.030
Hardliner 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
Boulware 0.162 0.009 1.000 0.000
Conceder Linear 0.414 0.034 1.000 0.000
Conceder 0.571 0.043 1.000 0.000
Table 8.3: An overview of the concession rate and standard deviation of every ANAC
2011 agent in the experiments against Conceder Linear and Hardliner.
similar to a Boulware strategy. The other four nalists: HardHeaded, BRAMAgent,
ValueModelAgent, and Agent K2 are more competitive. It is interesting to note that
HardHeaded, the winner of ANAC 2011, concedes the least against a cooperating
strategy. The fact that these strategies did very well in the competition seems to
indicate that in order to be successful in such circumstances, an agent should behave
competitively, especially against very cooperative strategies.
Now, it is interesting to see that, while the environment encourages exibility, being
adaptive does not necessarily benet the agents in terms of winning the competition.
In particular, it may come as a surprise that HardHeaded, a relatively simple and
inexible strategy, relying heavily on hard-coded parameters, achieved rst place in
ANAC 2011. There are several reasons for this. First of all, such a strategy relies
on the opponent strategies to eventually adapt to its demands. Thus, if there are
sucient adaptive strategies, being competitive is a good strategy to use.
Indeed, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the nicer we play against a conceding
opponent (meaning the higher our CR is against a conceding opponent), the less
utility we make in the negotiation. To test this hypothesis, we selected Conceder
Linear as the opponent, and then compared the CR of every agent against the average
utility of the agreements being reached. The results are plotted in Figure 8.6. It is
readily observable that against this type of opponent, it pays to concede as little
as possible. For example, HardHeaded has the lowest CR after Hardliner, which
results in a very high score against Conceder Linear. In general, the correlation is
very high (coecient of determination of R2 = 0:86) between the CR and utility
162Figure 8.5: A scatter plot of the concession rate and standard deviation of every
ANAC 2011 agent in the experiments against Conceder Linear and Hardliner. The
error bars represent one standard deviation from the mean.
obtained against Conceder Linear (see Figure 8.9). This means that CR is a good
predictor of how an agent fares against a cooperative agent. As noted, the CR is a
measure of the bidding strategy. Therefore, against such a cooperative opponent, the
decisive factors in the success of an agent are the circumstances and timing under
which the bidding strategy makes its concessions.
In contrast, we cannot make similar statements about how to play against a very
competitive agent such as Hardliner. As can be seen in Figures 8.6 and 8.7, there is
a positive correlation between the CR and the average utility obtained when playing
Hardliner. This means that the nicer an agent plays, the more utility is obtained
against Hardliner. This makes sense, as competitive play against Hardliner is sure
to result in a break o. However, the correlation is very weak, with a coecient of
determination of R2 = 0:20. Therefore in this case the CR is not a good predictor of
the negotiation success. Because a break o of the negotiation is more likely against
a very competitive opponent, the acceptance conditions of an agent play a much
more important role than in the previous case.
Clearly, the only way to receive any utility in a negotiation against Hardliner is for an
agent to give in fully. But in a tournament setting, an agent should not only take into
account its own utility, but it should also make sure not to give away too much utility
163Figure 8.6: Comparing the results versus the concession rate against the Conceder
Linear opponent.
Figure 8.7: The correlation between the concession rate and utility obtained against
the Conceder Linear opponent of all ANAC 2011 and benchmark agents.
164Figure 8.8: Comparing the results versus the concession rate against the Hardliner
opponent.
Figure 8.9: The correlation between the concession rate and utility obtained against
Hardliner of all ANAC 2011 and benchmark agents.
165to the other contestants. Indeed, it is not entirely clear how one should successfully
negotiate against the Hardliner (or similar strategies such as HardHeaded) without
getting exploited in terms of tournament score. As a consequence, there exists a
tension between the short-term negotiation incentives of a negotiating agent and
its goal to get a high overall tournament ranking. Such considerations are related
to the composition of the tournament pool [17], which we cover more deeply in
Section 11.3.6 of our overall conclusions.
8.5 Conclusion and Discussion
Making concessions during a negotiation is vital for getting an agreement. Successful
negotiations are only possible when both parties employ an eective conceding
strategy. Designing a good strategy of when and how much to concede is challenging,
and that is why there are many current negotiation implementations that concede in
very dierent ways.
In this chapter, we characterized negotiation strategies by how they concede through-
out the negotiation, and we did so by using a quantitative measure called the
concession rate of an agent. We rst formally dened the notion of concession rate as
a normalized measure of the largest concession that was made during the negotiation.
This formalizes the concept of an agent's willingness to concede against dierent
opponents.
We then presented an empirical method to eectively compute the concession rate of
agents, and then applied our approach to a selection of well-known agents (including
all participants of ANAC 2010 and 2011) in an experimental setting. For the rst
time, this gives insight into the strategy space of negotiation tactics employed in
ANAC. We subsequently used our method to classify the agents into four categories
of concession behavior.
In addition to classifying agent strategies, various conclusions can be drawn based
on charting the experimental results. Indeed, there is a wide spread in concession
rates of current agents, and our classication chart is a useful method to cluster
strategy types. The concession rate diagram shows that similar strategies have
similar concession characteristics, and makes it easy to understand the agent's main
negotiation characteristics at a glance.
Some extreme agents are located in the extreme regions of the chart, while the
stronger agents form a cluster in the competitive corner. The results indicate that in
order to be successful in an automated negotiation competition, an agent should not
concede much, especially not to very cooperative strategies.
In general, the correlation is very high between the concession rate and utility
obtained against such a conceding strategy. This means that a low concession rate is
a good predictor for high performance against a conceding agent. The same behavior
166would be inappropriate against a very competitive agent that does not concede at
all during the negotiation. We have also demonstrated that, in general, the nicer
an agent plays against this type of opponent, the more utility it obtains. This is
because, against such a hard-headed opponent, there is a high chance the negotiation
would break down if no concessions are made.
This then leads to a dilemma for the agents to be either a teacher (who tries to
entice their opponent to adapt by employing a tough strategy) or a learner (who
tries to adapt to maximize its own utility, given the behavior of the opponent), which
lies at the heart of many bilateral negotiation problems. If the opponent is exible
and adapting to one's demands, there is little point in conceding. However, if the
opponent is being strictly hard-headed (even appearing irrationally so), reaching
some agreement is typically preferable to no agreement. The importance of learning
strategies that try rst to detect the adaptivity of the opponent (such as Gahboninho,
which proved very robust in ANAC 2011) is an important insight which could be
taken up in further research in bilateral negotiations beyond the competition.
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Optimal Non-adaptive
Concession Strategies
In the previous chapter we presented an empirical method to classify agents into four broad
categories of concession behavior, and we formulated guidelines on how agents should bid
against each category. This chapter follows an alternative approach by devising optimal
concession strategies against specic classes of acceptance strategies.
Many time-based concession strategies have already been proposed, but they are typically
heuristic in nature, and therefore, it is still unclear what is the right way to concede toward
the opponent. We provide a theoretical model in which a bidder makes a series of oers to
an acceptor with unknown preferences. We apply sequential decision techniques as we did
in Chapter 5, but this time to nd analytical solutions that optimize the expected utility
of the bidder, given certain strategy sets of the opponent. We then compare our solution
to state of the art concession techniques in a negotiation simulation. Our solutions turn
out to signicantly outperform current approaches in terms of obtained utility. Our results
open the way for a new and general concession strategy that can be combined with various
existing learning and accepting techniques to yield a fully-edged negotiation strategy for
the alternating oers setting.
169This chapter is based on the following publications:
Tim Baarslag, Rak Had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non-adaptive concession strategies with incomplete information. In Proceedings of The
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1709.1 Introduction
A key insight of negotiation research is that making concessions is crucial to con-
ducting a successful negotiation. There are important reasons to make concessions
during the negotiation [216]: it is often used to elicit cooperation from the other, in
the hope that the other will reciprocate in kind. Second, it conveys information to
the opponent, both about the negotiator's preferences and about the perceptions of
the opponent. But most importantly, it is the time pressure of the negotiation itself
(typically in the form a deadline or a perceived maximum number of bidding rounds)
that operates as a force on the parties to concede [51]. An approaching deadline puts
important pressure on the parties to reduce their aspirations, especially when the
time pressure heightens, which is referred to as the\eleventh hour eect".
Given the paramount importance of time in bargaining, it is not surprising that many
negotiating agents adjust their level of aspiration based on the time that is left in the
negotiation. There is a clear rationale behind the design of such agents, given their
aim to maximize the chance of reaching an agreement in a limited amount of time.
For example, well-known time dependent tactics (see Section 2.3.3), such as Boulware
and Conceder, are characterized by the fact that they consistently concede throughout
the negotiation process as a function of time. The same kind of time-based concession
curves can also be observed in practice in ANAC (see Appendix B). However, in the
TDT's, as well as in some very eective agents, such Agent K (winner of ANAC
2010) and HardHeaded (winner of ANAC 2011), the specic concession curve is
selected rather arbitrarily, and is not informed by any other insights; therefore, they
make largely unfounded choices on how much to concede at each time interval.
Alternatively, behavior dependent tactics such as Tit for Tat (cf. Section 2.3.3) base
their decision to make concessions on the actions of the other negotiating party.
However, such adaptive approaches do not give us any information on how to concede
based on time alone.
Work that presents optimal choices of how much to concede includes game theoretic
work (e.g. [217]) and single-shot bargaining, also known as the ultimatum game [202].
However, these approaches usually assume a complete information setting, or a
game where the deal is struck immediately, which we cannot apply to a typical
concession-based negotiation. Furthermore, this type of work typically revolves
around equilibrium strategies, which assumes full rationality on the part of both
agents. We are more interested in optimal solutions for one negotiating party, playing
against various classes of acceptance strategies.
This chapter aims to nd out how time pressure alone, in the form of a deadline,
should inuence the concession behavior of a negotiator against specic opponent
classes. To do so, we employ methods from sequential decision theory to devise
negotiation strategies that make optimal concessions at each negotiation round.
Finally, we show that an agent making these optimal concessions performs better
171than any other in our experimental setup.
We begin with an example in Section 9.2 that sets the stage for our time-based
concession model in Section 9.3. We apply our methods to nd optimal concessions
against opponents that accept according to acceptance thresholds in Section 9.4
and 9.5. We subsequently compare the optimal bidding strategy with state of the
art bidding strategies in a series of tests (Section 9.6). We conclude our chapter
with a discussion of the contributions of this chapter, as well as its implications
(Section 9.7).
9.2 An Example
The following example serves as an illustration of the basic insights that have
motivated our approach.
Suppose agent B is negotiating the purchase of a house with a buyer, agent A. As in
the rest of this chapter, we will only focus on one of the two parties; in this case B.
B has set the opening price at $300,000, but is (secretly) willing to go down to
$250,000 if necessary. B has to strike a balance between the probability that A buys
the house, and getting as much utility out of the agreement as possible (i.e., not
conceding too much). Our main question is: what oers or concessions should B
make towards A in order to perform optimally and maximize his own outcome? That
is, what is the right way to lower the price of the house depending on the remaining
time and the acceptance policy of A?
Let us consider the easiest case where B has only one oer to make to A, which A
can either accept or reject. If B makes an oer x 2 [$250;000;$300;000] to A, then
this will yield him the following utility:
U(x) =
 x $250;000
$50;000 ; if A decides to accept;
0; when A rejects the oer:
Now suppose A is prepared to pay up to $280,000 for the house. Of course, B does
not know this, but instead presumes that A's acceptance threshold could be anywhere
between $200,000 and $300,000 with equal probability. It follows that B believes
the chance that A accepts decreases linearly in terms of the price oered. Then, B's
strategy is simple: he should set the price to
argmax
x
U(x)  P(A accepts x); (9.1)
which is equal to
argmax
x

x   $250;000
$50;000



1  
x   $200;000
$100;000

: (9.2)
172We can readily compute that the maximum is reached for x = $275;000, and so with
only one oer to make, B should pick this price in order to optimize his utility. Note
how B's oer falls exactly in between his reservation price and his opening price.
Fortunately for both, the price x is also actually lower than the maximum A was
willing to pay, and therefore, she will buy the house.
This simple case serves as a good intuition to proceed to the more general setting we
consider below.
9.3 Making Non-adaptive Concessions
Our negotiation model builds upon our denitions in Section 2.2.2: two agents A
and B exchange oers in turns on a negotiation domain 
. A and B have utility
functions UA : 
 ! [0;1] and UB : 
 ! [0;1] and reservation values rvA;rvB 2 [0;1]
respectively. The agents will only propose oers that they deem acceptable, namely
bids with higher utility than their reservation value. Likewise, the reservation values
acts as the lowest utility they are willing to accept.
The process is illustrated in Figure 9.1. With n rounds remaining, B starts by making
an oer Bn 2 
, which A can either respond to with an accept or a counteroer. If
A accepts, the negotiation ends in agreement, and both sides obtain their respective
utility. If A rejects the oer, she replies with a counteroer An, the number of
remaining rounds decreases by one, and B can make a second oer, Bn 1. This
process continues until B makes his last oer B1. If A also turns down this last oer,
A and B receive their respective reservation values rvA and rvB.
B Bn // A
An
ss B Bn 1 // A
An 1
ss B Bn 2 // A
B B1 // A
Accept or Reject oo
Figure 9.1: Sequential diagram of the negotiation process. B starts the negotiation
with bid Bn, and after every proposal, the other responds with a counteroer or an
Accept.
We are concerned with nding optimal concessions for one of the parties, given
certain strategies used by the opponent. As in Chapter 5, we focus on agent B for
his Bidding role, and on A for her Accepting role. In particular, we do not focus on
what oers A should generate, or what acceptance policy B should employ.
173There is an important class of strategies that allows us to make some further
simplications. In line with our aim to nd concession curves that depend only on
the time remaining, we will assume B's strategy is not adaptive (i.e., B does not
change his behavior according to the bids that have been exchanged). This means
B can completely ignore A's bids, and we can code them by Accept or Reject
instead. Other examples of such agents include the family of time-dependent tactics,
the sit-and-wait agent, and IAMcrazyHaggler (cf. Appendix C). Note that this then
eectively denes an one-sided bidding protocol in which B submits n bids to A
in a sequential manner, which is equivalent to a repeated ultimatum game with
reservation values [233].
The fact that B does not adapt to his opponent puts him in a signicantly more
dicult epistemic position than in a typical negotiation, since B could normally
gather valuable information from A's counter oers. This holds in a very fundamental
sense: apart from the incoming oers, B can only distinguish n dierent possible
states, namely the number of rejects that he received. This means that we can
already compute the appropriate concession curve before the start of the negotiation;
i.e., the bids or utilities that need to be sent out at every round.
Also note that as time moves forward, the indexing of the oers by B runs backward,
just as in Chapter 5. This has the advantage that it simplies the calculations of
certain recurrence relations we encounter in this chapter, as the expected utility
with j + 1 rounds remaining depends on the expected utility in the future (i.e., with
j rounds remaining). Secondly, it allows us to dene our model without a preset
deadline, as we do not need to specify the maximum number of rounds beforehand.
9.4 Conceding and Accepting
The aim of this chapter is to nd the right concession behavior for B given that
he only has n oers to try out. B will only propose oers that he himself deems
acceptable, namely bids in the following set:
OB = f! 2 
 j UB(!)  rvBg: (9.3)
B can make his bids in many ways. A well-known method using concession curves are
the time-dependent tactics such as Boulware and Conceder, as dened in Section 2.3.3.
When there are j rounds remaining (out of a total of n rounds), such strategies make
a bid with utility closest to
Pmin + (Pmax   Pmin) 
 
1   k   (1   k) 

1  
j
n
 1
e
!
;
for certain choices of k, e, Pmin and Pmax, which control the concession rate and
the minimum and maximum target utilities. These tactics form the basis of many
174successful negotiation strategies [17, 82, 131, 250], in which variants of the above
formula are used to decide the appropriate concessions, combined with advanced
techniques such as preference modeling and strategy prediction. In this chapter,
we will propose a dierent kind of concession curve that is also able to provide the
groundwork for designing an advanced negotiation agent.
B's optimal strategy of course depends on how A chooses to accept or reject. While
B makes his oers, A has to solve some kind of stopping problem to decide when the
oer is sucient.
Player A will have to either accept or reject a bid ! 2 
 in every round j. A may
update her beliefs in round j based on ! and the bidding history of the opponent,
which is an element hj from the set of oers Hj = 
n j made by B. Note that we
only need to consider the bids made by B, since the rejects of A are already implicitly
represented. For example, for n = 8 and j = 5, the information set of A is a history
of rejected oers h5 = (B6;B7;B8) 2 H5, adjoined with the bid B5 of the current
round.
Hence, we can represent A's acceptance strategy in round j as a function
 : Hj  
 ! fAccept;Rejectg: (9.4)
We will focus on a specic set of strategies that accept according to acceptance
thresholds. That is, A's acceptance strategy in round j is specied by a utility
constant j (possibly dependent on rvA) such that
(hj;!) =

Accept if UA(!)  j;
Reject otherwise. (9.5)
We believe acceptance thresholds are a natural set of acceptance strategies to consider,
since it is reasonable to assume that if A nds a bid acceptable, then so is any bid
with higher utility.
One of the simplest acceptance strategies for A is satiscing: accepting any oer
with a utility above her reservation value by setting all j equal to rvA. This is done,
for example, when a negotiator is more concerned with getting any deal at all than
reaching the best possible deal (e.g., [186]). Needless to say, this is a very simple
acceptance strategy, as A normally wants to get as much out of the negotiation as
possible. In other applications, illustrated in Figure 9.2, A's threshold would be
higher at the beginning of the negotiation, and would slowly decrease towards rvA.
However, as we shall see in the next section, the case of a satiscing acceptor already
requires highly eective conceding behavior by B.
A might also employ a more fundamental approach by trying to optimize her own
utility, taking into account the number of rounds remaining. Optimal stopping theory
provides optimal solutions for A for the case that A has incomplete information
about B's oers. We repeat Proposition 5.1 from Chapter 5 p. 96, which expresses
the optimal solution against a bidder B with completely unknown utility goals:
175Figure 9.2: A's acceptable oers for round j consist of all bids ! with UA(!)  rvA,
while B's possible oers OB consist of all bids ! such that UB(!)  rvB.
Proposition 9.1
When B makes random bids of utility uniformly distributed in [0;1], and with j
oers still to be observed, A's optimal acceptance strategy is to accept an oer
of utility x exactly when x  vj, where vj satises the following equation:

v0 = rvA;
vj = 1
2 + 1
2v2
j 1: (9.6)
As it will turn out, this strategy is closely related to the strategy B should follow
against satiscing acceptors.
9.5 Making Optimal Oers
We will now outline our general method to make optimal oers, which extends our
running example from Section 9.2 to a general domain with an arbitrary number of
remaining rounds.
Suppose A uses an acceptance strategy based on acceptance thresholds (0;1;:::),
with j  rvA; that is, A accepts an oer ! 2 
 with j remaining rounds exactly
when UA(!)  j. Suppose we have j + 1 rounds to go, and B has to decide the
optimal bid Bj+1 to make.
176The general formula for the expected utility Uj+1(!) for B of oering ! 2 OB is as
follows:
Uj+1(!) =
8
> > <
> > :
UB(!); if A accepts;
the expected utility
with j remaining rounds; if A rejects:
When there are no more rounds remaining, B will get rvB, hence U0(!) = rvB. The
recursive nature of this equation allows us to employ techniques from sequential
decision theory to formulate the optimal way to make concessions.
We will write Uj+1 for the highest expected utility B can obtain in round j+1, which
is thus given by the following equations:
U0 = rvB; and
Uj+1 = max
!2OB
UB(!)  P(UA(!)  j+1)
+ Uj  P(UA(!) < j+1)
= Uj + max
!2OB
(UB(!)   Uj)  P(UA(!)  j+1):
The corresponding optimal bid that B should make is given by the ! that maximizes
the above equation, and therefore,
Bj+1 = argmax
!2OB
(UB(!)   Uj)  P(UA(!)  j+1):
Solving this equation would be straightforward, if it were not for the fact that B in
general does not have full knowledge of a number of aspects in this equation: UA is
of course unknown to B, and so are the acceptance thresholds j. To make matters
worse, the acceptance thresholds generally depend on the reservation value of A,
which is also unknown to B.
B will therefore have to make some assumptions about UA and her concession
thresholds. Assume that B has an estimation of the reservation value of A, which
does not change according to A's behavior. As in [158], the estimation is characterized
by a probability distribution Fj(x) for every remaining round j, where Fj(x) denotes
the probability that A's reservation value is no greater than x.
We will now analytically solve the specic case of an opponent with a satiscing
accepting strategy. To get concrete examples of concession curves, we will consider
the same classical buyer-seller scenario as in Chapter 5 to evaluate our solutions. We
study the negotiation scenario of Split the Pie [217, 237], where two players have
to reach an agreement x 2 [0;1] on the partition of a pie of size 1. The pie will be
partitioned only after the players reach an agreement. In this setting, we instantiate

 = [0;1] to represent a pie of size 1, with A and B having opposing preferences on
them: UB(x) = x and UA(x) = 1   x.
We assume that A's acceptance strategy is limited to the class where she accepts
any oer that is better than her reservation value; i.e., 8jj = rvA, where we assume
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Figure 9.3: Graph of Bj and Uj for remaining rounds j 2 f0;100g.
rvA is uniformly distributed. The probability that A accepts in round j is now:
P(UA(!)  j) = P(UA(!)  rvA) = Fj(UA(!)): (9.7)
The general formula now simplies to
Uj+1 = Uj + max
xrvB
(x   Uj)  (1   x): (9.8)
Note that the following holds, even for the general setting:
Proposition 9.2
When B has more rounds remaining, B can expect to get more utility out of
the negotiation. That is, for every remaining round j, we have Uj+1  Uj.
Proof.
B can always make the bid !max = argmax! UB(!) with j +1 rounds remaining,
to get at least as much utility as in the next round.
With the help of Prop. 9.2, we can show the maximum in equation (9.8) is attained
for x = Bj, where Bj satises the following relationship:

B1 =
rvB+1
2 ;
Bj+1 =
1+Uj
2 :
(9.9)
178Figure 9.4: Expected utility Uj for B with j 2 f1;2;3;4g rounds to go, depending
on B's reservation value rvB.
This yields the following recurrence relation for Uj:

U0 = rvB;
Uj+1 = 1
4 (Uj + 1)
2 :
(9.10)
With these equations, we can now compute the expected value of the optimal bids B
has to make in terms of his own reservation value (see Figure 9.4). For example:
U1 =
1
4
(1 + rvB)
2 ;
U2 =
1
64
(5 + rvB(2 + rvB))
2;
. . .
The corresponding optimal concessions by B are as follows:
B1 =
1 + rvB
2
;
B2 =
1
8
 (5 + rvB  (rvB + 2));
. . .
Note that both equations (9.9) and (9.10) are expressed in terms of the value Uj. We
obtain a much more elegant formulation when we express them in terms of Bj:
179Proposition 9.3
For all j  1,
Bj+1 =
1
2
+
1
2
B
2
j;
and
Uj = B
2
j:
Proof.
Both statements follow from rewriting equations (9.9) and (9.10).
This also means that equation (9.10) is related to the logistic map, as was the case
in equation (5.4) of Chapter 9: if we substitute Uj = 1   4xj in equation (9.10) we
get the equivalent relation of the logistic map xj = xj 1(1   xj 1) at r = 1, so we
cannot expect to solve the recurrence relation.
Proposition 9.4
For rvB = 0, there exists the following connection between Bj, Uj, and the
optimal stopping cut-o values vj from equation (9.6):
Bj = vj;
and
Uj = v
2
j:
Proof.
When rvB = 0, then B1 = 1
2, and consequently, the Bj sequence has the same
starting value and denition as the optimal stopping sequence vj.
Corollary 9.4 shows that optimal bidding against a satiscing acceptor with unknown
reservation value is the mirrored version of Proposition 5.1 about optimal accepting
against a bidder that makes unknown oers. In both cases, the idea is the same, but
with switched roles: both the optimal bidder and the optimal stopper aim to pick the
optimal utility threshold that simultaneously maximizes the expected utility of an
agreement and the chance of acceptance, given stochastic behavior by the opponent.
We conclude this section with an example that relates our results to the housing
example of Section 9.2.
180Remaining
rounds
Optimal
oer
Expected
utility
1 $275,000 0.25
2 $281,250 0.39
3 $284,766 0.48
4 $287,086 0.55
5 $288,754 0.60
10 $293,055 0.74
100 $299,060 0.96
Table 9.1: The optimal oers to make and their expected utility in the housing
example, given the remaining amount of bidding rounds.
Example
Our assumptions in this section are consistent with our housing example when
we scale the pie 
 to [$250;000;$300;000], and when rvB = 0 corresponds to
the utility of selling the house for $250;000.
Our results indicate that the seller of the house should act as follows: we see
that indeed, B1 = 1
2, so with one bid remaining, B should make a bid halfway
between $250,000 and $300,000, as we had calculated before, with an expected
utility of U1 = 1
4.
Also, B2 = 5
8, which means with two bids remaining, B should oer
$250;000 +
5
8
 $50;000 = $281;250:
See Table 9.1 for other entries.
Note that since B does not learn anything about A, B actually overestimates
the expected utility, and more so when the number of rounds increases (as can
be seen in Table 9.1). This is because B is not able to deduce, from A's rejects,
that high utility values for B are simply not attainable.
9.6 Experiments
In order to test the ecacy of the optimal bidding technique given by Prop. 9.3, we
integrated it into a fully functional negotiating agent. Given j remaining rounds it
makes an oer with utility target Bj as dened by equation (9.9). It does not accept
any oers and it does not model the opponent in any way.
181Figure 9.5: The utility obtained by the bidding strategies in our experiments for
dierent values of the total number of rounds n. The vertical bars indicate one
standard deviation from the mean.
For the opponents (side A), we selected various well-known negotiation agents
available for our setting, including the top three agents of ANAC 2012, namely
CUHK Agent, AgentLG, and OMAC Agent (see Appendix E). We also included the
time dependent tactics Boulware (with concession factor e = 0:2), and Conceder
(e = 2), and as a baseline, we included the Random Walker strategy. We then
compared the optimal bidder's performance with the same set of strategies on side B.
To analyze the performance of dierent agents, we employed Genius (Appendix A).
Note that some of the agents in our setup are originally designed to work with the
alternating oers protocol, while we essentially employ a one-sided bidding protocol;
however, since our model is a simplied alternating oers protocol, it is easy to
adjust the agents to work in our setting: for the opponents, we ignore any bids that
are sent out; i.e., when side A accepts, the negotiation ends in agreement, while
A's counter-oers count as rejects and are ignored. In eect, this means only A's
acceptance mechanisms are used.
For our negotiation scenario we use a discretized version of Split the Pie. We set
rvB = 0, and we selected varying reservation values for A: rvA 2 f0;0:1;0:2;:::;0:9g.
We ran our experiments using varying total number of rounds n 2 f1;20;40;:::;100g,
and we repeated every negotiation session 5 times for statistical signicance.
The results of our experiment are plotted in Figure 9.5, with the total amount of
rounds n varying between 1 and 100. As is evident from the results, the optimal
bidder signicantly outperforms all agents in all cases (one-tailed t-test, p < 0:01
for every n). The good relative performance of the optimal bidder is even more
182pronounced for n = 1, and it is easy to see why. Many of the other strategies will
persist in aiming for a high utility, even with only few bids to send out. This results
in many break-os, while optimal bidder will settle for a much lower value in the last
rounds with more potential agreements. For example, for n = 1, optimal bidder sets
his utility target halfway between his reservation value and the maximum attainable;
i.e., B1 =
rvB+1
2 . On the other hand, with more bids remaining, optimal bidder acts
as an extreme Boulware strategy, trying to get as much out of the negotiation as
possible. Indeed, optimal bidder and Boulware tend to act more similar as n increases.
CUHK Agent (the winner of ANAC 2012) and AgentLG obtain particularly low
scores. The main reason for this is that these strategies are very behavior-dependent
and do not take into account the remaining time as much as they need to.
Note that almost all agents obtain higher utilities with more negotiation rounds.
This is to be expected, as more time allows for a more ne-grained search of what
is acceptable for the opponent. The only exception is Random Walker, who only
increases the chances to make disadvantageous bids for itself with more available
time.
9.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents a theoretical model to calculate optimal concession curves
against strategies that decide when to accept using acceptance thresholds. We
compute these optimal concessions by employing sequential decision methods, and
we show that they signicantly outperform state of the art concession strategies,
even against a much wider set of acceptance strategies. In specic instances, the
optimal concession curve is equal in shape to the curve describing optimal stopping
cut-o points. This conrms that optimal stopping theory is a powerful method that
has many possible application in negotiation research. It is interesting to note that
the concession curve that we found (as shown in Figure 9.3) is not equal any time
dependent curve (seen in Figure 2.3 on page 33), but it bears most resemblance to a
Boulware-like concession curve. As far as the authors are aware, this is the rst time
such informed time-based concession strategies have been formulated and tested in
practice.
Our results demonstrate that our optimal bidding mechanism is an eective way for
a negotiating agent to take into account the passing of time. We believe even more
eective concession curves can be computed by studying broader ranges of acceptance
strategies than we did in this chapter. Further improvements could be made by
introducing a form of learning to the optimal bidder, using the BOA framework.
Eventually, we envision a design of an automated negotiator that incorporates our
optimal concession curve with regard to time-related concessions, while other types
of concessions (e.g., to elicit cooperation or to convey information) are handled
separately by other concession modules.
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Putting the Pieces Together
In the previous chapters, we performed extensive research into three dierent aspects of an
automated negotiator: bidding (Chapter 8 and 9), learning (Chapter 6 and 7), and accepting
(Chapter 4 and 5). We have found novel ways to handle each component, sometimes even
in optimal ways for particular circumstances. The natural question then arises: how do the
pieces t together? Or, more specically: how do the components of a negotiating agent
inuence its overall performance, and which components are the most important for the
end result of an agent?
In this chapter, we provide an answer to this question in a quantitative way. In doing
so, we show that the BOA framework not only provides a useful basis for developing and
evaluating agent components, but also provides a powerful agent design tool. Furthermore,
we demonstrate that combining eective key components from dierent agents improves an
agent's overall performance. This validates the analytical approach of the BOA framework
towards optimizing the individual components of a negotiating agent.
By combining agent components in varying ways, we are able to demonstrate the contri-
bution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and thus determine the key
contributing components. Moreover, we study the interaction between components and
present detailed interaction eects. We nd that the bidding strategy in particular is of
critical importance to the negotiator's success and far exceeds the importance of opponent
preference modeling techniques. Our results contribute to the shaping of a research agenda
for negotiating agent design by providing guidelines on how agent developers can spend
their time most eectively.
185This chapter is based on the following publications:
Tim Baarslag, Alexander Dirkzwager, Koen Hindriks, and Catholijn Jonker. The signicance
of bidding, accepting and opponent modeling in automated negotiation. In 21st European
Conference on Articial Intelligence, 2014
18610.1 Introduction
Throughout this thesis, we performed extensive research into three dierent aspects
of an automated negotiator. One key components is the bidding strategy; focusing on
what kind of oers the negotiation strategy should choose, and in particular, what
kind of concessions should be made (see Chapter 8 and 9). We also put emphasis
on learning techniques to model various opponent attributes, such as the (partial)
preference prole or the opponent's next move (Chapter 6 and 7). Finally, there
is the question of when to accept; i.e., under which circumstances an oer by the
opponent should be agreed to (Chapter 4 and 5).
In the preceding chapters, we found eective components for each of these aspects
by focusing on one particular component. However, the interactions and relative
importance of the individual components have not been studied in detail before. Some
components may have a stronger impact on the performance than others, and there
could be strong interdependencies between the components (e.g., a very competitive
strategy hampering a learning technique by not exploring enough options). Thus,
the main question of this chapter is: How do the components of a negotiating agent
inuence its overall performance, and which components are the most important?
Answering this question requires us to bring together so-far unconnected research
on various elements of negotiating agent design, and to research whether combining
eective key components from dierent agents improves an agent's overall perfor-
mance. In this chapter, we show that the BOA framework not only provides a useful
basis for developing and evaluating agent components, but also provides a powerful
tool for designing full negotiating agents. We validate the analytical approach of the
BOA framework by demonstrating that combining eective key components from
dierent agents also improves an agent's overall performance.
We investigate the importance and relations between three key components of the
BOA framework: the bidding strategy, the opponent model and the acceptance
strategy. The question then becomes: what is more important for a negotiation
strategy to do well: to bid, to learn about the opponent, or to accept? Or, more
formally, how do each of the three components contribute to the eectiveness of a
negotiation agent, and what are the interaction eects between them? We make
these questions precise by formulating them in quantiable terms of predictability of
variance, and we determine the contribution of each component using the statistical
measure of eect size. Once the individual contribution of each key component is
established, we focus on the eects of combining components.
This process will give us a better understanding of how we can improve negotiation
agents, as well as provide guidelines for the design of negotiating agents. Our ndings
indicate that the bidding strategy is by far the most important component, while the
signicance of learning about the opponent's preferences is rather small in comparison.
Given the current focus on opponent learning techniques in automated negotiation
187research, we argue that more eort needs to be made to formulate eective bidding
strategies.
We start by outlining our method to quantify importance of agent components in
Section 10.2, with the notion of eect size. Section 10.3 presents our experiments,
in which we combine a large set of agent components, followed by Section 10.4,
which studies the contribution and interaction eects of each component. Finally,
Section 10.5 presents our conclusions and recommendations for a research agenda on
agent design.
10.2 Measuring the Contribution of Strategy Com-
ponents
To determine the importance of a particular agent component in relation to another,
and to measure the interactions between them, we use the notion of eect size.
The eect size is a statistical measure to quantify the interactions between various
controlled variables and measures their eect on the dependent variable, which in our
case is the average outcome utility of the agent. In this way, the eect size expresses
how signicant or important a variable is [59]. This goes beyond the question of
whether a specic variable is signicant or important, which can be answered with
standard statistical signicance testing. We use the relative proportion of variation,
known as the 2 measure.
The 2 measure examines the variance explained by every component to determine
its importance. When the contribution of a component is small (a low 2 value),
there is little variation and the dierence between the dierent components is small.
This makes the choice of which component to use less important. On the other hand,
if the contribution of a component is large (a high 2 value), then the choice of a
component is sure to have a big impact.
The 2 measure rates the variance that a variable introduces using the Sum of
Squares. The Total Sum of Squares (SSTotal) expresses the total dispersion of all
data points; i.e., the total variance found within the data, which can be calculated
from the dierences between the data points xi and the total mean  x as follows:
SSTotal =
n X
i=1
(xi    x)
2: (10.1)
The Sum of Squares Between Groups (SSb) determines the variance between the
dierent groups and is calculated as follows:
188SSb =
jGj X
j=1
nj( xj    x)
2; (10.2)
where the  xj represents the group mean, jGj represents the number of groups and nj
is the number of data points in group j.
To calculate the 2 value for each variable i, we use equation (10.3), where SSbi is
the sum of squares between groups for variable i:

2
i =
SSbi
SSTotal
(10.3)
A benet of using this measure is that it allows for easy comparison between the
dierent 2 values on an interval scale, because the 2 values are scaled according
to the total variation (SSTotal). This is not the case with other eect size measures
(e.g. partial 2), which only allows for an ordinal scale comparison [208]. Another
advantage of using 2 is that it can be expressed in the form of percentages, making
it more intuitive to understand. For example, if a certain controlled variable v has a
2 value of 0.35, it means that 35% of the variation in the dependent variable can be
accounted for (or explained by) v.
10.3 Experiments
To analyze the relative importance and interactions of each strategy component, we
require a wide array of tactics and techniques for every component. To explore the
space of BOA components, we need a representative selection for every component
from the BOA framework repository, ranging from baseline techniques to state of
the art techniques. For every component, we aimed to select many variants, given
that they were designed for a negotiation setting consistent with ours, with publicly
available code, and consistent with the BOA framework (i.e., generic enough so that
we could freely interchange them with arbitrary other components). To ensure as
much variety as possible, we included components not only from this thesis, but also
components designed by various researchers.
We employ the same negotiation setting of a bilateral negotiations with the alternating-
oers protocol as in our denitions in Chapter 2. To make the extensive experiments
feasible, we used a discrete time line as in Chapter 7, with a specied number of
rounds N = 3000. Both agents receive utility 0 if they do not succeed in reaching an
agreement before the deadline.
Our range of components are shown in Table 10.2. We selected 11 dierent bidding
strategies in total. We selected state of the art bidding strategies from the top
three strategies of the ANAC 2011 and 2012 competitions (see Appendix D and E),
189and as baseline bidding tactics, we included the time-dependent tactics Boulware
(with concession rate e = 0:2), Conceder Linear (e = 1), Conceder (e = 2), and
behavior-dependent strategies such as Nice Tit for Tat, Absolute Tit for Tat and
Relative Tit for Tat (all dened in Section 2.3.3).
All bidding strategies were combined with six dierent opponent models. We selected
ve state of the art opponent models from ANAC that we could freely combine with
arbitrary bidding strategies. To ensure a fair representation of opponent models, we
selected from two main categories as dened in Chapter 6; Bayesian models, which
use Bayesian learning techniques to create and update a model of the opponent's
preference prole [270] and Frequency models, which keep track of how often certain
items are requested by the opponent. As a baseline, we chose No Model, which selects
bids for the opponent at random.
For the state of the art acceptance conditions, we selected a number of sophisticated
strategies from top ANAC agents. We also included the most advanced version of
the optimal stopping acceptance policy from Chapter 5 (Optimal Stopping GPR),
which predicts the opponent's strategy using a Gaussian process regression tech-
nique to determine the probability that a better bid will be oered in the future.
Lastly, we added the best performing acceptance strategies from Chapter 4, namely
ACcombi(T;MAX
W) and ACcombi(T;AVG
W), with T = 0:95. We selected a number
of simple baseline acceptance policies as dened in Chapter 4, such as: ACconst(c)
(c 2 f0:6;0:7;0:8;0:9g), which accepts exactly when the utility of the opponent's
oer is higher than a constant threshold c; ACgap(g), which accepts when the utility
gap between the parties is smaller than a gap size g 2 f0:1;0:2g; and ACnext(;)
( 2 f1:0;1:1;1:2g; 2 f0;0:1;0:2g), which accepts when   u0 +   u, where
u is the utility of the bid that is ready to be sent out and u0 is the utility of the
opponent's oer.
For our opponent pool, we selected a representative set of 7 agents, ranging from
baseline strategies (Boulware and Conceder Linear) to some of the top performing
agents from the ANAC competitions (the top 2 agents from ANAC 2011: HardHeaded
and Gahboninho [17], and number 1 and 3 from ANAC 2012: CUHKAgent [103]
and The Negotiator Reloaded). Note that we did not run all agents against each
other, but elected a representative opponent set instead. A full tournament with all
negotiation agents would be unfeasible, since much smaller tournaments (such as
ANAC) already take weeks to complete.
The negotiation scenarios were chosen on the basis of the following characteristics:
domain size (number of possible bids), bid distribution (average distance of all bids
to the nearest Pareto-optimal bid), and the opposition of the domain (the distance
from the Kalai-Smorodinsky point to complete satisfaction). We picked 5 negotiation
scenarios used in ANAC such that every characteristic varies between high, medium
and low. The scenario information is summarized in Table 10.1 (we refer to Table C.3
and D.3 for more details).
190Scenario name Size Bid distrib. Opposition
Car 15625 (med.) 0.136 (low) 0.095 (low)
Grocery 1600 (med.) 0.492 (high) 0.191 (med.)
Itex vs. Cypress 180 (low) 0.222 (med.) 0.431 (high)
Laptop 27 (low) 0.295 (med.) 0.178 (med.)
Travel 188160 (high) 0.416 (high) 0.230 (med.)
Table 10.1: Characteristics of the negotiation scenarios.
We created a large number of negotiation agents by combining all BOA components
into full negotiation agents; i.e., we created a pool of 11 bidding strategies  6
opponent models  24 acceptance conditions, which amounts to 1584 negotiation
agents in total.1 We let all of them play against the 7 opponents in each scenario
listed in Table 10.1, keeping track of their obtained utility in every negotiation
session. To run our tournament we used the BOA framework as implemented in
Genius (Appendix A). Since not all the negotiation strategies are deterministic, the
tournament setup was run 5 times in order to reduce the amount of variance in the
data, resulting in 277200 negotiation sessions in total.
10.4 Component Contribution
To determine the contribution of each BOA component, we calculated the 2 of
the three components, using as input the utilities of all component combinations
averaged over all the runs, domains and opponents. The calculated 2 values are
presented in Table 10.3 and visualized in Figure 10.1.
From the calculated contributions, we can observe that the bidding strategy is by far
the most important component, accounting for 58% of the variation in the negotiation
strategy's performance, which is signicantly higher (one-tailed t-test, p < 0:01) than
the other components. Recall that the bidding strategy controls the concession
speed of the agent, thereby managing the rate with which it moves towards the
opponent according to its own utility. This is expected to have a huge impact on the
nal outcome, as it determines the subset of the outcome space an agreement can
possibly be made in. We can also observe that the variance of the bidding strategy
contribution is rather high, especially with respect to the opponent pool; this is
explored further in Section 10.4.1.
Note that our method allows us to express the eectiveness of a specic choice for
any given strategy component. For example, we can x the bidding strategy to
CUHK Agent, and calculate its average obtained utility when combined with all
1Note that this set also includes already existing agents such as HardHeaded and The Negotiator
Reloaded, since their components occur in all three groups.
191Bidding, Opponent Modeling, and Accepting Components
Bidding Strategy Acceptance Conditions
AgentLG ACcombi(T;AVG
W)
CUHK Agent [103] ACcombi(T;MAX
W)
HardHeaded [17] ACconst(c)
IAMhaggler2012 ACgap(g)
The Negotiator Reloaded [66] ACnext(;)
Absolute Tit For Tat [75] Agent K2 [17]
Nice Tit For Tat [29] AgentLG
Relative Tit For Tat [75] AgentMR [180]
Time-dependent tactics [75] BRAMAgent2 [17]
HardHeaded [250]
Opponent Model IAMhaggler2012
Agent Smith (Frequency) [249] Nice Tit For Tat [29]
HardHeaded (Frequency [250] OMAC Agent [52]
IAMhaggler (Bayesian) [261] Optimal Stopping GPR
NASH Agent (Frequency) The Negotiator [67]
The Negotiator Reloaded (Bayesian) [66] The Negotiator Reloaded [66]
No Model
Table 10.2: All negotiation strategy components used in experimental setup.
Standard Deviation
Component 2 Runs Domains Opponents
Bidding Strategy (BS) 0.582 0.003 0.118 0.163
Opponent Model (OM) 0.035 0.002 0.020 0.037
Acceptance Conditions (AC) 0.118 0.003 0.121 0.071
BS * AC 0.114 0.003 0.023 0.082
OM * AC 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.016
BS * OM 0.085 0.004 0.040 0.040
BS * OM * AC 0.051 0.002 0.037 0.051
Table 10.3: The 2 measure for every component and the standard deviation of 2
over the dierent runs, domains and opponents.
192Figure 10.1: Visual representation of the contribution of components
opponent models and acceptance conditions and then compare this with the average
utility of another choice of the bidding strategy, for example Conceder. In fact, the
dierence in this case is particularly large, because using this method, CUHK Agent
(bidding strategy of the winner of ANAC 2012) obtains the highest score of 0.79,
while Conceder (a baseline bidding strategy) has the lowest score of 0.63. Such a
utility dierence means the dierence between place 1 and place 8 in ANAC 2012
(see Table E.2), which gives a good indication of how important the bidding strategy
is.
The second most important component is the acceptance condition, with a contribu-
tion of 12%, which is signicantly higher than the opponent model (one-tailed t-test,
p < 0:01). Also in this case, the baseline acceptance conditions (e.g., ACconst(c) and
ACnext(;)) obtain the lowest scores (0.65), while optimal stopping from Chapter 5
scores highest by far (0.75). The contribution of the acceptance condition still comes
1932 against opponents
Component e = 0:02 e = 1 e = 2 e = 5
BS 0.770 0.675 0.600 0.419
OM 0.010 0.014 0.007 0.004
AC 0.053 0.163 0.234 0.446
BS * AC 0.077 0.076 0.083 0.073
OM * AC 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002
BS * OM 0.063 0.059 0.056 0.035
BS * OM * AC 0.022 0.013 0.018 0.020
Table 10.4: 2 playing against time dependent opponents
out low because these are only the extreme scores, and most acceptance condition
scores are clustered around the group average (0.71).
Finally, the opponent model makes a surprisingly small contribution to the perfor-
mance of a negotiation strategy, accounting for only 4% of the explained variance.
There is only a small dierence between using No Model (0.69) and any of the state
of the art models (0.72). This is still a signicant dierence and could make the
dierence between place 1 and place 5 in ANAC 2012. However, there is almost no
dierence between the learning methods themselves, which indicates that once an
agent employs a reasonable opponent model, there is not much more to gain after
that.
10.4.1 The Inuence of the Opponent
Table 10.3 also presents the standard deviation of 2 over the runs, domains and
opponents for each of the components. This gives an indication of how much an
additional run, domain or opponent would aect the average contribution of each
component. Adding more runs will have little eect on the components' contribution,
but the same cannot be said for the domains and opponents, which both have high
standard deviations, especially for the bidding strategy and acceptance condition,
which indicates that these components highly interact with the domain and opponent.
As we can see from Table 10.3, the opponent is the most important source of variance
when considering component contribution. We take a closer look at this phenomenon
by focusing on the subset of opponents that employ time-dependent tactics, comparing
the 2 values when negotiating against each of them. The advantage of focusing on
the time-dependent opponents is that they are from the same family of tactics, so that
only one factor is altered between the dierent opponents, namely the rate at which
they concede. To get a more complete picture, we add two more time-dependent
tactics to our opponent pool, namely Extreme Boulware (e = 0:02) and Extreme
194Figure 10.2: The 2 values of all components against dierent time-dependent
opponents.
Conceder (e = 5).
The 2 values are listed in Table 10.4 and presented in Figure 10.2. They show
a clear trend for the contribution of the strategy components. As the value of e
increases (raising the cooperativeness of the opponent) the contribution of the bidding
strategy decreases dramatically, from 77% to 42%. Through closer inspection of the
negotiation dynamics between the agents, we are able to explain this trend.
When the opponent concedes very little, it is up to the bidding strategy of the agent
to yield to the opponent to avoid the consequences of no agreement. This places
a lot of importance on the bidding strategy, because the speed at which the agent
concedes dictates the agreement that will be reached, hence its large 2 value. In
these situations, the importance of having an eective opponent model is at its
peak, since it is both more challenging to achieve an acceptable outcome and it is
harder to learn the opponent's preferences. Also, when an opponent makes very
small concessions, the oers dier very little in utility. This makes the role of the
acceptance condition less important, because the moment the agreement is reached
is not as signicant.
On the other hand, when the opponent is very cooperative, the choice between
accepting and waiting for more concessions can make a big dierence in the achieved
outcome. Therefore, the acceptance condition of the agent and the bidding strategy
195of the opponent will primarily dictate the meeting point between the two agents.
This is why, as the opponent concedes more, the contribution of the acceptance
condition increases from 5% to 47% at the cost of the bidding strategy.
10.4.2 Interaction Eects
Agent components do not perform their function in isolation. First of all, they interact
with each other: for example, a learning method may be far less eective when the
bidding strategy does not select enough `exploratory oers' to learn more about
the opponent's preferences. There are also interaction eects with the environment,
such as the negotiation domain (e.g., learning about the opponent may be harder
in big contract spaces), and the opponent (e.g., a good acceptance strategy is more
important when the opponent is likely to make attractive oers).
The presence of these interactions requires a more thorough analysis, because the
impact of one component can depend on the level of another. We denote interaction
eects as C1  C2, where Ci represents a component. The term interaction eect is
used to quantify the eects of the interactions between the components. To determine
the 2 for an interaction we need to calculate the SSbC1C2 as follows:
SSbC1C2 =
jC1j X
i=1
jC2j X
j=1
(xij    xi    xj +  x)
2 (10.4)
This is then divided by SSTotal to determine the 2 value for the interaction. The
component interaction eects are listed at the bottom of Table 10.3. We will cover
two types of interaction eects: the interactions between the components, and the
interactions between the negotiation agent and its opponent.
There are two important interactions that deserve some attention. One is between
the bidding strategy and the acceptance conditions (BS  AC), which is the highest
interaction eect of 11%. The bidding strategy and acceptance condition can be
viewed as two simultaneous processes that can each result in a potential agreement.
One process consists of oering bids that are appealing to the opponent in the
hope that it will be accepted (bidding strategy), the other consists of receiving
oers from the opponent and deciding whether these should be accepted or not
(acceptance condition). These two components complement each other, as a good
acceptance condition can compensate for a bad performing bidding strategy by
accepting bids from the opponent, while a good bidding strategy can compensate for
a bad acceptance condition by oering enticing counter bids.
Another important interaction is between the bidding strategy and the opponent
model (BS  OM), which, with 9%, is the second highest interaction eect. The
opponent model directly inuences the bidding strategy by aiding it in oering bids
that are appealing to the opponent, thereby improving the chances of an agreement.
196Conversely, the e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Should the bidding strategy not use the opponent model to its full potential, then
its eectiveness will be diminished. For example, the bidding strategy from BRAM
Agent presents the opponent model with only a small selection of bids, combining
only the ten most recent oers of the opponent, which reduces the eectiveness of
the opponent model.
Interaction also exists between the acceptance conditions and the opponent model
(AC  OM); however, this contribution is rather small (1%). This is because the
purpose of the opponent model is to model the opponent's attributes, while the
acceptance condition typically acts according to the agent's own utility.
There are also three way interactions involving all three strategy components
(BS  OM  AC), which account for 5% of the variance (calculated analogously
to equation (10.4)). For example, there are agents that not only use the opponent
model to determine the best bid to oer to the opponent, but also use to determine
their target utility. More sophisticated acceptance conditions make use of this tar-
get utility and are thus also aected by the opponent model, causing a three way
interaction.
10.4.3 Combining the Best Components
Given the interaction eects between the dierent components, it is not immediately
clear whether combining the best components together result in the most eective
negotiation strategies. Note that we combined 11  6  24 components, resulting in
large number (1584) of agents. We could simply test whether the highest scoring
agent out of the 1584 is indeed composed of the the best B, O, and A component,
but we elected to take a more general approach. We rst categorize the components
in groups, and then test whether the top components together can assemble the top
agents resulting from all group combinations.
We used the Jenks Natural Break Algorithm [121] for the classication of the individual
components. Jenks Natural Break Algorithm is a data classication method designed
to separate values into dierent groups. The algorithm attempts to nd a series
of natural break or separation values, which helps cluster the data in a natural
way instead of an arbitrary classicatory scheme (e.g. dividing the space into equal
intervals). The algorithm searches for the best break values such that it minimizes
the variance within the groups and maximizes the variance between the groups.
We used the Jenks Natural Break Algorithm to divide each BOA component listed
in Table 10.2 into three dierent performance groups (High, Medium, and Low),
based on their average utility score. In order to determine whether combining better
performing components would result in eective negotiation strategies, we combined
these groups into 27 agent sets, of which we then tested the average utility (see
Table 10.5).
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BS OM AC Avg. Util. Std Dev
High High High 0.790 0.001
High Medium High 0.761 0.003
High Low High 0.761 0.003
High High Medium 0.751 0.001
High Medium Medium 0.739 0.001
Medium High High 0.739 0.001
High Low Medium 0.737 0.001
Medium Medium High 0.726 0.003
High High Low 0.726 0.001
Medium High Medium 0.713 0.001
High Medium Low 0.713 0.002
High Low Low 0.708 0.003
Medium Medium Medium 0.706 0.003
Medium High Low 0.684 0.001
Medium Low High 0.678 0.001
Low Medium High 0.678 0.002
Medium Low Medium 0.669 0.001
Low Medium Medium 0.669 0.001
Low High High 0.669 0.001
Medium Medium Low 0.666 0.002
Low High Medium 0.656 0.001
Low Low Medium 0.639 0.002
Low Medium Low 0.631 0.002
Low High Low 0.628 0.002
Low Low High 0.625 0.002
Medium Low Low 0.609 0.001
Low Low Low 0.608 0.001
Table 10.5: Rankings of 27 agent sets that were created by combining all BOA
components that were each categorized to have High, Medium or Low individual
performance.
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in isolation (i.e., the agents that were comprised of components that were all in the
High category) have the highest average utility, performing signicantly (one-tailed
t-test, p < 0:01) better than all other agent groups. This means that indeed, the
top components together produce the top agents. This shows that independently
optimizing the individual components of the BOA framework is a feasible approach
for developing negotiating agents. The agent group that used the worst performing
components (Low, Low, Low) has the lowest average utility. The agent group
(Medium, Medium, Medium) is found somewhere in the middle of the rankings, as
expected.
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the performance eects of combining dierent instantiations
of key components of existing negotiating agents, namely the bidding strategy, the
opponent model, and the acceptance conditions. For this purpose, we analyzed the
key components of a large set of both baseline and state of the art agents. We
analyzed each component independently as well as in combination with the other
components, using the measure 2 to quantify their eect.
We found that combining the best agent components indeed results in the strongest
agents. This shows that the three-component view of the BOA architecture not only
provides a useful tool for developing negotiating agents, but this also validates the
analytical approach of optimizing its individual components. By varying the key
components of automated negotiators, we are able to demonstrate the contribution
of each component to the negotiation result, and thus analyze the signicance of
each. Moreover, we are able to study the interaction eects between them. With
respect to the impact of each BOA component, we found that the bidding strategy
is by far the most important to consider, followed by the acceptance conditions and
nally followed by the opponent model.
The low importance of the opponent model is surprising, as the importance of
opponent models has been shown on many occasions. We argue that in our setting,
existing learning techniques already do quite well, and consistent with what we found
earlier in Chapter 7, no signicant eect is to be expected by further improving on
currently existing preference learning techniques. This is in contrast to the bidding
strategy and acceptance conditions, which have a substantial inuence on the agent's
performance. To put it another way: our results indicate that the majority of the
implementation eort of an agent designer should be focused on the bidding and
accepting strategy.
This brings us to the goal of shaping the research agenda on negotiating agent
design. Based on our results we recommend that research into bidding strategy and
acceptance conditions should stay on the agenda. The state-of-the-art in opponent
199preference modeling is already so good, that we recommend to focus the attention
on the research into automated learning of the bidding strategy and acceptance
conditions of the opponent. We will have more to say on this in our overall conclusions
in the next chapter.
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Conclusion
This chapter gives an overview of the contributions of this thesis and revisits and answers
the research questions posed in Chapter 1. We outline what we learned through our
contributions, we reect on the impact and limitations of our work, and we describe where
we believe research eort should be directed in the following years.
20120211.1 Contributions
The aim of this thesis project was to research eective ways for an automated
negotiating strategy to bid, to learn, and to accept. We presented a method to design
and evaluate a component-based automated negotiator, and we introduced new and
improved ways for the agent to eectively bid, learn, and to accept.
The contributions to the research into negotiation strategies as presented in this
thesis are the following:
1. Introducing a component-based negotiation architecture to explore
the negotiation strategy space. (Chapter 3)
We introduced a component-based negotiation architecture that distinguishes
the bidding strategy, opponent modeling techniques, and acceptance strategies
(BOA) in negotiation agents. The BOA framework can be applied in multiple
ways to systematically explore the space of automated negotiation strategies.
We showed that existing negotiation strategies can be re-tted into our architec-
ture, and we demonstrated that we can signicantly improve the performance
of negotiating agents by recombining their components;
2. Developing evaluation and benchmarking methods for negotiation
agents. (Appendix A and B)
We organized four annual negotiation competitions (ANAC) that had more
than 60 international participants in total. The competitions were successful
events that have enriched the research eld on practical automated negotiation.
ANAC provides a platform for objectively evaluating generic negotiation agents
and makes a wide variety of benchmark negotiation strategies and scenarios
available to the research community. ANAC started out as an exploratory
search method for generic negotiating agents, but since then, it has matured into
a platform that has helped push forward the state-of-the-art in the development
and evaluation of automated negotiators.
As our underpinning platform for both ANAC and the BOA framework, we
established a negotiation simulation environment (Genius) that has proved
itself as a valuable and versatile research and analysis tool for the design of
generic automated negotiators and for improving their performance. More than
one hundred negotiation scenarios are currently available in Genius, and the
repository of strategies contains more than 40 automated negotiation strategies,
including all ANAC 2010{2013 agents. The BOA architecture and all agent
components are also included in Genius, together with all performance and
accuracy measures used in this thesis. The design and evaluation methods of
Genius have set an accepted standard for the experimental design of automated
negotiation, and Genius is now used by over 20 research institutes all over the
world;
2033. Formulating optimal acceptance policies. (Chapter 4 and 5)
We determined optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes using
optimal stopping techniques. We classied and compared existing acceptance
strategies, and we showed our techniques perform better than the state-of-the-
art, demonstrating that the optimal stopping mechanism is a valuable element
of a negotiating agent's strategy that works in theory as well as in practice;
4. Identifying the most eective and accurate learning methods. (Chap-
ter 6 and 7)
We found out which opponent modeling techniques perform best, why they
perform best, and how to best predict the performance of opponent models.
To do so, we introduced a procedure to evaluate the performance and ac-
curacy of state-of-the-art opponent modeling techniques in negotiation. We
determined the best performing opponent modeling techniques and analyzed
how the negotiation setting aects the opponent model's eectiveness. We
identied the correspondence between accuracy and performance of opponent
models, and we found the best methods to predict good performance. We
found three measures that are signicantly best: dierence in Pareto frontier
surface, Pearson correlation, and ranking distance.
5. Formulating optimal bidding strategies and categorizing concession
behavior. (Chapter 8 and 9)
We computed optimal non-adaptive bidding strategies against particular accep-
tance strategies by employing sequential decision methods. The results show
the remarkable fact that the optimal acceptance strategies we found earlier can
also be used to make optimal oers.
Moreover, in order to gain insight into the strategy space of bidding techniques,
we presented an empirical method to characterize negotiation strategies by their
bidding strategy. We used our method to classify agents into four categories of
concession behavior (i.e., Inverter, Conceder, Competitor, or Matcher), and we
formulated guidelines on how agents should bid in order to be successful. The
results indicate that in order to be eective, an agent should have a competitive
negotiation stance;
6. Quantifying the importance and interactions of the components of
a negotiating agent. (Chapter 10)
We found that combining the best agent components indeed improves an
agent's overall performance. This validates the analytical approach of the
BOA framework towards optimizing the individual components of a negotiating
agent. We established that the bidding strategy is by far the most important
component for the overall performance of an agent, followed by the acceptance
strategy, and nally the opponent modeling component. We also showed
how the relative importance of the components depends on the opponent, the
characteristics of the negotiation setting and the interaction eect between the
components;
2047. Validating the BOA architecture and demonstrating its success.
In this thesis, the BOA architecture has shown its value in its dierent applica-
tions and was validated in many dierent ways:
(a) We won rst place in the ANAC 2013 competition with an agent (The
Fawkes) that used the BOA architecture to combine the most eective
components. ANAC 2013 had 19 participating negotiation strategies,
which were implemented by international experts. (Appendix F)
(b) We showed that the BOA framework can be used to design generic,
component based negotiation agents by implementing it in Genius. The
BOA framework now functions as a general software framework and is
available as a development tool for agent designers, including participants
of ANAC. The BOA framework is also used in education in at least four
dierent international institutes. (Chapter 3 and Appendix A)
(c) We demonstrated that existing agents can be re-tted (i.e., decoupled)
into the BOA architecture while retaining exactly the same functionality
and with practically the same performance. The BOA framework contains
over 90 components from existing agents, which can all be mixed and
matched with each other. This shows that the BOA framework is a feasible
tool that it is able to incorporate existing agent designs while providing
the agent designer with more evaluation and implementation exibility.
(Chapter 3)
(d) The BOA framework is an indispensable tool in almost every chapter of
this thesis, allowing us to individually optimize the bidding, opponent
modeling, and acceptance components of a negotiation agent. (Chapter 4
through 9)
(e) We showed that indeed, the BOA components can be successfully op-
timized independently. That is, the BOA components that were best
individually, were found to combine into the best agents. (Chapter 10)
(f) The BOA framework allowed us to explore the negotiation space and nd
out which components of a negotiation agent are most important for the
overall performance of an agent. (Chapter 10)
11.2 Answers to our Research Questions
All taken together, our contributions outlined in Section 11.1 answer the research
questions that we originally started with in Section 1.4.
In our set of Research Questions I, we asked how to design a component-based
automated negotiation framework, that:
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negotiation strategies;
(I.2) facilitates evaluating and combining various negotiation strategy components;
(I.3) enables us to decompose existing, state of the art agent designs into distinct
components.
Question I.1 is amply addressed by Contribution 1: by supporting the design of new
agents, Genius and the BOA framework have been shown to provide insight into
the eectiveness of negotiation strategies, not only throughout this thesis, but also
in the ANAC competition.
Through our work on the BOA framework (Contribution 2) and by implementing it
together with Genius, we developed an environment that addresses Question I.2.
The user interface and detailed logging functionality of the BOA framework (including
all performance and accuracy measures that we dened in Section 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 and
all measures we applied in Contribution 4) make it easy to evaluate every negotiation
component individually. The BOA framework enables us to create thousands of
negotiation strategies by combining all negotiation components of the BOA repository.
We decoupled well-known agents from literature, and additionally, by organizing the
ANAC competitions (Contribution 1), we were able to supplement our repository
with more than 60 state of the art negotiation strategies. We decomposed more than
27 of them, resulting in over 90 negotiation components in total (Contribution 7c).
This shows how we can decompose existing, state of the art agent designs into the
BOA framework, which addresses Question I.3.
In our set of Research Questions II on analyzing the negotiating strategy components,
we posed the following questions:
(II.1) What measures can we use to compare and predict the performance of the
individual components?
(II.2) Can we pinpoint classes of opponents against which we can nd eective
components? Can we formulate optimal solutions for any of the components?
(II.3) How does the performance of the components inuence the negotiator's perfor-
mance as a whole, and which components are most important?
With Contributions 3{6, we measured the performance of the individual components
by employing our component-based BOA architecture (Contribution 2), keeping one
component xed, while we varied the others in a negotiation tournaments similar to
ANAC (Contribution 1). We followed this approach in particular when we quantied
the importance of every component (Contribution 6). For the bidding strategies and
acceptance strategies, we mainly used the average utility as our performance measure,
but for the opponent modeling components, we identied an array of performance
measures (and additionally, accuracy measures) and formulated ways to predict their
performance (Contribution 4). This answers Question II.1.
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the acceptance strategies, we determined a set of eective acceptance strategies for a
heterogeneous set of opponents (i.e., the top 3 of ANAC 2010), and we identied
optimal acceptance strategies against both unpredictable and time-dependent agents
(both described in Contribution 3). For the opponent modeling component, we
managed to identify the most eective learning methods in Contribution 4. Finally,
our work on classifying bidding strategies and computing optimal bidding curves
(Contribution 5) gives us specic guidelines on what kind of bidding behavior to
display given the negotiation behavior of the opponent.
Lastly, Contribution 6 addresses Question II.3: by combining the components of a
large set of negotiating agents, we established how each of the components contributes
to the performance of a negotiator, how they interact with each other, and which
component is most important to consider when designing an agent.
11.3 Outlook and Challenges
We conclude this thesis with a general outlook on the topics we have covered, and
we present the research challenges that we consider relevant for future work.
11.3.1 The BOA Architecture
The BOA framework has been instrumental in almost every chapter of this thesis,
allowing us to individually optimize the bidding, opponent modeling, and acceptance
components of a negotiation agent. We showed that these components can be
successfully optimized independently to explore the negotiation space.
The BOA architecture has already been widely applied since it was rst released.
Since its implementation in 2011, the BOA architecture has been used in the ANAC
competitions that followed. In ANAC 2012, the BOA agent The Negotiator Reloaded
reached the nals and nished overall third and received the reward for best per-
forming agent in non-discounted domains. In ANAC 2013, two agents that used
the BOA architecture reached the nals, of which The Fawkes agent won the 2013
competition.
The BOA architecture has also found its way into the classroom. At academic insti-
tutes such as Bar-Ilan University, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Maastricht
University, and Delft University of Technology, Genius and the BOA architecture
have been integrated into articial intelligence courses, where part of the syllabus
covers automated negotiation and the creation of negotiation strategies.1
1All educational material for the BOA architecture can be freely downloaded from ii.tudelft.
nl/genius
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improvement is to add additional components to the architecture, by expanding
the opponent modeling techniques to a larger class of learning components, such
as strategy prediction, or opponent proling. Comparing learning techniques for
these types of opponent attributes would require more learning techniques to be
developed and a new generic negotiation architecture to compare them. Also, BOA
agents are currently equipped with a single component during the entire negotiation
session. It would be interesting to run multiple BOA components in parallel, and
use recommendation systems (or a meta-component) to select the best component at
any given time. We discuss the components of the BOA architecture in more detail
in the sections below.
11.3.2 Bidding
In this thesis, we classied agents according to their concession behavior, and we
formulated guidelines on how agents should bid in order to be successful. Our work
in Chapter 8 and 9 makes a number of contributions, but formulating a general and
eective bidding strategy for all circumstances is still an important open question in
automated negotiation. The importance of nding such a strategy is conrmed by
our results in Chapter 10, which show that more than half of the utility obtained by
a negotiating agent is determined by its bidding strategy.
A major challenge in dening a generally eective bidding strategy is that there is
no universally agreed upon method to dene its eectiveness in isolation. In other
words, even when we would know exactly when to accept and when we have perfect
knowledge about the opponent's preferences, it is still dicult to decide what oers
to propose. We do not have an established way to measure what a good strategy
is, other than to empirically evaluate what works best against a set of opponents.
This is in sharp contrast to the opponent modeling component, for which we can
employ the accuracy measures from Chapter 7 to quantify their eectiveness. The
urgency of the problem is underlined by the fact that even after four incarnations of
ANAC, some of the participants (e.g., HardHeaded, winner of ANAC 2011) still use
concession strategies that were devised in 1998 [75].
Other important concerns when designing the bidding strategy are multi-level reason-
ing and exploitability. In order to select the right oer to make, the agent needs to
simultaneously answer a variety of questions that not only concern itself, but also the
mental state of the opponent; for example: what does the opponent want? What will
the opponent learn from the proposed oer? How will the opponent change its mental
state, and how will this aect the bids that will be received in the future? Such
issues become even more important in a tournament setting, where it is sometimes
advisable to sacrice some utility to the detriment of the other competitors. This
makes the bidding strategy the most complex component of the three we distinguish
in this thesis.
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involved in making bids. In particular, we need to understand the interactions
between the agent's preferences, the opponent's preferences, the time remaining in
the negotiation, the opponent's strategy, and the overall performance measure to
optimize (such as tournament score).
As a rst step towards understanding these relationships we propose to study nal
oers. Making a nal oer in a negotiation (i.e., announcing to `take it or leave it')
is a well-known real-life negotiation tactic that is primarily used as a means to put
pressure on the opponent to accept. It also occurs naturally (and more implicitly) in
the negotiations in which there is some kind of deadline. Any oer that is made right
before the deadline can be considered a nal oer, as there may not be enough time
to generate a counter-oer. In that case, the opponent is forced to choose between
accepting the oer or breaking o the negotiation. This is similar to the ultimatum
game, only with a prior bargaining history known to both players.
We believe nal oers could act as a useful device to answer some questions about
the bidding strategy that would be too dicult to answer in the more general setting,
such as: what is the optimal nal oer to make at any given point in time, and what
is the expected utility? How does it depend on the beliefs about the opponent? In
what circumstances would it appropriate to make a nal oer?
If we set the total number of rounds to 1, then some of the results we obtained in
Chapter 9 translate over to the setting of nal oers. We provide a sample result
that shows how we might select a nal oer given the discount factor and beliefs
about the opponent.
Sample result
Let the negotiation setting be the Split the Pie game with discounted utilities
(with discount factor ), and with the possibility of making nal oers. Agent A
and B have reservation values rvA;rvB 2 [0;1] respectively. Suppose B believes
A's reservation value is distributed uniformly. B contemplates a nal oer x
(i.e., it would oer y = 1   x to A, and take x for himself). The expected utility
for B of making a nal oer x is:
U(x) = x  P(y  rvA) + rvB  P(y < rvA)
= x(y + rvB);
which is optimal when
xopt =
rvB + 1
2
and yopt =
1   rvB
2
;
with value U(xopt) = x2
opt.
209Note how this sample result is consistent with our results of Proposition 9.3 for j = 1
on page 180.
As a corollary, when  < x2
opt, this gives an equilibrium strategy: B makes the oer
of xopt (and announces the oer as nal), and A accepts when yopt > rvA.
11.3.3 Opponent Modeling
When it comes to preference learning techniques, it seems the biggest goals have
been accomplished within the scope of this thesis. Simple learning techniques are
already surprisingly eective, even on large domains. We have good measures to
predict the eectiveness of opponent models, and the best techniques are already
at 90% of their upper limit. We also know how the negotiation setting inuences
the performance and accuracy. In terms of performance, there is not much to gain
from better preference learning techniques, given their rather minimal performance
increases. This is conrmed by our results in Chapter 10, which show that opponent
modeling is the least important aspect in the design of an eective agent. Some of
the most successful ANAC agents go as far as to not even explicitly model the utility
space of the opponent. Although Agent K (winner of ANAC 2010) and HardHeaded
(winner of ANAC 2011) still use learning to determine the appropriate concession
level, they do not explicitly model the opponent's utility space.
A possible explanation for the low importance of opponent modeling is the fact that
the number of oers that can be exchanged between the ANAC agents easily reaches
tens of thousands, allowing for exhaustive exploration of all but the largest utility
spaces. Such a large number of oers clearly makes it easier for software agents
to explore the utility space, yet one could argue whether this is entirely realistic.
Even though software agents are able to compute many more oers than humans, in
practice there may be other constraints, such as network delays, that would limit
the number of oers bargaining agents could exchange. Thus, introducing stochastic
break-os or a minimum time delay between oers may be an issue to consider in
our negotiation model.
Some other potential interesting research lines include the following:
1. We need a clearer understanding of how time inuences the learning of the
opponent's preferences. As we discussed in Chapter 7, many agents take a
rather adhoc approach towards the passing of time, causing them to actually
become less accurate over time. The main cause of this phenomenon is that
the bids presented later on in the negotiation are incorrectly handled. The
most often used learning techniques treat every received bid the same way,
independent of the time it is received [103, 102, 112]. To solve this, we need to
understand the relationship between the opponent's bidding strategy and the
opponent's preferences and how we can learn them in tandem.
2102. Many of the learning techniques presented in this thesis require hundreds of
bids of input before converging to a reasonable estimate. New methods are
required that can learn from a smaller sample of bids if we wish to apply
them in other domains, such as human-computer negotiations, continuous
domains, and non-linear preferences.2 For this, we need a better understanding
of how dierent modeling assumptions (as we explored in Chapter 6) aect the
faithfulness of the model, and what it means for the assumptions to be robust
with respect to a given set of potential opponents.
3. When learning the opponent's preference prole, a learning technique usually
makes assumptions about the structure of the negotiation scenario (e.g., [60,
76, 270]). Negotiation strategies can exploit the internal structure of the issues
of the negotiation domain in order to improve their prociency. For example,
a learning technique can benet from the information that a certain issue is
predictable. Informally, an issue is predictable when the global properties of its
evaluation function is known. To illustrate, consider the discrete issue Amount
of funding from the Zimbabwe{England domain (cf. Section C.2). Its values
are: no agreement, $10 billion, $50 billion, or $100 billion. Even without any
additional information, we can be condent that the utility of each party is
either increasing or decreasing in the amount of funding. A price issue like this
is typically predictable, but other issues, such as color, are more dicult learn
about. Learning to label issues as either predictable or unpredictable could
dramatically improve the eciency of learning algorithms.
11.3.4 Accepting
We have come a long way in formulating eective acceptance strategies for negotiating
agents. If we have a good idea of how many oers we can still expect (possibly using
an estimation of the number of rounds remaining) and of the range of bids we can
expect at every time step (using a strategy prediction mechanism), we can make
the optimal choice of when to accept. The optimal choice is only as good as the
estimations, but we have rather good estimators at our disposal, and the optimal
stopping rules are robust to estimation errors in practice.
The most important limitation of our optimal stopping model presented in Chapter 5
is that the eect of rejecting the opponent's oer is not included in the model. If the
opponent's oer is not accepted, the opponent's behavior is aected by the counter
oer, thus making the bidding strategy an important aspect to consider, as our
results in Chapter 10 on their interaction eects also makes clear.
Second, our model already incorporates the concept of negotiation costs, but we
assumed them to be zero throughout; it would be interesting to see the eects of costs
2Finding new learning techniques for the non-linear case is especially relevant for ANAC 2014;
see Section 11.3.5
211on optimal acceptance behavior. Similarly, we need new optimal stopping rules for
negotiation scenarios that have discounted payos. Both extensions will incentivize
agents to employ more permissive acceptance conditions.
On the other hand, adding reservation values to the agent's preferences would make
an agent less inclined to accept. In many cases, it is irrational to withdraw from a
negotiation (i.e., by sending a message ending the negotiation), as it leaves the agent
with nothing. Combining reservation values with discounted scenarios, as is done in
ANAC 2012, cause both contract utility and outside options to devaluate with the
passing of time. In such a setting, novel acceptance conditions are required that give
more consideration to the negotiation timeline. For example, it can be advantageous
for an agent to end the negotiation prematurely and receive its reservation value,
rather than continuing an exchange of oers while the contract diminishes in value.
This adds an additional dimension to the acceptance dilemma, as prolonging the
negotiation does not necessarily increase the agent's chances of a good outcome and
can induce agents to fall back on their reservation value by ending the negotiation
prematurely. This `outside option' gives rise to a new variety of optimal acceptance
strategies that have to make the optimal choice between continuing, accepting, or
walking away.
11.3.5 The Automated Negotiating Agents Competition
Based on the popularity and the lessons we learned from the competition, we believe
that many of our aims regarding ANAC have been accomplished. Recall that we
set out for this competition in order to steer the research in the area of bilateral
multi-issue negotiation and to enable negotiating agents to be evaluated in realistic
environments with a wide variety of opponents and scenarios. The competition has
achieved just that. Since ANAC is designed in such a way that the opponents, as well
as the scenarios in which negotiation occurs are unknown in advance, competition
participants are compelled to design generic negotiation agents that perform eectively
in a variety of circumstances.
Many teams have participated in the four international competitions so far, and
we hope that many more will participate in the future. The four incarnations of
ANAC have already yielded more than 60 new strategies and scenarios, which provide
a comprehensive and freely available repository against which negotiation agents
can be benchmarked. This, in turn, allows the negotiation research community to
push forward the state-of-the-art in the development and evaluation of automated
negotiators and comparison to other automated negotiators.
Since 2010, we have extended Genius with all ANAC resources and with the
new functionality described in Appendix B (e.g., negotiation strategies, protocols,
scenarios, discount factors, and reservation values), the BOA architecture and agent
components from Chapter 3, the acceptance strategies from Chapter 4 and 5, and
212the performance and accuracy measures described in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
However, as with many competitions, ANAC is continually evolving to address new
challenges and issues. Given the lessons learned from running ANAC, we intend to
eventually introduce several tracks to the competition to model dierent aspects
of the automated negotiation problem, similar to the tracks of the Trading Agents
Competition (TAC) [97, 138, 187, 238, 257]. We see these parallel competition tracks
as naturally supporting the dierent strands of ongoing research in the automated
negotiation community.
For ANAC 2014, we intend to introduce non-linear utility functions into the com-
petition. Non-linear utility functions are generally more complex representations of
preferences, with many interdependent issues. In such contexts, nding the ideal
contract becomes a dicult, nonlinear optimization problem. Selecting bids corre-
sponding to a target utility is dicult already, let alone constructing a model of the
opponent utility [139]. With much recent interest in this area [118, 170, 220, 228, 272]
we expect the non-linear scenarios and negotiation strategies to be a worthwhile
addition to our repository.
Finally, we believe our work on ANAC has inuence outside the framework of the
competition. For example, the relative success of a meta-learning strategy such
as Gahboninho (see Section D.1) shows how second-level adaptivity can pay o,
where rst-level adaptivity (such as Nice Tit for Tat Agent, see Section D.1) does
not. Where Nice Tit for Tat Agent simply adapts to the opponent's behavior,
Gahboninho has a meta-learning strategy which rst tries to establish the learning
behavior of the negotiation opponent, and then uses this to exploit its opponent. For
example, if the opponent is adapting to the strategy of the agent, then Gahboninho
will be less exible. If, on the other hand, the opponent does not seem to adapt,
Gahboninho will be more exible. In other words, the strategy tries to establish
whether its opponent is a teacher or learner, and adapts accordingly (note that
this teacher/learner dilemma has been observed in other game-theoretic learning
competitions, such as the Lemonade Game [178, 242]). Such an approach has been
shown to be successful in the ANAC competition, but also provides useful insights
for practical negotiations in general, and is likely to be useful in future research on
automated negotiation. In fact, the study of learning and concession behavior of
agents in bilateral negotiations provides a natural framework to explore such issues.
11.3.6 Robustness of Negotiation Strategies
The most commonly adopted criterion for evaluating a negotiation strategy is the
average utility payo it can obtain under dierent negotiation scenarios against other
negotiation strategies, as we discussed in Section 2.4.3. We used a similar method
in many of the experiments in this thesis, ranking the agents using their average
performance in a tournament setup. Note that the goal of achieving the highest score
213in such a tournament is somewhat dierent to that of reaching the highest score in
an individual negotiation.
An alternative criterion to further encourage the development of exible negotiators
would be the total number of games won, instead of the average utility obtained in
these games. However, such a criterion would encourage agents to simply beat their
opponent, rather than maximize their own utility. This means that agents would be
encouraged to get more utility than their opponent at all cost, even if this means
reducing their own utility (e.g. by delaying the agreement in the case of a discounted
scenario). Such spiteful behavior has also been found in auction bidding [40, 251]
and is realistic in some cases, but obviously encouraging such strategies should not
be our goal.
Apart from individual performance, a tournament setting also demands that agents
take into account their relative performance; i.e., that they are robust in the sense
of not yielding too much to the other contestants. However, an agent can only
control the outcomes of the negotiations it is involved in; it has no control over the
negotiations between other agents. Thus, maximizing the utility of each negotiation
an agent participates in can be seen as a good approximation that an agent can take
in order to maximize its tournament score.
Another parameter that can potentially aect the diversity in outcomes is the specic
composition of the opponent pool. We may be interested to know how the winning
strategy would change if the tournament size were chosen dierently, and especially, if
the mix of opponent strategies were dierent. Moreover, it is natural to ask whether
the agents participating in a tournament have an incentive to switch to a dierent
strategy in order to improve their score.
To this end, one can explore the inuence of the tournament pool by considering
dierent mixes of opponent strategies. We have performed additional work on this
in [17], in which we used the technique of empirical game theory as a method for
analyzing the results gathered from ANAC. The technique was rst developed by [255]
to provide insights into the strategies used in the Trading Agent Competition (TAC)
and has been shown to be a useful tool in addressing questions about robustness
of trading strategies in [258] and [53]. Similar techniques have also been used to
analyze continuous double auctions [254]. EGT analysis uses the assumption that
the strategy used by each player is selected from a xed set of strategies and searches
for pure Nash equilibria in a tournament setup.
Specically, using the payos achieved by each agent in a given prole, deviation
analysis considers the best single-agent deviation available to an agent in that prole
(see Figure 11.1). A deviation is dened as the incentive of one agent to change
its strategy, assuming that all other agents maintain their current strategies. An
agent has such an incentive to switch to another strategy if this switch will bring
an improvement in its own utility. This approach can be used in order to search for
tournaments in which agents have no incentive to deviate (i.e. switch) to a dierent
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Figure 11.1: Illustration of deviation analysis for one-to-one negotiations in ANAC
2011. Arrows indicate statistically signicant reasons for one of the players to switch
strategies. At each node, the highest scoring agent is marked by a colored background.
Each ANAC 2011 agent is represented by a dierent letter (B = BRAMAgent, H =
Hardheaded, and so on).
strategy. Such tournaments are considered to be empirical equilibria. In some games,
there may be a subset of proles, such as the cycle of three shown in Figure 11.1,
each of which are not an equilibrium by themselves, but for which there exists a path
of best deviations which connect them, and there is no best deviation which leads to
a prole outside of the subset. Such a subset is referred to as a best reply cycle [266].
Since an agent never knows which opponent it faces in practice, strategies which are
part of an equilibrium, and have a large basin of attraction (i.e., where sequences of
deviations often lead to that strategy), are more robust than strategies that are not
in equilibrium.
11.3.7 Negotiation Setting
Throughout this thesis, we have emphasized the need for a universally adopted
experimental design of negotiation, given how sensitive agent performance is to
the particular setup of experiments. The overall scores achieved in one specic
tournament, by themselves, do not reveal much about the applicability of the
215negotiation strategies in dierent settings. For example, the ANAC 2011 results show
that, in both the Energy and Nice or Die scenarios, agents obtain lower utility on
average, compared to the other scenarios. Moreover, the performance of the agents
in these scenarios are more diverse, with some agents having much higher utilities
than others. In other scenarios, these utilities are much closer. The reason is that,
even though the scenarios are quite distinct (with the Energy being the largest and
Nice or Die being the smallest) both of these scenarios have strong opposition (i.e.,
are relatively competitive), whereas in the other scenarios it is possible to achieve
close to the maximum score for both agents. Due to the diversity, the performance in
these scenarios has a greater impact on the overall utility, and therefore the strategies
which do well in these scenarios have a denite advantage over the other strategies.
This underlines the importance of maintaining a variety of scenarios with dierent
characteristics to properly evaluate the performance of an agent.
A possible limitation of negotiating agents is that they often rely on xed, pre-
determined parameters in their strategies, such as the time elapsed before the
agent becomes more concessive, or the utility an agent should concede to at a
given time. Such xed parameters are used both by less successful agents, such as
ValueModelAgent, BRAMAgent and The Negotiator, but also by the ANAC 2011
winner HardHeaded. Strategies that try to be more generic, and avoid relying too
much on hand-tuned parameters include IAMhaggler2011, Gahboninho and Nice Tit
for Tat Agent, but we are still a long way from designing agents that are exible
towards considerable changes in the negotiation setting.
We intend to generalize results of this thesis to settings that deal not only with
bilateral, but also with concurrent, one-to-many, and many-to-many negotiations. In
this type of negotiation, the concession strategy in each thread may be considerably
inuenced by the oers made and received in the parallel threads. Such issues have
already been explored by the negotiation community, e.g. [143, 185, 246, 259, 262],
but there is no universally accepted benchmark to compare such agents. Yet another
direction of further work could be around mediated negotiation scenarios, in which
two (or more) negotiating agents incrementally reveal their preferences to a mediator
agent that has the task of suggesting a mutually agreeable outcome. Such approaches
could be combined with a future track of the ANAC competition that is somewhat
similar to the TAC Market Design competition and Power TAC (see Section 2.4.2).
Negotiation strategies from previous ANAC competitions could be provided as part
of the platform, while participants would be asked to design an agent for this market,
or a policy for the mediating agents. A further track could consider a repeated series
of negotiations in which the agents can learn based on previous interactions with the
opponents.
Another important direction is the design of agents that perform well not only against
other automated strategies, but also against human opponents [93, 161, 162, 246].
Social interaction, emotions and culture are some of the issues that need to be
considered when designing such an agent; issues that were not tackled when designing
216agents in this thesis. Specically, dierent approaches are required, since negotiations
with humans need to be much shorter, in terms of the number of oers that can be
exchanged in a short timespan.
The results in this thesis are based on discrete domains, where each issue takes a
value from a nite set3, yet the BOA framework and the Genius platform are able to
handle continuous issues as well. For future work, we would like to include domains
with a combination of continuous and discrete issues. Having continuous issues would
generalize the agents even further and benet application domains where continuous
issues occur naturally (such as the allocation of continuous resources, like money or
time).
Another important extension is to consider agent utility functions with interde-
pendencies between the issues being negotiated, such as those considered in [10,
13, 90, 174, 210]. So far, all the agent utility functions considered in this thesis
are additive. However, this may be a limitation since in many real-life scenarios,
the utility functions of dierent agents exhibit complex interdependencies between
issues. We have extended the capabilities of Genius to incorporate non-linear utility
functions for ANAC 2014 (see Section 11.3.5).
Another recent development worth noting is the Negowiki project [172, 173], which
aims to unify current approaches in negotiation research by creating a collection of
standardized negotiation scenarios. Their framework is integrated in the Negowiki
website, where researchers can share and download their scenarios and results. As
in Genius, analysis of the results is provided, so that researchers can compute
a set of metrics over the results of the negotiation. This can work seamlessly in
combination with Genius: a developer can upload the outcomes of an experiment
and the Negowiki provides the tools to upload the results to a central repository for
others to share. All scenarios oered by Negowiki are also available for download in
Genius format, and non-linear scenarios from Negowiki are used for ANAC 2014.
11.3.8 Application to Human Negotiations
An important application of our research would be to introduce it into domains
in which one or more of the negotiating parties is human. It would be interesting
to evaluate the performance of the various negotiating agents presented in this
thesis when they play against, or when they support, human negotiators. There are
recent extensions of Genius that already enable ecient negotiations with human
negotiators, using a chat-based interface [274]. The analytical toolbox of Genius
can be used to discover patterns of negotiation behavior to compare the automated
negotiation strategies with human negotiators. Another option is to use Genius as
3With the exception of Chapter 5 and 9, which formulate optimal bidding and accepting rules
for both discrete and continuous cases.
217Figure 11.2: The bidding phase of the Pocket Negotiator in which a job applicant is
assisted in a job negotiation. Depicted is a suggested bid by the Pocket Negotiator
(shown in red), which is a good oer for the job applicant, but not for the prospective
employer. The black outcomes constitute the Pareto frontier, and the green area in
the outcome space indicates the locations of win-win outcomes.
a training environment to teach people negotiation concepts, such as exploration of
outcome spaces, analysis of opponent's oers, trade-os between issues, etc.
A rst step in applying our research to a real-life setting is the Pocket Negotiator [126],
of which we have recently released a prototype (Figure 11.2). The Pocket Negotiator
is a negotiation support system (NSS) that assists the user in the negotiation process.
It can be used to support the user in negotiation with other people and to train
human negotiators by means of negotiations against automated agents.
An NSS can help overcome many of the diculties involved in human negotiations.
Humans are usually better at understanding the negotiation context and emotional
uctuations, and have the necessary background knowledge to interpret the nego-
tiation domain. Computers, on the other hand, are capable of storing extensive
domain specic knowledge, they can exhaustively search through the entire bid space,
and they are not troubled by emotions. Therefore, automated negotiators can work
side-by-side humans, where each can benet from their unique strengths.
218It is not easy to create an eective NSS, as the system should be able to be de-
ployed in any negotiation situation, against a beforehand unknown other party.
Research into the Pocket Negotiator involves many dierent subprojects and its
research challenges include: creating a shared preference model of negotiation [252],
considering human values in the design process [197], providing preference elicitation
and explanation [196, 195], providing runtime bidding advice [247], and developing
aective computing technologies and increasing user awareness of emotions and
conict handling styles [41].
The Pocket Negotiator distinguishes four phases of negotiation (seen at the top of
Figure 11.2): preparation, joint exploration, bidding, and closure. The results of
this thesis are predominantly used for negotiation support during the bidding phase.
To assist the user, the Pocket Negotiator can be provided with any of the versatile,
automated strategies that were presented in this thesis. When the user requests the
Pocket Negotiator to suggest a bid, Genius is activated, and a negotiation strategy
of the designer's choice is consulted for advice.
Our work on the BOA framework is a natural next step in improving the bidding
support of the Pocket Negotiator. We envision an interface where users can choose
the appropriate bidding, learning, and accepting technique to assist them, based on
their knowledge of the negotiation domain and the other party.
219220Summary { What to Bid and
When to Stop
Negotiation is an important activity in human society, and is studied by various
disciplines, ranging from economics and game theory, to electronic commerce, social
psychology, and articial intelligence. Traditionally, negotiation is a necessary, but
also time-consuming and expensive activity. Therefore, in the last decades there has
been a large interest in the automation of negotiation, for example in the setting of
e-commerce. This interest is fueled by the promise of automated agents eventually
being able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators.
Every year, automated negotiation agents are improving in various ways, and there
is now a large body of negotiation strategies available, all with their unique strengths
and weaknesses. For example, some agents are able to predict the opponent's
preferences very well, while others focus more on having a sophisticated bidding
strategy. The problem however, is that there is little incremental improvement in
agent design, as the agents are tested in varying negotiation settings, using a diverse
set of performance measures. This makes it very dicult to meaningfully compare
the agents, let alone their underlying techniques. As a result, we lack a reliable way
to pinpoint the most eective components in a negotiating agent.
There are two major advantages of distinguishing between the dierent components
of a negotiating agent's strategy: rst, it allows the study of the behavior and
performance of the components in isolation. For example, it becomes possible to
compare the preference learning component of all agents, and to identify the best
among them. Second, we can proceed to mix and match dierent components to
create new negotiation strategies., e.g.: replacing the preference learning technique
of an agent and then examining whether this makes a dierence. Such a procedure
enables us to combine the individual components to systematically explore the space
of possible negotiation strategies.
This summary is based on the following publication:
Tim Baarslag. Designing an automated negotiator: Learning what to bid and when to stop. In
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS '13, pages 1419{1420. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, 2013
221The BOA Architecture
To develop a compositional approach to evaluate and combine the components,
we identify structure in most agent designs by introducing the BOA architecture
(Chapter 3), in which we can develop and integrate the dierent components of
a negotiating agent. We identify three main components of a general negotiation
strategy; namely a bidding strategy (B), possibly an opponent model (O), and an
acceptance strategy (A). The bidding strategy considers what concessions it deems
appropriate given its own preferences, and takes the opponent into account by using
an opponent model. The acceptance strategy decides whether oers proposed by the
opponent should be accepted.
The BOA architecture is integrated into a generic negotiation environment called
Genius (Appendix A), which is a software environment for designing and evaluating
negotiation strategies. To explore the negotiation strategy space of the negotiation
research community, we amend the Genius repository with various existing agents
and scenarios from literature. Additionally, we organize a yearly international
negotiation competition (ANAC) (Appendix B) to harvest even more strategies and
scenarios. ANAC also acts as an evaluation tool for negotiation strategies, and
encourages the design of negotiation strategies and scenarios.
We re-implement agents from literature and ANAC and decouple them to t into
the BOA architecture without introducing any changes in their behavior. For each
of the three components, we manage to nd and analyze the best ones for specic
cases, as described below. We show that the BOA framework leads to signicant
improvements in agent design by wining ANAC 2013, which had 19 participating
teams from 8 international institutions, with an agent that is designed using the BOA
framework and is informed by a preliminary analysis of the dierent components.
Acceptance Strategies
In every negotiation, one of the negotiating parties must accept an oer to reach
an agreement. Therefore, it is important that a negotiator employs a procient
mechanism to decide under which conditions to accept. When contemplating whether
to accept an oer, the agent is faced with the acceptance dilemma: accepting the
oer may be suboptimal, as better oers may still be presented before time runs out.
On the other hand, accepting too late may prevent an agreement from being reached,
resulting in a break o with no gain for either party. In Chapter 4, we classify and
compare state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions. We propose new acceptance
strategies and we demonstrate that they outperform the other conditions. We also
provide insight into why some conditions work better than others and investigate
correlations between the properties of the negotiation scenario and the ecacy of
acceptance conditions.
In Chapter 5, we adopt a more principled approach by applying optimal stopping
222theory to calculate the optimal decision on the acceptance of an oer. We approach
the decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the
bids received as a stochastic process. We determine the optimal acceptance policies
for particular opponent classes and we present an approach to estimate the expected
range of oers when the type of opponent is unknown. We show that the proposed
approach is able to nd the optimal time to accept, and improves upon all existing
acceptance strategies.
Opponent Models
Another principal component of a negotiating agent's strategy is its ability to take
the opponent's preferences into account. The quality of an opponent model can be
measured in two dierent ways. One is to use the agent's performance as a benchmark
for the model's quality. In Chapter 6, we evaluate and compare the performance
of a selection of state-of-the-art opponent modeling techniques in negotiation. We
provide an overview of the factors inuencing the quality of a model and we analyze
how the performance of opponent models depends on the negotiation setting. We
identify a class of simple and surprisingly eective opponent modeling techniques
that did not receive much previous attention in literature.
The other way to measure the quality of an opponent model is to directly evaluate
its accuracy by using similarity measures. We consider opponent models from
this perspective in Chapter 7. We review all methods to measure the accuracy
of an opponent model and we then analyze how changes in accuracy translate
into performance dierences. Moreover, we pinpoint the best predictors for good
performance. This leads to new insights concerning how to construct an opponent
model, and what we need to measure when optimizing performance.
Bidding Strategies
Finally, we take two dierent approaches to gain more insight into eective bidding
strategies. In Chapter 8, we present a new classication method for negotiation
strategies, based on their pattern of concession making against dierent kinds of
opponents. We apply this technique to classify some well-known negotiating strategies,
and we formulate guidelines on how agents should bid in order to be successful, which
gives insight into the bidding strategy space of negotiating agents.
We focus on nding optimal bidding strategies in Chapter 9. We apply optimal
stopping theory again, this time to nd the concessions that maximize utility for
the bidder against particular opponents. We show there is an interesting connection
between optimal bidding and optimal acceptance strategies, in the sense that they
are mirrored versions of each other.
223Putting the Pieces Together
Lastly, after analyzing all components separately, we put the pieces back together
again in Chapter 10. We take all BOA components accumulated so far, including
the best ones, and combine them all together to explore the space of negotiation
strategies.
We compute the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result,
and we study the interaction between components. We nd that combining the
best agent components indeed makes the strongest agents. This shows that the
component-based view of the BOA architecture not only provides a useful basis
for developing negotiating agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By
varying the BOA components we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each
component to the negotiation result, and thus analyze the signicance of each. The
bidding strategy is by far the most important to consider, followed by the acceptance
conditions and nally followed by the opponent model.
Our results validate the analytical approach of the BOA framework to rst optimize
the individual components, and then to recombine them into a negotiating agent.
224Samenvatting { Wat te
Bieden en Wanneer te
Stoppen
Onderhandelen is een belangrijke activiteit in onze samenleving en wordt in verschil-
lende vakgebieden bestudeerd, waaronder de economische wetenschappen, speltheorie,
e-commerce, sociale psychologie en kunstmatige intelligentie. Normaal gesproken
is onderhandelen een noodzakelijke, maar ook tijdrovende en kostbare activiteit.
Daarom is er gedurende de afgelopen decennia groeiende belangstelling voor het
automatiseren van het onderhandelingsproces, bijvoorbeeld in de e-commerce. De
drijvende kracht achter deze ontwikkeling is de hoop dat geautomatiseerde agenten
op een dag in staat zullen zijn om namens menselijke onderhandelaars te kunnen
optreden.
Onderhandelende agenten worden jaarlijks steeds beter, en tegenwoordig zijn er
vele onderhandelingsstrategie en beschikbaar, ieder met hun eigen sterke en zwakke
punten. Sommige agenten zijn bijvoorbeeld heel goed in staat om de voorkeuren
van de tegenstander te voorspellen, terwijl andere agenten weer een verjnde bied-
ingsstrategie bezitten. Het probleem is echter dat er weinig incrementele verbetering
is in hun ontwerp, aangezien de agenten in verschillende omstandigheden worden
getest, en er gebruik wordt gemaakt van verschillende prestatie-indicatoren. Dit
bemoeilijkt de onderlinge vergelijking van de agenten, laat staan de beoordeling van
hun onderliggende technieken. Als gevolg hiervan ontbreekt het aan een betrouwbare
manier om de meest eectieve componenten in een onderhandelingsagent vast te
stellen.
Het onderscheiden van de verschillende onderdelen van een onderhandelingsstrate-
gie heeft twee belangrijke voordelen: ten eerste laat dit toe om het gedrag en de
prestaties van de afzonderlijke componenten te bestuderen. Op deze manier kunnen
bijvoorbeeld de leertechnieken van agenten worden vergeleken, en de beste worden
ge denticeerd. Ten tweede kunnen we nieuwe onderhandelingenstrategie en samen-
stellen uit de verschillende componenten, bijvoorbeeld door het opponent model
Deze samenvatting is gebaseerd op de volgende publicatie:
Tim Baarslag. Designing an automated negotiator: Learning what to bid and when to stop. In
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS '13, pages 1419{1420. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, 2013
225(het model van de tegenstander) van een agent te vervangen door een andere, en
vervolgens te onderzoeken of dit een verschil maakt. Een dergelijke procedure stelt
ons zo in staat om de afzonderlijke componenten te combineren om zo de ruimte van
onderhandelingenstrategie en systematisch te onderzoeken.
De BOA Architectuur
Om een compositionele aanpak te ontwikkelen waarmee we de componenten kunnen
evalueren en combineren, onderscheiden we bepaalde onderdelen in het ontwerp van
een agent. We doen dit door de BOA architectuur (Hoofdstuk 3) te introduceren,
waarin we de verschillende componenten van een onderhandelingsagent kunnen
ontwikkelen en integreren. We identiceren drie belangrijke onderdelen van een
onderhandelingsstrategie, namelijk een biedingsstrategie (B), eventueel een opponent
model (O), en een acceptatiestrategie (A). De biedingsstrategie beslist welke concessies
passend zijn gegeven de eigen voorkeuren, en houdt rekening met de tegenstander
met behulp van het opponent model. De acceptatiestrategie beslist of de voorstellen
van de tegenstander moeten worden geaccepteerd.
De BOA architectuur is ge ntegreerd in een generieke onderhandelingsomgeving
genaamd Genius (Bijlage A), een software-omgeving voor het ontwerpen en evalueren
van onderhandelingsstrategie en. Om de ruimte van onderhandelingsstrategie en te
verkennen, breiden wij Genius uit met verschillende bestaande agenten en scenario's
uit de literatuur. Daarnaast organiseren we een jaarlijkse internationale onderhan-
delingscompetitie (ANAC) (Bijlage B), hetgeen nog meer strategie en en scenario's
oplevert. ANAC fungeert ook als een evaluatie-instrument voor onze onderhandel-
ingsstrategie en en stimuleert het ontwerp van nieuwe onderhandelingsstrategie en en
scenario's.
We her-implementeren agenten uit de literatuur en ANAC en ontkoppelen de agenten
om deze in de BOA architectuur in te passen zonder veranderingen aan te brengen
in hun gedrag. Voor elk van de drie componenten vinden en analyseren we de beste
varianten voor specieke gevallen, zoals hieronder wordt beschreven. We laten zien
dat de BOA architectuur leidt tot een signicante verbetering door winst in ANAC
2013 (met 19 deelnemende teams uit 8 internationale instituten), met een agent die is
ontworpen met behulp van de BOA architectuur en het resultaat is van onze analyse
van de individuele componenten.
Acceptatiestrategie en
In elke onderhandeling moet  e en van de onderhandelende partijen een aanbod
accepteren om een akkoord te bereiken. Daarom is het belangrijk dat onderhandelaars
gebruik maken van een eectief mechanisme dat bepaalt onder welke voorwaarden
moet worden geaccepteerd. Bij deze overweging wordt de agent geconfronteerd met
het acceptatiedilemma: het in een vroeg stadium aanvaarden van een aanbod kan
226suboptimaal zijn, omdat er zich nog betere aanbiedingen kunnen voordoen voordat
de tijd opraakt. Aan de andere kant kan een te late acceptatie verhinderen dat een
overeenkomst wordt bereikt, hetgeen resulteert in een mislukte onderhandeling waar
beide partijen niet bij gebaat zijn. In Hoofdstuk 4, classiceren en vergelijken we
generieke, state-of-the-art acceptatiemechanismen. Wij doen aanbevelingen voor
nieuwe acceptatiestrategie en en laten zien dat deze beter presteren. Ook geven
we inzicht in de omstandigheden waaronder sommige acceptatiestrategie en beter
werken dan anderen, en we onderzoeken het verband tussen hun eectiviteit en de
eigenschappen van de onderhandelingsomgeving.
In Hoofdstuk 5 benaderen we het probleem op een principi elere manier door optimal
stopping theory toe te passen, waarmee we de optimale beslissing aangaande de
acceptatie van een aanbod berekenen. We beschouwen de beslissing om al dan niet
te accepteren als een sequential decision problem, door de te ontvangen biedingen te
modelleren als een stochastisch proces. We bepalen de optimale acceptatiestrategie
voor bepaalde klassen van tegenstanders en we laten zien hoe we de toekomstige
biedingen kunnen voorspellen wanneer de tegenstander onbekend is. We tonen aan
dat de door ons voorgestelde aanpak op het optimale tijdstip accepteert en beter
werkt dan alle bestaande acceptatiestrategie en.
Opponent Models
Een ander belangrijk onderdeel van een onderhandelingsstrategie is de mogelijkheid
rekening te houden met de voorkeuren van de tegenstander middels een opponent
model. De kwaliteit van een opponent model kan op twee verschillende manieren
worden gemeten. E en daarvan is om de prestaties van een agent te gebruiken als
maatstaf. In Hoofdstuk 6, evalueren en vergelijken we de prestaties van state-of-
the-art opponent models tijdens een onderhandeling. We geven een overzicht van
de factoren die de kwaliteit van een model be nvloeden en we analyseren hoe hun
prestaties afhangen van de onderhandelingsomgeving. We identiceren een klasse
van eenvoudige en verrassend eectieve opponent models die nog niet veel aandacht
hebben gekregen in de huidige literatuur.
Een andere manier om de kwaliteit van een oppponent model te meten is door de
nauwkeurigheid rechtstreeks te beoordelen met behulp van maten die zijn gebaseerd op
overeenkomst. Wij beschouwen opponent models vanuit dit perspectief in Hoofdstuk 7.
We beschouwen alle methoden om de nauwkeurigheid van opponent models te meten
en we analyseren vervolgens hoe veranderingen in nauwkeurigheid zich vertalen
in prestatieverschillen. Bovendien bepalen wij de beste voorspellers voor goede
prestaties. Dit leidt tot nieuwe inzichten in de manier waarop een opponent model
moet worden opgebouwd en welke metingen moeten worden verricht om de prestaties
te optimaliseren.
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Tenslotte volgen we twee verschillende benaderingen om meer inzicht te verkrijgen
in eectieve biedingsstrategie en. In Hoofdstuk 8, presenteren we een nieuwe classi-
catiemethode voor onderhandelingsstrategie en, gebaseerd op de mate waarin zij
concessies doen tegen verschillende soorten tegenstanders. We passen deze techniek
toe op een aantal bekende onderhandelingsstrategie en en formuleren richtlijnen voor
succesvolle biedingsstrategie en, hetgeen inzicht geeft in de ruimte van onderhandel-
ingsstrategie en.
Wij richten ons op het vinden van optimale biedingsstrategie en in Hoofdstuk 9. We
passen optimal stopping theory opnieuw toe, ditmaal om de optimale concessies te
vinden tegen bepaalde tegenstanders. We laten zien dat er een interessante relatie
bestaat tussen optimale biedingsstrategie en en optimale acceptatiestrategie en, in de
zin dat zij gespiegelde versies van elkaar zijn.
Putting the Pieces Together
Na het afzonderlijk analyseren van alle componenten brengen wij de losse puzzel-
stukken samen in Hoofdstuk 10. Wij combineren alle tot dusver gevonden BOA
onderdelen (met inbegrip van de beste) en combineren deze met elkaar om de ruimte
van onderhandelingsstrategie en te verkennen.
Wij berekenen in hoeverre elke component bijdraagt aan het uiteindelijke onder-
handelingsresultaat, en we onderzoeken de wisselwerking tussen de afzonderlijke
componenten. We laten zien dat het combineren van de beste componenten inder-
daad de sterkste agenten oplevert. Dit toont aan dat de op componenten gebaseerde
aanpak van de BOA architectuur niet alleen een ontwikkelmethode voor onderhan-
delende agenten biedt, maar ook als een nuttig analytisch instrument kan fungeren.
Door het vari eren van de BOA componenten kunnen wij onderzoeken in hoeverre
elke component aan het onderhandelingsresultaat bijdraagt, en dus kunnen we van
elke component het belang onderzoeken. De biedingssstrategie blijkt veruit de be-
langrijkste component te zijn, gevolgd door de acceptatiestrategie en als laatste het
opponent model.
Onze resultaten valideren de analytische benadering van de BOA architectuur om
eerst de individuele componenten te optimaliseren, en deze vervolgens te combineren
tot een onderhandelingsagent.
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Genius: an environment to
support the design of
generic automated
negotiators
We present an environment called Genius, which is a General Environment for Negotiation
with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation. Genius helps facilitate both the design
and evaluation of automated negotiators' strategies. It implements an open architecture
that allows easy development and integration of existing negotiating agents and can be used
to simulate individual negotiation sessions, as well as tournaments between negotiating
agents in various negotiation scenarios. Genius also allows the specication of dierent
negotiation domains and preference proles by means of a graphical user interface.
Genius is employed throughout this thesis as a common environment and testbed to
evaluate various ways for automated negotiating strategies to bid, to learn, and to accept.
We show the advantages and underlying benets of using Genius and how it can facilitate
experimental design in automated negotiation. In particular, it is used as a tournament
platform for the negotiation competition discussed in Appendix B.
241This appendix is based on the following publication:
Raz Lin, Sarit Kraus, Tim Baarslag, Dmytro Tykhonov, Koen Hindriks, and Catholijn M.
Jonker. Genius: An integrated environment for supporting the design of generic
automated negotiators. Computational Intelligence, 30(1):48{70, 2014
242A.1 Introduction
There are several diculties that emerge when designing automated negotiating
agents, i.e., automated programs with negotiating capabilities. First, while people
can negotiate in dierent settings and domains, when designing an automated
agent a decision should be made whether the agent should be a general purpose
negotiator, that is, domain-independent (e.g., [165]) and able to successfully negotiate
in many settings or suitable for only one specic domain (e.g., the Colored Trail
domain [85, 92], or the Diplomacy game [71, 72, 146]). There are obvious advantages
of an agent's specicity in a given domain. It allows the agent designers to construct
strategies that enable better negotiation compared to strategies for a more general
purpose negotiator. However, this is also one of the major weaknesses of these types
of agents. With the constant introduction of new domains, e-commerce and other
applications that require negotiations, the generality of an automated negotiator
becomes important, as automated agents tailored to specic domains cannot be
re-used in the new domains and applications.
Another diculty in designing automated negotiators concerns open environments,
such as online markets, patient care-delivery systems, virtual reality and simulation
systems used for training (e.g., the Trading Agent Competition [256]). These envi-
ronments lack a central mechanism for controlling the agents' behavior, where agents
may encounter opponents whose behavior is diverse.
We do not focus on the design of an ecient automated negotiator here; we do,
however, present an environment to facilitate the design and evaluation of automated
negotiators' strategies. The environment, Genius, is a General Environment for
Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation. To our knowledge,
this is the rst environment of its kind that both assists in the design of strategies for
automated negotiators and also supports the evaluation process of the agent. Thus,
we believe this environment is very useful for agent designers and can take a central
part in the process of designing automated agents. While designing agents can be
done in any agent oriented software engineering methodology, Genius wraps this in
an easy-to-use environment and allows the designers to focus on the development
of strategies for negotiation in an open environment with multi-attribute utility
functions.
Genius incorporates several mechanisms that aim to support the design of a general
automated negotiator; from the initial design, through the evaluation of the agent,
to re-design and improvements, based on its performance. The rst mechanism is an
analytical toolbox, which provides a variety of tools to analyze the performance of
agents, the outcome of the negotiation and its dynamics. The second mechanism is
a repository of domains and utility functions. Lastly, it also comprises repositories
of automated negotiators. A comprehensive description of the tool is provided in
Section A.2.
243In addition, Genius enables the evaluation of dierent strategies used by automated
agents that were designed using the tool. The user interacts with Genius via a
graphical user interface (GUI) and can keep track of the negotiation results with an
extensive logging system. This is an important contribution as it allows researchers to
empirically and objectively compare their agents with others in dierent domains and
settings and validate their results. This in turn allows to generate better automated
negotiators, explore dierent learning and adaptation strategies and opponent models,
and collect state-of-the-art negotiating agents, negotiation domains, and preference
proles, and making them available and accessible for the negotiation research
community.
We begin by giving an overview of Genius relating to its design.
A.2 The Genius System
Genius is a General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose
Usage Simulation. The aim of the environment is to facilitate the design of negotiation
strategies. Using Genius programmers can focus mainly on the strategy design.
This is achieved by Genius providing both a exible and easy-to-use environment for
implementing agents and mechanisms that support the strategy design and analysis of
the agents. Moreover, the core of Genius can be incorporated in a larger negotiation
support system that is able to fully support the entire negotiation from beginning to
end. Examples include the Pocket Negotiator [111] and an animated mediator [160];
we give more details in Section 11.3.8 of our conclusions.
The design of Genius is consistent with our denitions in Section 2.2. Genius
supports arbitrary protocols, with a focus on bilateral negotiation. Genius can
represent arbitrary negotiation domains, by allowing the user to dene both the
negotiation issues and the associated range of values. A common agent API enables
the user to design generic automated negotiators, whose preferences can be prescribed
by any given preference prole.
In the following sections, we describe the detailed and technical architecture of
Genius and how it can be used by researchers.
A.2.1 Genius' Architecture
Genius provides a exible simulation environment. Its architecture, presented in
Figure A.1, is built from several modules: (a) analysis, (b) repository, (c) logging,
and (d) simulation control. The analysis module provides researchers the option to
analyze the outcomes using dierent evaluation metrics. The repository contains
three dierent modules of the negotiation that interact with three analysis modules
built into Genius:
244Figure A.1: The high-level architecture of Genius
1. Negotiation scenarios, consisting of a negotiation domain with at least two
preference proles dened on that domain. When a negotiation scenario has
been specied, Genius is able to perform outcome space analysis on the
scenario;
2. Negotiating agents that implement the Agent API. Agent introspection allows
the agents to sense the negotiation environment;
3. Negotiation protocols, both one-to-one, and multilateral. Depending on the
particular protocol, Genius can provide negotiation dance analysis to evaluate
negotiation characteristics such as fairness, social welfare, and so on.
Finally, the simulation control and logging modules allow researchers to control the
simulations, debug it and obtain detailed information.
A.2.2 Genius as a Tool for Researchers
Genius enables negotiation between automated agents, as well as people. In this
section we describe the use of Genius prior to the negotiation and afterwards.
245Preparation Phase
For automated agents, Genius provides skeleton classes to help designers implement
their negotiating agents. It provides functionality to access information about the
negotiation domain and the preference prole of the agent. An interaction component
of Genius manages the rules of encounter or protocol that regulates the agent's
interaction in the negotiation. This allows the agent designer to focus on the design
of the agent, and eliminates the need to implement the communication protocol or
the negotiation protocol. Existing agents can be easily integrated in Genius by
means of adapters.
When designing an automated agent, the designer needs to take into account the
settings in which the agent will operate. The setting determines several parameters
that dictate the number of negotiators taking part in the negotiation, the time frame
of the negotiation, and the issues on which the negotiation is being conducted. The
negotiation setting also consists of a set of objectives and issues to be resolved. Various
types of issues can be involved, including discrete enumerated value sets, integer-value
sets, and real-value sets. The negotiation setting can consist of non-cooperative and
cooperative negotiators. Generally speaking, cooperative agents try to maximize
their combined joint utilities (see also Chapter 8), while non-cooperative agents try
to maximize their own utilities regardless of the other sides' utilities. Finally, the
negotiation protocol denes the formal interaction between the negotiators: whether
the negotiation is done only once (one-shot) or repeatedly, and how the exchange
of oers between the agents is conducted. In addition, the protocol states whether
agreements are enforceable or not, and whether the negotiation has a nite or innite
horizon. The negotiation is said to have a nite horizon if the length of every possible
history of the negotiation is nite. In this respect, time costs may also be assigned
and they may increase or decrease the utility of the negotiator. Genius provides
a testbed which allows the designer to easily vary and change these negotiation
parameters.
Using Genius a researcher can setup a single negotiation session or a tournament via
the GUI simulation (see Figure A.2) using the negotiation domains and preference
proles from a repository and choose strategies for the negotiating parties. For this
purpose, a graphical user interface layer provides options to create a negotiation
domain and dene agent preferences. This also includes dening dierent preferences
for each role.
A preference prole species the preferences regarding possible outcomes of an agent.
This can be considered a mapping function that maps the outcomes of a negotiation
domain on the level of satisfaction of an agent associated with that outcome. The
structure of a preference prole, for obvious reasons, resembles that of a domain
specication. The tree-like structure enables specication of relative priorities of
parts of the tree. Figure A.3 demonstrates how a preference prole can be modied
using Genius.
246Figure A.2: An example of Genius' main user interface, showing the results of a
specic negotiation session.
Figure A.3: Setting the preference prole for the England{Zimbabwe scenario.
247More than one hundred negotiation domains are currently available in the repository
of Genius. Each domain has at least two preference proles required for bilateral
negotiations. The number of issues in the domains ranges from 1 to 10, where the
largest negotiation domain in the repository is the AMPO vs. City taken from [202],
and has over 7,000,000 possible agreements. Issues in the repository have dierent
predictabilities of the evaluation of alternatives. Issues are considered predictable
when even though the actual evaluation function for the issue is unknown, it is
possible to guess some of its global properties (for more details, see [109, 113]). The
repositories of domains and of agents allow agent designers to test their agents on
the dierent domains and against dierent kinds of agents and strategies.
Post-Negotiation Phase
Genius provides an analytical toolbox for evaluating negotiation strategies. This
allows to review the performance and benchmark results of negotiators that negotiated
using the system. The toolbox calculates optimal solutions, such as the Pareto ecient
frontier, Nash product and Kalai-Smorodinsky (see Section 2.2.4). These solutions
are visually shown to the negotiator or the designer of the automated agent, as
depicted in the top right corner of Figure A.2. We can see all the possible agreements
in the domain (all dotted areas), where the highest and most right lines denote the
Pareto ecient frontier. During the negotiation each side can see the distance of its
own oers from this Pareto frontier as well as the distance from previous oers (as
shown by the two lines inside the curve). Also, the designer can inspect both agents'
proposals using the toolbox. We note that the visualization of the outcome space
together with the Pareto frontier is only possible from the external point of view of
Genius, which has complete information of both negotiating parties. In particular,
the agent themselves are not aware of the opponent utility of bids in the outcome
space and do not know the location of the Pareto frontier. The researcher however, is
presented the external overview provided by Genius that combines the information
of both negotiation parties.
Using the analytical toolbox one can analyze the dynamic properties of a negotiation
session, with built-in measures such as a classication of negotiation moves (a step-
wise analysis of moves) and the sensitivity to a counterpart's preferences measure, as
suggested in [109]. For example, one can see whether his/her strategy is concession
oriented, i.e., steps are intended to be concessions, but in fact some of these steps
might be unfortunate, namely, although from the receiver's perception the proposer
of the oer is conceding, the oer is actually worse than the previous oer. The
result of the analysis can help agent designers improve their agents.
Genius keeps track of over 20 dierent performance measures for the negotiators,
such as the utility performance of the agents, the average time of agreement, and the
percentage of Pareto-ecient bids. Social welfare measures, such as average distance
from the outcome to the Pareto-frontier, Kalai-point, and Nash-point are included for
248all negotiations that result in an agreement. All accuracy measures from Chapter 7
are also implemented in Genius, such as Pearson correlation, ranking distance, and
average dierence between the real and estimated preferences of an agent.
A.3 Conclusion
This appendix presents a simulation environment that supports the design of generic
automated negotiators. The importance and contribution of Genius is that it
provides, in addition to the design of domain-independent agents, a general infras-
tructure for dening negotiation scenarios, and for evaluating agents. Genius is
publicly available1 and provides researchers a simple and eective tool for designing
negotiations' strategies.
Negotiating agents designed using heuristic approaches need extensive evaluation,
typically through simulations and empirical analysis, as it is usually hard to predict
precisely how the system and the constituent agents will behave in a wide variety
of circumstances. To do so, Genius provides an environment for the development
of a best practice repository for negotiation techniques. Using Genius, many new
state-of-the-art negotiation strategies have been developed. Genius can be used
to develop and test agents, and its easy-to-use agent skeleton makes it a suitable
platform for negotiating agent development. Moreover, as we show in Appendix B,
Genius has proved itself as a valuable and extendable research and analysis tool
for tournament analysis. Genius has the ability to run a wide range of dierent
tournaments, an extensive repository of dierent agents and domains, and it contains
standardized protocols and benchmarks.
1http://ii.tudelft.nl/genius
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The Automated Negotiating
Agents Competition (ANAC)
In Appendix A, we described Genius, an environment to design and analyze automated
negotiators. To compare dierent negotiation settings, Genius requires a variety of
dierent negotiating agents, protocols, and scenarios. With this in mind, we organized
ANAC: an international competition based on Genius that challenges researchers to
develop successful automated negotiation agents for scenarios where there is no information
about the strategies and preferences of the opponents.
We present an in-depth exposition of the design of ANAC and the key insights gained
from four annual International Automated Negotiating Agents Competitions (ANAC 2010{
2013). The key objectives of ANAC are to advance the state-of-the-art in the area of
practical bilateral multi-issue negotiations and to encourage the design of agents that
are able to operate eectively across a variety of scenarios. We present an overview of
the competition, as well as an exposition of general and contrasting approaches towards
negotiation strategies that were adopted by the participants of the competition. Based on
analysis in post{tournament experiments, we also provide some insights with regard to
eective approaches towards the design of negotiation strategies.
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252B.1 Introduction
From May 2011 to May 2013 we held the four instances of the International Automated
Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC)1 [17, 31, 264] in conjunction with the
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).
This competition follows in the footsteps of a series of successful competitions
that aim to advance the state-of-the-art in articial intelligence (other examples
include the Annual Computer Poker Competition2 and the various Trading Agent
Competitions (TAC) [257]). ANAC focuses specically on the design of practical
negotiation strategies. In particular, the overall aim of the competition is to advance
the state-of-the-art in the area of bilateral, multi-issue negotiation, with an emphasis
on the development of successful automated negotiators in realistic environments with
incomplete information (where negotiators do not know their opponent's strategy,
nor their preferences) and continuous time (where the negotiation speed and number
of negotiation exchanges depends on the computational requirements of the strategy).
More specically still, the principal goals of the competition include: (i) encouraging
the design of agents that can prociently negotiate in a variety of circumstances,
(ii) objectively evaluating dierent negotiation strategies, (iii) exploring dierent
learning and adaptation strategies and opponent models, and (iv) collecting state-of-
the-art negotiating agents and negotiation scenarios, and making them available and
accessible as benchmarks for the negotiation research community.
A number of successful negotiation strategies already exist in literature (e.g. [76, 75,
117, 125, 166]; see Chapter 2). However, the results of the dierent implementations
are dicult to compare, as various setups are used for experiments in ad hoc
negotiation environments [113, 159]. An additional goal of ANAC is to build a
community in which work on negotiating agents can be compared by standardized
negotiation benchmarks to evaluate the performance of both new and existing agents.
The competition was established to enable negotiating agents to be evaluated in
realistic environments and with a wide variety of opponents and scenarios. Moreover,
since the opponents, as well as the scenarios in which negotiation occurs are unknown
in advance, competition participants are compelled to design generic negotiation
agents that perform eectively in a variety of circumstances. These agents, together
with a wide range of negotiation scenarios, provide a comprehensive repository against
which negotiation agents can be benchmarked. This, in turn, allows the community
to push forward the state-of-the-art in the development of automated negotiators
and their evaluation and comparison to other automated negotiators.
To achieve this, Genius was developed, which is the underpinning platform of ANAC
that allows easy development and integration of existing negotiating agents. As
explained in Appendix A, it can be used to simulate individual negotiation sessions,
1http://ii.tudelft.nl/anac
2http://www.computerpokercompetition.org
253as well as tournaments between negotiating agents in various negotiation scenarios.
With Genius in place, we organized ANAC with the aim of coordinating the research
into automated agent design and procient negotiation strategies for bilateral multi-
issue closed negotiation, similar to what the TAC [257] achieved for the trading
agent problem. We believe ANAC is an important and useful addition to existing
negotiation competitions, which are either aimed at human negotiations or have a
dierent focus, as we explained in Section 2.4.2.
In this appendix, we will outline the general rules, goals and results of the ANAC
installments. For specic information on agents, scenarios, and scores, we refer to
the appendices C through F.
ANAC is held in conjunction with AAMAS, which is a well-suited platform to host
the competition, as it is the premier scientic conference for research on autonomous
agents and multiagent systems, which includes researchers on automated negotiation.
It brings together an international community of researchers that are well-suited to
tackle the automated agents negotiation challenges posed by ANAC.
This appendix is organized as follows. Section B.2 provides an overview over the
design choices for ANAC, including the model of negotiation, tournament platform
and evaluation criteria. The participating agents, the scenarios, and the results
of four years of ANAC are described in Section B.3. Section B.4 closes o with a
discussion of the implications of ANAC.
B.2 General Design of ANAC
Our aim in designing ANAC is to provide a strategic challenge on multiple accounts.
We begin by describing the challenges set forth by ANAC, and the negotiation model
that is used during each negotiation encounter. After that, we describe how the
competition tournament is formed as a series of such encounters.
One of the goals of ANAC is to encourage the design of agents that can negotiate
in a variety of circumstances. This means the agents should be able to negotiate
against any type of opponent within arbitrary domains. Such an open environment
lacks a central mechanism for controlling the agents' behavior, and the agents may
encounter dierent types of opponents with dierent characteristics. Therefore,
the participating automated negotiation agents should be capable of negotiating
prociently with opponents that are diverse in their behavior and negotiate in a
dierent manner.
The negotiation model behind ANAC is in line with our denitions in Section 2.2:
we consider bilateral negotiations using the alternating-oers protocol, in which
the utilities of the players are additive. The design of the competition was focused
on the development of negotiating strategies, rather than other aspects of the
254negotiation process (though not less important aspects) such as preference elicitation,
argumentation or mediation. The setup of ANAC was designed to make a balance
between several concerns, including:
 Strategic challenge: the game should present dicult negotiation domains in a
real{world setting with real{time deadlines.
 Multiplicity of issues on dierent domains, with a priori unknown opponent
preferences.
 Realism: realistic domains with varying opponent preferences.
 Clarity of rules, negotiation protocols, and agent implementation details.
B.2.1 Tournament Platform
As a tournament platform to run and analyze the negotiations, we use the Genius
environment3. Genius is a research tool for automated multi{issue negotiation, that
facilitates the design and evaluation of automated negotiators' strategies. It also
provides an easily accessible framework to develop negotiating agents via a public
API. This setup makes it straightforward to implement an agent and to focus on the
development of strategies that work in a general environment.
Each participating team has to design and build a negotiation agent using the Genius
framework. Genius incorporates several mechanisms that support the design of
a general automated negotiator for ANAC. The rst mechanism is an analytical
toolbox, which provides a variety of tools to analyze the performance of agents, the
outcome of the negotiation and its dynamics. The second mechanism is a repository
of scenarios. Lastly, it also comprises repositories of automated negotiators. In
addition, Genius enables the evaluation of dierent strategies used by automated
agents that were designed using the tool. This is an important contribution as it
allows researchers to empirically and objectively compare their agents with others in
dierent domains and settings.
As we mentioned in Section A.2, the Genius framework provides skeleton classes to
facilitate the design of negotiating agents. Other aspects of negotiation { specifying
information about the domain and preferences, sending messages between the nego-
tiators while obeying a specied negotiation protocol, declaring an agreement { is
handled by the negotiation environment. This allows the agent's designer to focus on
the implementation of the agent. The agent's designer only needs to implement an
agent interface provided by the Genius framework. In essence, the agent's developer
implements two methods: one for receiving a proposal, and one for making a proposal.
The rest of the interaction between the agents is controlled by Genius.
3See Appendix A and http://ii.tudelft.nl/genius
255Figure B.1: Setting up a tournament session for ANAC 2010 involves choosing a
protocol, the participating agents, and appropriate preference proles.
Genius is freely available to the ANAC participants and researchers to develop and
test their agent. Table B.1 gives an overview of the most important information that
was available to the agent through the API provided by Genius.
The exibility provided by the built{in general repository makes Genius an eective
tournament platform. The contestants of ANAC are able to upload their agent source
code (or even compiled code) to the ANAC organizers. The agents are then added to
the Genius repository. The ANAC agents and domains are bundled in the Genius
repository and released to the public after the tournament. Genius also provides a
uniform, standardized negotiation protocol and scoring system, as every developing
team implements the agent inside the same Genius environment.
Genius supports a number of dierent protocols, such as the alternating oers
protocol, one-to-many auctions, and many-to-many auctions. See Figure B.1 for an
overview of the types of tournaments that can be run.
The analytical toolbox of Genius (see Figure B.2) provides a method to evaluate
the negotiation strategies employed by the ANAC participants. The toolbox gives
valuable graphical information during the negotiation sessions, including: Pareto
optimal solutions, Nash product, Kalai-Smorodinsky. The negotiation logging system
gives insight into the agent's reasoning process and can help improve the agent code.
When a particular negotiation has nished, an entry is added to the tournament
overview, containing information about the number of rounds used, and both utilities
associated with the agreement that was reached by the agents. This information can
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Action chooseAction()
Enables the agent to oer a bid to the
opponent.
String getName()
Returns the name of the agent.
Timeline getTimeline()
Gets information about possible time con-
straints.
Double getUtility(Bid bid)
Computes the discounted utility of a bid,
given the current Timeline.
UtilitySpace getUtilitySpace()
Gets the preference prole of the agent.
receiveMessage(Action opponentAction)
Informs the agent about the opponent's
action.
Bid
Value getValue(Issue issue)
Returns the selected value of a given issue
in the current bid.
setValue(Issue issue, Value value)
Sets the value of an issue.
Domain
List<Issue> getIssues()
Gets all issues of the negotiation domain.
IssueDiscrete (implements Issue)
String getDescription()
Returns a short description of the issue.
String getName()
Returns the name of the issue.
List<ValueDiscrete> getValues()
Returns all values associated with this
issue.
Timeline
Double getElapsedSeconds()
Returns the seconds that have elapsed
since the start of the negotiation.
Double getTime()
Gets the normalized elapsed time in [0;1].
UtilitySpace
Double getDiscountFactor()
Gets the discount factor.
Double getReservationValue()
Gets the agent's reservation value.
Double getUtility(Bid bid)
Computes the utility of a given bid.
ValueDiscrete (implements Value)
String getValue()
Returns the text representation of this
value.
Table B.1: Highlighted functionality of the API available to the agent in order to
access information about the negotiation environment and its preferences.
257Figure B.2: A tournament session with the ANAC 2010 agents playing on the ANAC
2010 scenarios using the Genius interface.
be used to assess the optimality of the agreements reached, either for both agents, or
for each agent individually. The result of the analysis can help new agent designers
to improve their agents as they play against previous ANAC strategies.
B.2.2 Competition Scenarios
The competition is targeted towards modeling multi-issue negotiations in uncertain,
open environments, in which agents do not know the preferences of their opponent.
The various characteristics of a negotiation scenario such as size, number of issues,
opposition and discount factor can have a signicant inuence on the negotiation
outcome (see also Section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4). Due to the sensitivity to the negotiation
specics, negotiation strategies have to be assessed on negotiation domains of various
sizes and of various complexity [113].
Therefore, in order to ensure a good spread of negotiation characteristics, and to
reduce any possible bias on the part of the organizers, we gathered the domains
and proles from the participants in the competition.4 Specically, in addition to
submitting their agents, each participant submitted a scenario, consisting of both a
4For ANAC 2010, there was only one nal round, and the domains and preference proles used
during the competition were designed by the organizing team.
258domain and a pair of utility functions. We then use the scenarios submitted by the
participants to run the tournament.
In all years, the scenarios are unknown to the agents prior to the tournament
and the agents receive no information about their opponent's preferences during
the tournament. Because ANAC is aimed towards multi-issue negotiations under
uncertainty in open environments, we encourage participants to submit domains and
proles with a good spread of the relevant parameters, such as the number of issues,
the number of possible proposals and the opposition of the domain. Another degree
of uncertainty is the strategies used by the opponents. Thus, although it is possible
to learn from the agents and domains of previous years, successful agents submitted
to ANAC have to be exible and domain-independent.
The domains and utility functions used during the competition were not known in
advance and were designed by the participants themselves. Therefore, in a given
negotiation, an agent does not know the utility function of its opponent, apart from
that the fact that it is additive. In more detail, the participants have no prior
knowledge of the distribution over the function's parameters and, furthermore, they
do not even know the opponent's preference ordering over the values for an individual
issue. The pairs of utility functions which form a scenario are designed by the
participants (who also develop the agents), but the rules prohibit designing an agent
to detect a particular scenario (and therefore the opponent's utility function) based
on knowledge of such a pair of functions. Furthermore, the scenarios were changed
during the updating period so that the nalists would not benet from tuning their
strategies to the scenarios of the qualifying round.
We approach the overall design of ANAC to comply with the goals that were described
in Section B.1.
B.2.3 Running ANAC
Due to the constant evolving nature of ANAC, the specic ANAC setup and rules
are slightly dierent every year; however, in general, the timeline of ANAC consists
of three phases: the qualifying round, the updating period and the nal round. An
agent's success is measured according to the average utility achieved in all negotiations
of the tournament for which it is scheduled.
First, a qualifying round is played in order to select the best 8 agents from the agents
that are submitted by the participating teams. Since ANAC 2010, each participant
also submits a domain and pair of utility functions for that domain. All these
scenarios are used in the qualifying rounds. For each of these scenarios, negotiations
are carried out between all pairings of the agents. The 8 agents that achieve the best
average scores during qualifying are selected as participants for the nal round.
Our evaluation metric is dened as follows. Every agent A plays against all other
259agents, but A will not play itself. The score for A is averaged over all trials, alternating
between the two preference proles dened on every domain (see Section B.2.2). For
example, on the Itex vs. Cypress domain (Table C.3), A will play both as Itex and as
Cypress against all others. Note that these averages are taken over all negotiations,
excluding those in which both agents use the same strategy (i.e. excluding self-play).
Therefore, the average score U
(A) of agent A in scenario 
 is given formally by:
U
(A) =
P
B2P;A6=B U
(A;B)
(jPj   1)
(B.1)
where P is the set of players and U
(A;B) is the utility achieved by player A against
player B in scenario 
.
Note that with the exception of ANAC 20135, we only consider situations where the
player can perform this learning within a negotiation session and that any learning
cannot be used between dierent negotiation encounters. This is done so that agents
need to be designed to deal with unknown opponents. In order to prevent the agents
learning across instances, the competition is set up so that a new agent instance is
created for each negotiation. The rules prohibit the agents storing data on disk, and
they are prevented from communicating via the Internet.
Agents can be disqualied for violating the spirit of fair play. The competition
rules allowed multiple entries from a single institution but required each agent to
be developed independently. Furthermore it was prohibited to design an agent that
benets some other specic agent (c.f. the work on collusion in the Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma competitions in 2004 and 2005 [212]).
B.3 The ANAC Installments
Every year, new features are incorporated into the competition environment to
increase realism and to encourage the development of exible and practical negotiation
agents. After every ANAC, the participating teams have a closing discussion, yielding
valuable suggestions for improving the design of following ANAC competitions,
introducing small innovations every year. We shortly describe four years of ANAC,
with a focus on ANAC 2010 and 2011, since their results and resources are used most
often in this thesis. For more details, we refer to Appendix C{F.
B.3.1 ANAC 2010
ANAC started in 2010 as a joint project of the universities of Delft and Bar-Ilan and
had seven participating teams from ve dierent universities, as listed in Table C.1 of
5For ANAC 2013, we allowed partial learning across domains, as described in Section B.3.4
260Appendix C. It was held at the Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010) in Toronto, Canada, with presentations of
the participating teams and a closing discussion.
ANAC 2010 was the only instance of ANAC without a qualifying round and in which
the organizers selected the negotiation scenarios instead of the participants. Three
dierent scenarios were selected, which can be viewed in Table C.3 and are visually
depicted in Figure C.1.
The scores of every agent in ANAC 2010 are listed in Table C.2. Agent K won ANAC
2010 by a relatively large margin, yet it only managed to dominate on the Travel
domain. On both Itex vs. Cypress and England{Zimbabwe scenarios, it earned second
place after Nozomi and Yushu, respectively. However, Agent K won the competition
due to its consistent high scores in all domains. Only IAMhaggler managed to mirror
this consistent scoring on all three domains.
Note that for ANAC 2010 only, the nal scores are normalized per domain. The
utility is normalized for every prole, using the maximum and minimum utility
achieved by all other agents. This gives a score per prole, which is averaged over the
two proles in the domain to give an overall normalized domain score. The domain
score is then averaged over all trials and yields the nal score of the agents. Due to
the normalization of the scores, the lowest possible score is 0 and the highest is 1
for every domain. The fact that the maximum and minimum score are not always
achieved by ANAC 2010 agents is due to the non-deterministic behavior of the agents:
the top ranking agent on one domain does not always obtain the maximum score on
every trial.
Table B.2 gives a more detailed overview of the strategy of all agents. Note that
most of the agents are non-deterministic, which is relevant for the experiments in
this thesis since it introduces noise in the tournament results. To illustrate: during a
negotiation, Agent K may decide on a certain proposal target. But if it previously
received better oers B, then it will counteroer a random oer taken from B.
Otherwise, it will also select a random proposal; in this case it will choose any oer
that satises its proposal target. Most agents have a similar mechanism, which we
elaborate on in Chapter 3: when they are indierent between certain oers, they will
choose randomly.
All agents of ANAC 2010, except for IAMcrazyHaggler, make concessions when the
deadline approaches. Because a break-o yields zero utility for both agents, an agent
that waits until the end of the negotiation takes a substantial risk. The other agent
may not know that the deadline is approaching and may not concede fast enough. In
addition, either the acceptance of a proposal or the (acceptable) counter-oer may
be received when the game is already over. In the same manner, a real{time deadline
also makes it necessary to employ a mechanism for deciding when to accept an oer.
We study the inclination of the agents of ANAC to exhibit either risk averse or risk
seeking behavior in more detail in Chapter 8. In order to get a good picture of the
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Time
dependent Learning method
Acceptance
criteria Deterministic
Agent K Yes All proposals Time/Utility No
Yushu Yes Best proposals Time/Utility No
Nozomi No Match compromises Time/Utility No
IAMhaggler Yes Bayesian learning Utility No
FSEGA Yes Bayesian learning Utility Yes
IAMcrazyHaggler No None Utility No
Agent Smith Yes Learn weights Time/Utility Yes
Table B.2: Strategy details of the agents that participated in ANAC 2010. Listed
details are: (1) whether the strategies change their proposals according to the
remaining time; (2) what kind of learning method is used; (3) whether the agents
take the oer's utility or remaining time into account when accepting; (4) whether
the agents are deterministic.
Break-o percentage
Agent Itex-Cyp Eng-Zimb Travel Avg.
Agent K 22% 6% 63% 30%
Yushu 36% 0% 90% 42%
Nozomi 25% 17% 75% 39%
IAMhaggler 11% 0% 63% 25%
FSEGA 22% 0% 100% 41%
IAMcrazyHaggler 72% 23% 83% 59%
Agent Smith 0% 0% 98% 33%
Table B.3: Percentage of all failed negotiations of every agent per domain.
risk management of the agents, we consider here the number of break-os that occur
for every agent. Table B.3 lists for each agent the percentage of negotiations that
result in a break-o. All break-os occur due to the deadline being reached or an
occasional agent crash on a big domain.
The number of break-os in the Travel domain stands out compared to the other
domains. Recall that this is the biggest domain of ANAC 2010, with 188,160 possible
proposals. Most of the agents had problems dealing with this domain. With such
a large domain, it becomes unfeasible to enumerate all proposals or to work with
an elaborate opponent model. For example the FSEGA agent was unable to nish
a single negotiation. Only Agent K, Nozomi and IAM(crazy)Haggler were able to
eectively negotiate with each other on this domain, which resulted in less break-os
for them, hence their higher scores.
With respect to the number of break-os, IAMHaggler performs very well on all
domains, while IAMcrazyHaggler ranks as the worst of all agents. This is to be
262expected, as its proposal generating mechanism does not take into account the time or
the opponent (see Section C.1 for an overview of its strategy). There is an interesting
trade-o here: when IAMcrazyHaggler manages to reach an agreement, it always
scores a utility of at least 0.9, but most of the time it scores 0 because the opponent
will not budge.
The exact opposite of IAMcrazyHaggler is the strategy of Agent Smith. Because
of an implementation error, Agent Smith accepts any proposal after two minutes,
instead of three minutes. This explains why it did not have any break-os on Itex
vs. Cypress and England{Zimbabwe. The reason for the break-os on the Travel
domain is due to crashing of its opponent model. The importance of the timing
aspects is underlined by the performance of Agent Smith: a small timing error
resulted in very poor scoring on all three domains.
B.3.2 ANAC 2011
The local organization of ANAC 2011 was in the hands of the winner of 2010, Nagoya
Institute of Technology. Eighteen teams (as compared to seven in the rst competi-
tion) submitted negotiating agents to the tournament, which was held during the
Tenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2011) in Taipei, Taiwan. The teams came from seven dierent institutes
(University of Alcal a, Bar-Ilan University, Ben-Gurion University, Politehnica Uni-
versity of Bucharest, Delft University of Technology, Nagoya Institute of Technology,
and University of Southampton) and six dierent countries (Spain, Israel, Romania,
the Netherlands, Japan, and the United Kingdom).
In contrast to the rst competition, ANAC 2011 introduced a discount factor for
some of the scenarios, to incentivize the agents to have more interesting negotiations
with faster deals (see Section 2.2.3). Agents still needed to operate in both discounted
and undiscounted settings: the discount factor was disabled (i.e., equal to 1) for half
of the scenarios; for the other half, the discount factor was decided randomly.
In ANAC 2010, the agents had three minutes each to deliberate. This meant the
agents had to keep track of both their own time and the time the opponent had left.
For ANAC 2011 and onwards, we elected a simpler protocol where both agents have
a shared time-line of three minutes. This means that, if one agent causes a delay,
this will aect both agents equally, both in terms of the discounting and getting
closer to the deadline.
This time, the participants submitted one agent and one negotiation scenario. Eight
of these teams continued to the nals after undergoing a qualifying round (see
Table D.1 of Appendix D). The qualifying round consisted of the 18 agents that were
submitted to the competition. For each pair of agents, under each utility function, we
ran a total of 3 negotiations. By averaging over all the scores achieved by each agent
263(against all opponents and using all utility functions), eight nalists were selected
based on their average scores.
Between the rounds, we allow a number of weeks as an updating period, in which
the 8 selected nalists were given the chance to improve their agents for the nal
round. The detailed results and all scenarios for the qualifying round were revealed
to all nalists, and they could use this additional information to tune their agents.
Since there were 18 agents, which each negotiate against 17 other agents, in 18 dierent
domains, a single tournament in the qualifying round consists of 1817=2218 =
5508 negotiation sessions.6 To reduce the eect of variation in the results, the
tournament was repeated 3 times, leading to a total of 16;524 negotiation sessions,
each with a time limit of three minutes. In order to complete such an extensive set
of tournaments within a limited time frame, we used ve high-spec computers, made
available by Nagoya Institute of Technology. Specically, each of these machines
contained an Intel Core i7 CPU and at least 4GB of DDR3 memory. Allocating the
entire tournament took one month to run.
It is notable that Gahboninho was the clear winner of the qualifying round (see Table
D.1). As we discuss in Chapter 8, we believe its strong performance is partly due to
the learning approach it adopts, in an attempt to determine whether the opponent is
cooperative.
The tournament among 8 nalists was played on the 8 scenarios submitted by all
nalists (cf. Table D.3). The entire set of pairwise matches were played among
8 agents, and the nal ranking of ANAC 2011 was decided. We matched each
pair of nalists, under each utility function, a total of 30 times. In the nal, a
single tournament consists of 8  7=2  2  8 = 448 negotiation sessions. Table D.2
summarizes the means, standard deviations, and 95% condence interval bounds
for the results of each agent, taken over the 30 iterations.7 In common with the
approach used in the qualifying round, all agents use both of the proles that are
linked to a scenario. Note the small dierences of the scores of the agents in positions
4 to 7. Specically, there is no statistically signicant dierence between the utilities
achieved by Agent K2, The Negotiator, BRAMAgent, and the Nice Tit for Tat Agent.
The shape of the outcome space of each scenario is presented graphically in Fig-
ure D.1 and D.2. In more detail, very large scenarios, such as the Energy scenario,
are displayed with a large number of points representing the many possible agree-
ments, whereas smaller scenarios, such as Nice Or Die, have only very few points.
Furthermore, scenarios which have a high mean distance to the Pareto frontier, such
6The combinations of 18 agents are 18  17=2, however, agents play each domain against each
other twice (once for each prole).
7The standard deviations and condence intervals are calculated based on the variance of the
utilities across the 30 iterations of the tournament (after being averaged over all of the scenarios).
Therefore they only measure the variance across complete tournaments, which may be due to
intentional randomness within the agents' strategies or stochastic eects that are present in the
tournament setup.
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HardHeaded 0.571 0.669 0.749 0.724 0.870 0.811 0.958 0.637
Gahboninho 0.546 0.730 0.752 0.668 0.929 0.665 0.946 0.682
IAMhaggler2011 0.300 0.750 0.813 0.726 0.781 0.715 0.864 0.543
Agent K2 0.429 0.655 0.788 0.717 0.750 0.727 0.921 0.459
The Negotiator 0.320 0.651 0.757 0.733 0.791 0.742 0.930 0.519
BRAMAgent 0.571 0.631 0.747 0.725 0.792 0.739 0.803 0.432
Nice Tit for Tat Agent 0.425 0.668 0.772 0.753 0.739 0.774 0.786 0.509
ValueModelAgent 0.137 0.641 0.764 0.765 0.857 0.781 0.951 0.037
Table B.4: Detailed scores of every agent in each scenario in the nal round of ANAC
2011. Bold text is used to emphasize the best score achieved in each scenario.
as the Grocery and Camera scenarios, appear very scattered, whereas those with a
low mean distance, such as the Company Acquisition scenario, are much more tightly
clustered. The other 10 scenarios (which were eliminated along with their agents in
the qualifying round) contained broadly similar characteristics to those of the nal 8
scenarios. Therefore, since the nal 8 scenarios capture a good distribution of the
characteristics we would like to examine, we consider only these scenarios in the rest
of this thesis.
The average score achieved by each agent in each scenario is given in Table B.4,
and presented visually in Figure B.3. In the nals, HardHeaded proved to be the
winner,8 with a score of 0:749. Figure B.3 clearly shows that in most scenarios the
margin between the worst and the best agents was minimal. Specically, in 6 of
the 8 scenarios, the worst agent achieved no less than 80% of the best agent's score.
The remaining two scenarios that had a much greater range of results were also the
scenarios with the greatest opposition between the two utility functions. We see
that winning the competition does not require the agent to win in all or even most
scenarios. The results presented in Table B.4 and Figure B.3 show that the winning
HardHeaded agent did not win in the majority of the scenarios (it only did so in 3
out of 8). The runner-up, Gahboninho, had the highest utility in 2 of the scenarios
8There are a number of reasons why the winner in the nal round was dierent to the qualifying
round. Firstly, the set of scenarios used in the nal was smaller than in the qualifying round, and it
is possible that the nal scenarios were more favorable to the HardHeaded agent. Secondly, the set
of participating agents was smaller, and furthermore, due to the elimination of the lower scoring
agents, those agents that remain were more competitive. Finally, it is possible that the agents were
modied between the two rounds.
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Figure B.3: Scores of every agent in each scenario in the nal round of ANAC 2011.
in the nals. As long as an agent wins by a large margin in those scenarios where it
comes rst, it can win the entire competition. IAMhaggler2011 won the Company
Acquisition and Laptop scenarios where there is a low discount factor; therefore,
IAMhaggler2011 is well suited to cases where agreements need to be reached quickly.
Its high degree of adaptivity enables the agent to reach ecient agreements, even
in large domains, or in scenarios that are subject to considerable time discounting.
However, while IAMhaggler2011 performed well in general, this did not secure it a
winning position overall, nor in many of the specic scenarios. The Nice Tit for Tat
Agent performed rather poorly overall. The failure of this agent is due to its relative
cooperativeness, i.e. willingness to adapt to the opponent's demands. We come back
to this kind of reasoning in Chapter 8.
Interestingly, the results show no clear connection between the discount factor
and the diversity in performance. This could be due to the fact that the most
discounted scenarios (i.e. Laptop and Company Acquisition, which have the lowest
discount factor) also have weak opposition and small domains, meaning that win-win
agreements can be easily found. It would be interesting to apply the discount factor
to other types of scenarios as well (i.e., with larger domains and stronger opposition),
to see the impact of the discount factor in more challenging settings.
266B.3.3 ANAC 2012
For ANAC 2012, 17 teams entered from 8 dierent institutions from 5 countries
(China, Israel, Netherlands, Japan, United Kingdom); see Table E.1. The University
of Southampton was the local organizer of this tournament, which was co-located
with the Eleventh International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS 2012) in Valencia, Spain.
For the qualifying round, negotiations were carried out for every combination of the
17 participants on 18 negotiation scenarios (17 submitted this year, plus the Travel
domain from 2010). Each negotiation was repeated 10 times to establish statistical
signicance, which resulted in a total of 52020 negotiations.
In 2012, the competition introduced a private reservation value as part of the
tournament (see Section 2.2.3). When an agent failed to reach an agreement by
the deadline, or if one of the agents terminated the negotiation, both received their
reservation value instead of zero utility. The reservation value could be dierent
for each agent and for each negotiation scenario. Each agent only knew its own
reservation value, and not that of its opponent. The reservation value was discounted
in the same way that an agreement would be in ANAC 2011. This made it rational,
in certain circumstances, for an agent to terminate an agreement early, in order to
take the reservation value with a smaller loss due to discounting.
For the nal round, 8 agents were selected, together with 24 base scenarios (17
submitted this year, 5 from 2011, and 2 from 2010). There were 13 scenarios that
featured for the rst time in ANAC 2012, which are shown in Table E.3. The
number of issues varied between 1 and 8. The 17 domains that were used to run
the competition had anywhere between 3 and 390,625 possible outcomes. From
each base scenario, three new scenarios were generated with dierent values for the
discount factor (either 0.5, 0.75, or 1) and for reservation value (either 0, 0.25, or
0.5), resulting in 72 scenarios in total. The entire setup was again repeated 10 times
to establish statistical signicance, resulting in 46080 negotiations.
In this thesis, we do not study negotiation settings with reservation values other than
zero (except for Chapter 9 on optimal bidding strategies with unknown reservation
values). We do, however, employ agents and scenarios from ANAC 2012 throughout
this thesis. When we do, we remove the reservation values from the preference
specications to ensure compatibility with the ANAC 2010 and 2011 agents.
B.3.4 ANAC 2013
ANAC 2013 had 19 participating teams from 8 dierent institutions. The local
organizing committee responsible for ANAC 2013 was Ben Gurion University of the
Negev, and the tournament was held during the Twelfth International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013) in Saint Paul,
267Minnesota, USA. The qualication round was played on 11 domains that were
randomly selected from the submissions (see Table F.1). Each negotiation was
repeated 10 times to establish statistical signicance and to allow learning. Thus,
every pair of agents played 20 times in each domain, totaling 75240 negotiations.
The nals contained 7 agents, who were pitted on 18 dierent negotiation scenarios
(12 submitted this year, plus 6 from 2012), which led to a total of 15120 negotiations.
The ANAC 2013 domains contained between 1 and 7 issues, creating an outcome
space of 3 to 56,700 possible outcomes (see Table F.3 and Figure F.1, F.2).
In 2013, we allowed agents to save information during and after negotiation session,
and load it at the beginning of new session on the same domain and prole. Agents
could use this information to learn about and adapt to the negotiation domains over
time. As with the reservation values that were introduced in ANAC 2012, we do not
explore this further in this thesis.
B.4 Conclusion
We described the goals and results of four installments of the International Auto-
mated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC). The main purpose of ANAC is
to motivate research in the area of bilateral multi-issue negotiations, with an em-
phasis on the practical design and development of successful automated negotiating
agents. Additional goals include: collecting and objectively evaluating dierent
state-of-the-art negotiation strategies and opponent models, dening a wide variety
of benchmark negotiation scenarios, and making them available to the negotiation
research community.
Based on the submissions and the process of running the competition, as well as the
post-tournament analysis reported in this thesis, we believe that this competition
serves its purposes. The past competitions were successful events, enriching the
research eld on practical automated negotiation in line with the aims as set out
in Section B.1. In particular, the widespread availability of ecient, general and
domain-independent automated negotiators, which this tournament has achieved,
has the advantages of minimizing the eort required for adaptation of a general
automated negotiator to a new domain. Furthermore, the availability of the dierent
agents allows researchers to have an objective measure to assist them in validating
and testing the eectiveness of future automated negotiators.
One of the successes of ANAC lies in the development of state-of-the-art negotiation
strategies that co{evolve every year. The four incarnations of ANAC already yielded
more than 60 new strategies and scenarios which can be used as benchmarks to test
the ecacy of subsequent work in this area, and we expect the trend of increasing
participation to continue in the next years.
Not only can we learn from the strategy concepts introduced in ANAC, we also gain
268understanding in the correct setup of a negotiation competition, which in turn gives
great insights into the deciding factors in the success of a negotiation agent.
The development of Genius is crucial to the organization of ANAC and conversely,
ANAC also advances the development of Genius. Moreover, Genius has proved
itself as a valuable and extendable research and analysis tool for (post) tournament
analysis. The success of ANAC underlines the importance of a exible and versatile
negotiation simulation environment such as Genius. Genius has the ability to run
a wide range of dierent tournaments, an extensive repository of dierent agents
and domains, and it contains standardized protocols and a scoring system, thus
making it the perfect tournament platform for ANAC. Every year since 2010, we
release a new, public build of Genius9 containing all relevant aspects of ANAC. In
particular, this includes all domains, preference proles and agents that were used
in the competition, in addition to the proposed improvements that were decided
upon during the yearly discussions. Consequently, this makes it possible for the
negotiation research community to do a complete re-run of ANAC and to perform
subsequent in-depth analysis of other facets of negotiation encounters.
9http://ii.tudelft.nl/genius
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In the appendices C through F, we outline the main results of the four Automated
Negotiating Agents Competitions (ANAC) that we organized between 2010 and
2013. We mainly focus on the participants, scenarios and results of the nals of each
competition, with an emphasis on ANAC 2010 and 2011, since these are the results
and resources most often used in this thesis.
The rst installment of ANAC was in 2010 and was comprised of seven participating
teams from ve dierent universities, as listed in Table C.1.
The normalized domain scores of every agent in ANAC 2010 are listed in Table C.2.
The normalized domain score is obtained by averaging the score against the other
agents on multiple trials. All agents use both of the proles that are linked to a
domain. The nal score is listed in the last column, thus making Agent K the winner
of ANAC 2010.
Agent Aliation
IAMhaggler University of Southampton
IAMcrazyHaggler University of Southampton
Agent K Nagoya Institute of Technology
Nozomi Nagoya Institute of Technology
FSEGA Babes Bolyai University
Agent Smith Delft University of Technology
Yushu University of Massachusetts Amherst
Table C.1: Participating teams of ANAC 2010.
271Score per domain
Rank Agent Itex-Cyp Eng-Zimb Travel Avg.
1 Agent K 0.901 0.712 0.685 0.766
2 Yushu 0.662 1.000 0.250 0.637
3 Nozomi 0.929 0.351 0.516 0.599
4 IAMhaggler 0.668 0.551 0.500 0.573
5 FSEGA 0.722 0.406 0 0.376
6 IAMcrazyHaggler 0.097 0.397 0.431 0.308
7 Agent Smith 0.069 0.053 0 0.041
Table C.2: Final scores and domain scores of every ANAC 2010 agent.
C.1 Agents
We continue to report on the individual strategies of the ANAC 2010 agents, starting
with the winner. We compare the strategies by highlighting both common and
contrasting approaches taken in the general strategic design. We are concerned with
the following aspects of proposal strategies:
1. Proposal behavior.
For every agent, we give a brief overview of the basic decisions that comprise the
agents' inner proposal loop. We also describe the criteria for accepting an oer.
Either of the two can be decided in a deterministic or non-deterministic manner.
2. Learning.
In order to reach an advantageous negotiation agreement, it is benecial to
have as much information about the preference prole of an opponent as pos-
sible. If an agent can take into consideration the opponent's interests and
learn during their interactions, then their utility might increase [269]. Because
of the closed negotiation setting of ANAC, the negotiating parties exchange
only proposals, but they do not share any information about their prefer-
ences. To overcome this problem, a negotiating agent may try to obtain a
model of the preference prole of its opponent by means of learning. For the
participating agents, we are concerned how their strategies model the opponent.
3. Timing aspects.
There are substantial risks associated with delaying the submission of a proposal
at the end of the negotiation. These risks arise from unpredictable delays and
can cause proposals to be received when the game is already over. Agents can
try to estimate the length of their negotiation cycles to cope with these risks.
The agents can then concede in the nal phase of the negotiation, or place
272their proposals in some calculated amount of time before the end. We examine
whether the agents make any predictions on how many time is left and how
they use this information.
Agent K
The proposal mechanism of Agent K [131] works as follows: based on the previous
proposals of the opponent and the time that is left, it sets a so-called proposal
target (initially set to 1). If it already received an oer that matches at least the
utility of the proposal target, it will oer this proposal to improve the chances of
acceptance. Otherwise, it searches for random proposals that are at at least as good
as the proposal target. If no such proposals are found, the proposal target is slightly
lowered.
The agent has a sophisticated mechanism to accept an oer. It uses the mean and
variance of the utility of all received oers, and then tries to determine the best oer
it might receive in the future and sets its proposal target accordingly. It then accepts
or rejects the oer, based on the probability that a better oer might be proposed.
For more information and technical details on Agent K, see [131].
Yushu
Yushu [4] is a fairly simple agent that makes use of a target utility to make its next
oer. As a learning mechanism, it uses the ten best proposals made by the opponent,
called suggested proposals. It also makes an estimate of how many rounds are still left
for the negotiation. Combining this information, Yushu obtains the target utility. It
also keeps track of the acceptability-rate: the minimum utility it is willing to accept.
To set the acceptability-rate, Yushu rst nds the best possible utility that can be
obtained in the domain, and accepts no less than 96% of it. When the number of
estimated future rounds becomes short, this percentage is lowered to 92%.
The agent can only accept a proposal when the oered utility is above the target
utility or when the utility reaches the acceptability-rate. Provided that either of the
two is the case it accepts, when there are less than eight rounds left. When there is
more time, it will accept only if it cannot nd a suggested proposal with a better
utility. If a better suggested proposal is available, it will oer that instead.
Nozomi
The proposal strategy of Nozomi [131] starts with an oer of maximum utility. It
denes the gap between two parties as the dierences in utility of their last oers.
Depending on the gap and time that is left, it then chooses to make a certain proposal
273type, such as making a compromise, or staying put. Nozomi keeps track of the
compromises made, but the agent does not model the utility function of the opponent.
The agent splits the negotiation into four intervals around 50%, 80% and 90% of the
negotiation time. Based on previous oers, the gap between the two parties, and the
time that is left in the negotiation, it will choose whether to accept an oer or reject
it.
IAMHaggler and IAMcrazyHaggler
IAMhaggler and IAMcrazyHaggler (cf. [261]) are both implementations of a frame-
work called SouthamptonAgent, thus creating a lot of similarity between the two
agents. The SouthamptonAgent provides standard methods for handling oers,
proposing oers and keeping track of time. The framework is the only one that also
keeps track of the time that the opponent uses.
IAMcrazyHaggler is a very simple take-it-or-leave-it strategy: it will make random
proposals with a utility that is above a constant threshold, set to 0.9 (without
discount factors it is set to 0.95). The proposal is done without regard to time or
opponent moves.
IAMHaggler, on the other hand, is a fully edged negotiation strategy, which incor-
porates a model of the opponent using Bayesian learning. It starts with a proposal
of maximum utility and successively sets a target utility based on multiple factors,
such as: the utility oered by the opponent, the time left for both agents, and the
perceived opponent's prole, such as hardheadedness. Upon receiving an oer, it
analyzes the previous proposals of the opponent and adapts the hypotheses on the
opponent's utility function. With this opponent model, it tries to nd trade-os that
satisfy the target utility.
Let u be the utility of the last opponent's oer. Both agents accept an oer depending
on u, namely when either of the following three conditions is met:
1. When u is at least 98% of the utility of its own previous oer.
2. When u is at least 98% of a maximum aspiration constant. The default value
is 0.9, but if there are discount factors it is set to 0.85 for IAMcrazyHaggler to
make it reach an agreement sooner.
3. When u is at least 98% of the utility of its own upcoming oer.
Note that the three conditions only depend on the utility of the oer and not on the
available time.
274FSEGA
Similar to Nozomi, the FSEGA strategy [226] splits the negotiation into three intervals
of time and applies dierent sub-strategies to each interval:
1. The rst interval consists of the starting 85% of the negotiation time and is
mainly used to acquire the opponent's prole from the counter-oers.
2. In the next 10%, the proposal strategy still does not concede, but relaxes some
conditions for selecting the next proposal to improve the chances that the
opponent accepts. The agent makes only small concessions and still tries to
learn the opponent's prole.
3. In the nal 5%, FSEGA considers the time restrictions and employs a concession-
based strategy to select the next oer up to its reservation value.
In the rst phase of the negotiation, the accept mechanism will admit any opponent
oer that is 3% better than the utility of FSEGA's last proposal. It will also always
accept the best possible proposal. Otherwise, it selects a new proposal, but if the
previous opponent's oer is better than the upcoming proposal it will accept it
instead. After interval 1, it will also accept when it cannot nd a better proposal for
the opponent.
Agent Smith
Agent Smith [249] constructs an opponent model that represents the importance and
preference for all values of each issue. The agent starts by making a rst proposal of
maximum utility and subsequently concedes slowly towards the opponent.
The agent accepts an oer given the following circumstances. The agents' threshold
for acceptance slowly decreases over time. In the last 10 seconds of the negotiation
session, Agent Smith will propose the best proposal that the opponent already
proposed (even when the oer is very bad for itself). Since it previously proposed it,
it is likely for a rational opponent to accept this proposal. However, an error was
made in the implementation, resulting in the fact that the agent already shows this
behavior after two minutes instead of three. This explains the poor performance of
the agent in the competition.
C.2 Scenarios
Three scenarios were selected for ANAC 2010 by the organizers, which can be viewed
in Table C.3.
275Domain Size Issues Opposition Bid distribution
England{Zimbabwe 576 5 0.278 0.298
Itex vs. Cypress 180 4 0.431 0.222
Travel 188160 7 0.230 0.416
Table C.3: Details of all ANAC 2010 scenarios.
England{Zimbabwe
The rst scenario of ANAC 2010 is taken from [159, 165], which involves a case
where England and Zimbabwe are negotiating to reach an agreement in response to
the world's rst public health treaty: the World Health Organization's Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. The leaders of both countries must reach an
agreement on ve issues:
Funding amount The total amount to be deposited into a fund to aid countries
that are economically dependent on tobacco production. This issue has a negative
impact on the budget of England and a positive eect on the economy of Zimbabwe.
The possible values are no agreement, $10, $50 or $100 billion. Thus, this issue has
a total of four possible values.
Other aid programs The impact on other aid programs. If other aid programs
are reduced, then this will create economic diculties for Zimbabwe. Possible values
are:
1. No reduction;
2. Reduction equal to half of the fund;
3. Reduction equal to the whole size of the fund;
4. No agreement.
Thus, a total of four possible values are allowed for this issue.
Trade barriers Trade issues for both countries. Zimbabwe and England can use
trade barriers such as taris (taxes on imports) or they can abstain from restrictive
trade barriers to increase imports from the other party.
There is a trade-o in revenue of these policies: taris increases short-time revenue,
but can lead to higher consumers prices. Decreasing import is good for local industries
but it can decrease costumer welfare due to the increase in costumer costs. There are
actually two issues here: the trade barriers that either side decides to use. Zimbabwe's
possible values are divided between
2761. Reducing taris on imports;
2. Increasing taris on imports;
3. No agreement.
While England can choose between:
1. Reducing imports;
2. Increasing imports;
3. No agreement.
Thus, a total of three possible values are allowed for each of the two issues.
Creation of a forum A forum can be created to explore other arrangements for
health-issues. Zimbabwe would like to establish such a fund, to be able to apply to
other global health agreements in the future, while this would be costly for England.
The four possible values are:
1. Creation of a fund;
2. Creation of a committee that will discuss the creation of a fund;
3. Creation of a committee that will develop an agenda for future discussions;
4. No agreement.
Consequently, the domain has a total of 43  32 = 576 possible agreements. England
and Zimbabwe have contradictory preferences for the rst two issues, but the other
issues have options that are jointly preferred by both sides, making it a domain of
medium opposition.
Itex vs. Cypress
The second scenario of ANAC 2010 is taken from [137], which describes a buyer{seller
business negotiation for one commodity. It involves representatives of two companies:
Itex Manufacturing, a producer of bicycle components and Cypress Cycles, a builder
of bicycles. There are four issues that both sides have to discuss: the price of the
components, delivery times, payment arrangements, and terms for the return of
possibly defective parts. An example outcome would be:
($3.98, 45 days, payment upon delivery, 5% spoilage allowed):
The opposition is strong in this domain, as the manufacturer and consumer have
naturally opposing needs and requirements. Altogether, there are 180 potential oers
that contain all combinations of values for the four issues.
277Travel
The nal domain of ANAC 2010 has two persons negotiating to go on holiday to a
location. From a small travel recommendation system we obtained multiple real{life
proles of travelers. They can each list their preferences on seven properties of a
holiday destination: Atmosphere, Amusement, Culinary, Shopping, Culture, Sport,
and Environment.
These properties determine the seven issues to discuss, all with a fairly large amount of
choices. This leads to a big oers space of 188,160 possibilities. A sample negotiation
outcome reads:
(Hospitable, Nightlife and entertainment, International cuisine, Small boutiques, Art
galleries, Outdoor activities, Parks and gardens).
The opposition is weak in this domain, because traveling friends may have very
compatible interests. Still the challenge is to nd this optimal outcome in such a big
search space.
278(a) England{Zimbabwe (b) Itex vs. Cypress
(c) Travel
Figure C.1: Outcome spaces of all ANAC 2010 scenarios. The points represent all of
the outcomes that are possible in each scenario. The solid line is the Pareto frontier,
which connects all of the Pareto ecient outcomes.
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Eighteen teams from seven dierent institutes and six dierent countries submitted
negotiating agents to the 2011 tournament. The qualifying round results are the
average over all 18 scenarios, which were submitted by the participants. Eight of these
teams continued to the nals after undergoing a qualifying round (see Table D.1).
Table D.2 shows the scores of the 8 nalists of the tournament on the 8 scenarios
submitted by all nalists.
D.1 Agents
In this section, we provide, in alphabetical order, brief descriptions of the individual
strategies of the nalists of ANAC 2011 based on descriptions of the strategies
provided by the teams.
Agent K2
This agent is identical to Agent K [131], winner of the ANAC 2010 competition.
When creating a counter oer Agent K calculates a target utility Ut based on the
previous oers made by the opponent and the time that is still remaining in the
negotiation. Agent K then makes random bids above the target utility. If no such
bid can be found, the target utility is lowered to allow for more oers. The target
utility Ut at time t is calculated using the following formula:
Ut = 1   (1   Emax(t))  t
; (D.1)
where Emax(t) is the estimated maximum value the opponent will present in the
future based on the average and variance of previous bids, and  is a parameter
281Rank Score Agent Aliation
1 0.756 Gahboninho Bar-Ilan University
2 0.708 HardHeaded Delft University of Technology
3 0.706 ValueModelAgent Bar-Ilan University
4 0.702 Agent K2 Nagoya Institute of Technology
5 0.701 IAMhaggler2011 University of Southampton
6 0.690 BRAMAgent Ben-Gurion University
7 0.686 Nice Tit for Tat Agent Delft University of Technology
8 0.685 The Negotiator Delft University of Technology
9 0.678 GYRL Ben-Gurion University
10 0.671 WinnerAgent Ben-Gurion University
11 0.664 Chameleon University Politehnica
of Bucharest
12 0.648 SimpleAgentNew Ben-Gurion University
13 0.640 LYYAgent Bar-Ilan University
14 0.631 MrFriendly Delft University of Technology
15 0.625 AgentSmith Bar-Ilan University
16 0.623 IAMcrazyHaggler University of Southampton
17 0.601 DNAgent Universidad de Alcala
18 0.571 ShAgent Bar-Ilan University
Table D.1: Scores and aliation of every strategy in the qualifying round of ANAC
2011.
95% Condence
Interval
Rank Agent Strategy Mean
Standard
Deviation
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
1 HardHeaded 0.749 0.0096 0.745 0.752
2 Gahboninho 0.740 0.0052 0.738 0.742
3 IAMhaggler2011 0.686 0.0047 0.685 0.688
4* Agent K2 0.681 0.0047 0.679 0.683
5* The Negotiator 0.680 0.0043 0.679 0.682
6* BRAMAgent 0.680 0.0050 0.678 0.682
7* Nice Tit for Tat Agent 0.678 0.0076 0.675 0.681
8 ValueModelAgent 0.617 0.0069 0.614 0.619
Table D.2: Tournament results in the nal round of ANAC 2011.
282which controls the concession speed.
Agent K uses quite a sophisticated acceptance mechanism, where it will use the
average and variations of the previous bid utilities presented by the opponent to
determine the best possible bid it can expect in the future. It will either accept or
reject the oer based on the probability that the opponent will present a better oer
in the future. If it has already received an oer from the opponent with the same
utility or higher, it will oer that bid instead.
BRAMAgent
This agent uses opponent modeling in an attempt to propose oers which are likely
to be accepted by the opponent. Specically, its model of the opponent stores
the frequency with which each value of each issue is proposed. This information is
maintained only over the 10 most recent oers received from the opponent. Therefore,
the rst 10 oers BRAMAgent makes will be its preferred bid (the one which
maximizes its utility), while it gathers initial data for its opponent model.
It also uses a time-dependent concession approach, which sets a threshold at a given
time. In each turn, BRAMAgent tries to create a bid that contains as many of the
opponent's preferred values as possible (according to its opponent model), with a
utility greater than or equal to the current threshold. If BRAMAgent fails to create
such a bid, a bid will be selected from a list of bids that was created at the beginning
of the session. This list contains all of the possible bids in the scenario (or all the
bids it managed to create in 2 seconds), sorted in descending order according to the
utility values. BRAMAgent chooses randomly a bid that is nearby the previous bid
that was made from that list.
BRAMAgent will accept any oer with utility greater than its threshold. The
threshold, which aects both acceptance and proposal levels, varies according to
time. Specically, the threshold levels are set as pre-dened, xed percentages of the
maximum utility that can be achieved (0-60 seconds: 93% of the maximum utility,
60-150 seconds: 85%, 150-175 seconds: 70%, 175-180 seconds: 20%).
Gahboninho
This agent uses a meta-learning strategy that rst tries to determine whether the
opponent is trying to learn from its own concessions, and then exploits this behavior.
Thus, during the rst few bids, Gahboninho steadily concedes to a utility of 0:9 in
an attempt to determine whether or not the opponent is trying to prole the agent.
At the same time, the agent tries to assert selshness and evaluate whether or not
the opponent is cooperative. The degree of the opponent's selshness is estimated
based on the opponent's proposals. Then, the more the opponent concedes, the more
competitive Gahboninho's strategy becomes. The opponent's willingness to concede
283is estimated based on the size of variance of the opponent's proposals. After this
phase, if the opponent is deemed concessive or adaptive, the agent takes a selsh
approach, giving up almost no utility. However, if the opponent asserts even more
hard-headedness, it adapts itself to minimize losses, otherwise it risks breakdown in
the negotiation (which has very low utility for both parties). In generating the bids,
the agent calculates its target, Ut at time t as follows:
Ut = Umax   (Umax   Umin)  t (D.2)
where Umax and Umin are the maximum and minimum utilities (respectively) in the
opponent's bidding history. Umax depends on the opponent's selshness and the
discount factor. Unlike many of the other agents, rather than using a model of the
opponent to determine the oer to propose at a given utility level, Gahboninho uses
a random search approach. Specically, the agent proposes a random oer above
the target utility T(t). The benet of this approach is that it is fast, therefore,
given the format of the competition, a very large number of oers can be exchanged,
allowing greater search of the outcome space. Moreover, the agent suggests using
the opponent's best bid if the time is almost up.
HardHeaded
In each negotiation round, HardHeaded considers a set of bids within a pre-dened
utility range which is adjusted over time by a pre-specied, monotonically decreasing
function. A model of the opponent's utility function is constructed by analyzing the
frequency of the values of the issues in every bid received from the opponent. From a
set of bids with approximately equal utility for the agent itself, the opponent model
is used to suggest bids that are best to the opponent in order to increase chances of
reaching an agreement in a shorter period of time.
The concession function species an increasing rate of concession (i.e. decreasing
utility) for the utility of the agent's bids. The function has non-monotonic curvature
with one inection point, determined by the discount factor of the scenario. This
function is determined by tuning the strategy based on the sample scenarios and data
made available before the competition. For the scenarios with time discounting, the
timeline is split into two phases over which the agent practices dierent strategies: it
starts by using a Boulware strategy, and after a certain amount of time has passed
(depending on the discount factor), it switches to a Conceder strategy [82].
IAMhaggler2011
This agent uses a Gaussian process regression technique to predict the opponent's
behavior [260]. It then uses this estimate, along with the uncertainty values provided
by the Gaussian process, in order to optimally choose its concession strategy. In so
284doing, the concession strategy considers both the opponent's behavior and the time
constraints.
The concession strategy is then used to determine the target utility at a given time. In
the concession strategy, the agent nds the time, t, at which the expected discounted
utility of the opponent's oer is maximized. In addition, it nds the utility level,
u, at which the expected discounted utility of our oer is maximized. The agent
then concedes towards [t;u], whilst regularly repeating the Gaussian process and
maximizations.
Finally, having chosen a target, the agent proposes an oer which has a utility close
to that target. In choosing the bids, IAMhaggler2011 uses an approach similar to
that of Gahboninho. Specically, a random package, with utility close to the target
is selected according to the concession strategy. This strategy is a fast process, which
allows many oers to be made and encourages the exploration of outcome space.
Nice Tit for Tat Agent
This agent plays a tit-for-tat strategy with respect to its own utility. The agent will
initially cooperate, then respond in kind to the opponent's previous action, while
aiming for the Nash point in the scenario. If the opponent's bid improves its utility,
then the agent concedes accordingly. The agent is nice in the sense that it does not
retaliate. Therefore, when the opponent makes an oer which reduces the agent's
utility, the Nice Tit for Tat Agent assumes the opponent made a mistake and does
nothing, waiting for a better bid. This approach is based on [106]. Nice Tit for Tat
Agent maintains a Bayesian model [112] of its opponent, updated after each move by
the opponent. This model is used to try to identify Pareto optimal bids in order to
be able to respond to a concession by the opponent with a nice move. The agent will
try to mirror the opponent's concession in accordance with its own utility function.
The agent detects very cooperative scenarios to aim for slightly more than Nash
utility. Also, if the domain is large, if the discount factor is high, or if time is
running out, the agent will make larger concessions towards its bid target. The agent
tries to optimize the opponent's utility by making a number of dierent bids with
approximately this bid target utility.
The Negotiator
Unlike the other nalist agents, this agent does not model the opponent. Its behavior
depends on the mode it is using, which can be either: Discount or NoDiscount.
A negotiation starts with the agent using its NoDiscount mode, which results in
hardheaded behavior. After a predetermined time period, the agent switches to its
Discount mode, in which its behavior becomes more concessive.
285The main dierence between the dierent modes is in the speed of descent of the
minimum threshold for acceptance and oering. In the NoDiscount mode, most
time is spent on the higher range of utilities and only in the last seconds are the
remaining bids visited. The Discount mode treats all bids equally and tries to
visit them all. An opponent's oer is accepted if it is above the current minimum
threshold. An oer should also satisfy the minimum threshold, however a dynamic
upper-bound is used to limit the available bids to oer in a turn. In 30% of the cases
this upper-bound is ignored to revisit old bids, which can result in acceptance in
later phases of the negotiation.
Finally, The Negotiator attempts to estimate the number of remaining moves to
ensure that it always accepts before the negotiation deadline.
ValueModelAgent
This agent uses temporal dierence reinforcement learning to predict the opponent's
utility function. The particular learning technique is focused on nding the amount
of utility lost by the opponent for each value. However, as the bid (expected) utilities
represent the decrease in all issues, a method is needed to decide which values should
change the most. To achieve this, the agent uses estimations of standard deviation
and reliability of a value to decide how to make the split. The reliability is also used
to decide the learning factor of the individual learning. The agent uses a symmetric
lower-bound to approximate the opponent's concession (if the opponent makes 100
dierent bids, and the 100th bid is worth 0.94, it is assumed the opponent conceded
at least 6%). These parameters were determined in advance, based on average
performance across a set of scenarios available for testing before the competition.
In more detail, ValueModelAgent starts by making bids which lie in the top 2% of
the outcome space. It severely limits the concession in the rst 80% of the timeline.
If there is a large discount, the agent compromises only as much as its prediction
of the opponent's compromise. If there is no discount, the agent does not concede
as long as the opponent is compromising. If the opponent stops moving, the agent
compromises up to two thirds of the opponent's approximated compromise. As the
deadline approaches (80%-90% of the time has elapsed), the agent compromises up
to 50% of the dierence, providing that the opponent is still not compromising. Once
90% of the time has elapsed, the agent sleeps and makes the \nal oer", if the
opponent returns oers the agent sends the best oer that has been received from
the opponent (accepting his last oer only if its close enough). ValueModelAgent
has a xed lower limit on its acceptance threshold, of 0.7. Therefore it never accepts
an oer with an undiscounted utility lower than this value.
286Domain Size Issues
Discount
Factor Opposition
Bid
distribution
Amsterdam 3024 6 1.000 0.223 0.254
Camera 3600 6 0.891 0.252 0.448
Car 15625 6 1.000 0.095 0.136
Energy 390625 8 1.000 0.448 0.149
Grocery 1600 5 0.806 0.191 0.492
Company Acquisition 384 5 0.688 0.125 0.121
Laptop 27 3 0.424 0.178 0.295
Nice Or Die 3 1 1.000 0.991 0.000
Table D.3: Details of the ANAC 2011 scenarios.
D.2 Scenarios
The properties of the 8 scenarios submitted by the nalists of ANAC 2011 are listed
in Table D.3, and the shape of the outcome space of each scenario is presented
graphically in Figure D.1 and D.2.
Nice Or Die
This scenario is the smallest used in the ANAC 2011 competition, with agents having
to select between only 3 possible agreement points: a fair division point (nice), which
is less ecient (in the sense that the sum of the agent's utilities is smaller) or one
of two selsh points (die). The scenario is symmetric, in that neither player has an
advantage over the other. The fair division point allows each player to achieve the
same, relatively low score, while the other two selsh points allow one agent to get a
high utility while its opponent achieves a very low one. As a result, the scenario has
strong opposition between the participants. This means that if both agents try to
get high utilities, it is hard for them to reach agreements. However, if agents would
like to make an agreement in this scenario, the social welfare is small (as the agents
cannot learn from previous interactions with an opponent).
Laptop
In this scenario, a seller and a buyer are negotiating the specications of a laptop.
An agreement in the negotiation reconciles their dierences and results in a purchase.
The scenario has three issues: the laptop brand, the size of the hard disk, and the
size of the external monitor. Each issue has only three options, making it a very
small scenario with only 27 possible outcomes. Unbeknownst to each other, the
buyer and seller actually both prefer to buy (and sell, respectively) a laptop with a
287(a) Amsterdam (b) Camera
(c) Car (d) Energy
Figure D.1: Outcome spaces of ANAC 2011 scenarios (a)-(d).
288(e) Grocery (f) Company Acquisition
(g) Laptop (h) Nice Or Die
Figure D.2: Outcome spaces of ANAC 2011 scenarios (e)-(h).
289small screen. The buyer prefers this because it is cheaper, and the seller prefers to
sell laptops with small screens because s/he has more of those in stock. If the two
parties are able to nd the outcomes that are mutually benecial to both, then they
are happy to do business together with high utility scores on both sides.
Company Acquisition
This scenario represents a negotiation between two companies, in which the man-
agement of Intelligent Solutions Inc. (IS) wants to acquire the BI-Tech company
(BT). The negotiation includes ve issues: the price that IS pays for BI Tech, the
transfer of intellectual property, the stocks given to the BI-Tech founders, the terms
of the employees' contracts and the legal liability of Intelligent Solutions Inc. Each
company wants to be the owner of the intellectual property. For IS, this issue is much
more important. IS and BI-Tech have common interest that the BI-Tech co-founders
would get jobs in IS. IS prefers to give BI-Tech only 2% of the stocks, while the
BI-Tech co-founders want 5%. IS prefer private contracts, while ring workers is
less desirable by them. BI-Tech prefers a 15% salary raise. For both sides this is
not the most important issue in the negotiation. Each side prefers the least legal
liability possible. In this case, the utility range is narrow and has high utility values
such that all outcomes give both participants a utility of at least 0.5. The scenario is
relatively small, with 384 possible outcomes.
Grocery
This scenario models a discussion in a local supermarket. The negotiation is between
two people living together who have dierent tastes. The discussion is about ve
types of product: bread, fruit, snacks, spreads, and vegetables. Each category consists
of four or ve products, resulting in a medium sized scenario with 1,600 possible
outcomes. For their daily routine it is essential that a product of each type is present
in their nal selection, however only one product can be selected for each type.
Besides their dierence in taste, they also dier in what category of product they
nd more important. The proles for agents Mary and Sam are modeled in such a
way that a good outcome is achievable for both. Sam has a slight advantage, since
he is easier to satisfy than Mary, and therefore is likely to have better outcomes.
This scenario allows outcomes that are mutually benecial, but the outcome space is
scattered so agents must explore it considerably to nd the jointly protable ones.
Amsterdam
This scenario concerns the planning of a tourist trip to Amsterdam and includes
issues representing the day and time of travel, the duration of the trip, the type of
290venues to be visited, the means of transportation and the souvenirs to buy. This
scenario is moderately large as the utility space has 3,024 possible bid congurations.
The utility functions specify a generous win-win scenario, since it would be unrealistic
for two friends to make a trip to Amsterdam and to have it be a zero-sum game. The
size of the scenario enables the agent to communicate their preferences (by means of
generating bids), without having to concede far. The size also puts agents which use
a random method of generating bids at a disadvantage, since the odds of randomly
selecting a Pareto optimal bid in a large scenario are small. So this scenario will
give an advantage to agents that make some attempt to learn the opponents' utility
function, and those capable of rapidly choosing oers.
Camera
This scenario is another retail based one, which represents the negotiation between a
buyer and a seller of a camera. It has six issues: maker, body, lens, tripod, bags, and
accessories. The size of this scenario is 3,600 outcomes. The seller gives priority to
the maker, and the buyer gives priority to the lens. The opposition in this negotiation
scenario is medium. The range of the contract space is wide, which means the agents
need to explore it to nd the jointly protable outcomes. While jointly protable
outcomes are possible (since the Pareto frontier is concave) [202], no party has an
undue advantage in this (since the Nash point is at an impartial position).
Car
This scenario represents a situation in which a car dealer negotiates with a potential
buyer. There are 6 negotiation issues, which represent the features of the car (such as
CD player, extra speakers and air conditioning) and each issue takes one of 5 values
(good, fairly good, standard, meager, none), creating 15,625 possible agreements.
Although the best bids of the scenario are worth zero for the opponent, this scenario
is far from a zero-sum game. For example, agents can make agreements in which one
of them can get close to the maximum possible utility, if it persuades its opponent
to accept a utility only slightly below this. The scenario also allows agents to
compromise to a fair division point in which both agents achieve a utility very close
to the maximum possible. Consequently, the scenario has very weak opposition
between the two participants.
Energy
This scenario considers the problem faced by many electricity companies to reduce
electricity consumption during peak times, which requires costly resources to be
available and puts a high pressure on local electricity grids. The application scenario
291is modeled as follows. One agent represents the electricity distribution company
whilst the other represents a large consumer. The issues they are negotiating over
represent how much the consumer is willing to reduce its consumption over a number
of time slots for a day-ahead market (the 24 hours in a day are discretized into
3 hourly time slots). For each issue, there is a demand reduction level possible
from zero up to a maximum possible (specically, 100 kW). In this scenario, the
distributor obtains utility by encouraging consumers to reduce their consumptions.
Participants set their energy consumption (in kWh) for each of 8 time slots. In
each slot, they can reduce their consumption by 0, 25, 50, 75 or 100 kWh. This
scenario is the largest in the 2011 competition (390,625 possible agreements) and has
highly opposing utility functions, therefore, reaching mutually benecial agreements
requires extensive exploration of the outcome space by the negotiating agents.
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ANAC 2012
For ANAC 2012, 17 teams entered from 8 dierent institutions from 5 countries. For
the qualifying round, negotiations were carried out for every combination of the 17
participants on 18 negotiation scenarios (17 submitted this year, plus the Travel
domain from 2010); see Table E.1.
For the nal round, 8 agents were selected, together with 24 base scenarios (17
submitted this year, 5 from 2011, and 2 from 2010). The results of the nal round
are shown in Table E.2.
E.1 Scenarios
There were 13 scenarios that featured for the rst time in ANAC 2012, which are
shown in Table E.3.
293Rank Score Agent Aliation
1-2 0.597 CUHK Agent The Chinese University
of Hong Kong
1-2 0.590 OMAC Agent Maastricht University
3-5 0.572 The Negotiator Reloaded Delft University of Technology
3-7 0.568 BRAMAgent2 Ben-Gurion University
3-7 0.565 Meta-Agent Ben-Gurion University
4-7 0.564 IAMhaggler2012 University of Southampton
4-8 0.563 AgentMR Nagoya Institute of Technology
8-10 0.550 AgentLG Bar-Ilan University
7-9 0.556 IAMcrazyHaggler2012 University of Southampton
9-11 0.547 Agent Linear Nagoya Institute of Technology
10-11 0.542 Rumba Bar-Ilan University
12 0.521 Dread Pirate Roberts Delft University of Technology
13-14 0.469 AgentX Delft University of Technology
13-14 0.465 AgentI Nagoya Institute of Technology
15-16 0.455 AgentNS Nagoya Institute of Technology
15-16 0.447 AgentMZ Nagoya Institute of Technology
17 0.394 AgentYTY Shizuoka University
Table E.1: Scores and aliation of every strategy in the qualifying round of ANAC
2012.
Rank Agent Score Variance
1 CUHK Agent 0.626 0.000003
2 AgentLG 0.622 0.000003
3-4 OMAC Agent 0.618 0.000002
3-4 The Negotiator Reloaded 0.617 0.000002
5 BRAMAgent2 0.593 0.000002
6 Meta-Agent 0.586 0.000003
7 IAMhaggler2012 0.535 0.000001
8 AgentMR 0.328 0.000003
Table E.2: Final ranking of every strategy in ANAC 2012.
294(a) Airport Site Selection (b) Barbecue
(c) Barter (d) Energy Small
(e) Fifty-Fifty (f) Fitness
Figure E.1: Outcome spaces of ANAC 2012 scenarios (a)-(f).
295(g) Flight Booking (h) House Keeping
(i) Music Collection (j) Outt
(k) Phone (l) Rental House
Figure E.2: Outcome spaces of ANAC 2012 scenarios (g)-(l).
296(m) Supermarket
Figure E.3: The Supermarket outcome space of ANAC 2012.
297Domain Size Issues Opposition Bid distribution
Airport Site Selection 420 3 0.296 0.361
Barbecue 1440 5 0.248 0.277
Barter 80 3 0.492 0.036
Energy Small 15625 6 0.432 0.217
Fifty-Fifty 11 1 0.707 0.000
Fitness 3520 5 0.275 0.283
Flight Booking 48 3 0.326 0.166
House Keeping 384 5 0.281 0.239
Music Collection 4320 6 0.158 0.343
Outt 128 4 0.198 0.327
Phone 1600 5 0.194 0.490
Rental House 60 4 0.327 0.096
Supermarket 112896 6 0.347 0.347
Table E.3: Details of the ANAC 2012 scenarios.
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ANAC 2013
ANAC 2013 had 19 participating teams from 8 dierent institutions (see Table F.1).
The qualication round was played on 11 domains that were randomly selected from
the submissions.
The nals contained 7 agents, who were pitted on 18 dierent negotiation scenarios
(12 submitted this year, plus 6 from 2012). The results of the nal round are shown
in Table F.2.
Note that we won rst place in the ANAC 2013 competition with The Fawkes, an
agent that used the BOA architecture to combine several components that were
known to be eective at the time.1 The bidding strategy and opponent modeling
component are based on the OMAC Agent [54] from ANAC 2012. To improve the
bidding strategy, the agent was designed to be more generous as the time passes
instead of using a xed target utility range. For the acceptance mechanism, we
selected a version of ACcombi(T;AVG
W), which is shown to be among the most
eective acceptance mechanisms in Chapter 4.
F.1 Scenarios
The ANAC 2013 domains contained between 1 and 7 issues, creating an outcome
space of 3 to 56,700 possible outcomes (see Table F.3).
1This means some of our later insights were not used in its design, such as our results on optimal
stopping (Chapter 5) and optimal bidding (Chapter 9).
299Rank Score Agent Aliation
1 0.562 Agent KF Tokyo University of
Agriculture and Technology
2-3 0.522 The Fawkes Delft University of Technology
2-4 0.516 TMF Agent Ben-Gurion University
3-4 0.495 Meta-Agent Ben-Gurion University
5-8 0.457 G-Agent Nagoya institute of technology
5-8 0.455 Inox Agent Delft University of Technology
5-11 0.447 Slava Agent Bar-Ilan University
5-11 0.446 VAStockMarketAgent Ben-Gurion University
7-11 0.432 RoOAgent Shizuoka University
7-11 0.431 Agent Talex Ben-Gurion University
7-11 0.43 AgentMRK2 Nagoya Institute of Technology
12-14 0.387 Elizabeth Nagoya Institute of Technology
12-15 0.374 ReuthLiron Ben-Gurion University
12-15 0.373 BOA Constrictor Delft University of Technology
13-18 0.359 Pelican Nagoya Institute of Technology
15-18 0.35 Oriel Einat Agent Ben-Gurion University
15-18 0.345 Master Qiao Maastricht University
15-18 0.338 E Agent Nagoya Institute of Technology
19 0.315 Clear Agent Bar-Ilan University
Table F.1: Scores and aliation of every strategy in the qualifying round of ANAC
2013.
Rank Agent Score Variance
1 The Fawkes 0.606434 0.000011
2 Meta-Agent 0.600209 0.000083
3 TMF Agent 0.583094 0.000012
4-5 Inox Agent 0.568215 0.000069
4-5 G-Agent 0.564908 0.000055
6 Agent KF 0.534514 0.000147
7 Slava Agent 0.484973 0.000023
Table F.2: Final ranking of every strategy in ANAC 2013.
300(a) Animal (b) Coee
(c) Defensive Charms (d) Dog Choosing
(e) Ice Cream (f) Kitchen
Figure F.1: Outcome spaces of ANAC 2013 scenarios (a)-(f).
301(g) Lunch (h) Planes
(i) Smart Phone (j) Ultimatum
(k) Wholesaler
Figure F.2: Outcome spaces of ANAC 2013 scenarios (g)-(k).
302Domain Size Issues Opposition Bid distribution
Animal 1152 5 0.110 0.429
Coee 112 3 0.486 0.145
Defensive Charms 36 3 0.322 0.165
Dog Choosing 270 5 0.051 0.471
Ice Cream 720 4 0.148 0.328
Kitchen 15625 6 0.063 0.071
Lunch 3840 6 0.420 0.196
Planes 27 3 0.165 0.311
Smart Phone 12000 6 0.237 0.512
Ultimatum 9 2 0.545 0.123
Wholesaler 56700 7 0.308 0.394
Table F.3: Details of the ANAC 2013 scenarios.
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